

“The World We Want”?

The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals, and Interests in Canadian Foreign Policy

Kim Richard Nossal

“The world we want,” Bill Graham, Canada’s minister of foreign affairs, told a Toronto audience in November 2002, “is much like the Canada we want: a sustainable future of shared security and prosperity; of tolerance and respect for diversity; of democracy and the realization of human rights; of opportunity and equal justice for all.”¹ As a set of objectives for any country’s foreign policy, this constituted an expansive vision. But Graham’s statement attracted little comment: after almost a decade of being told by their government that one of the primary aims of Canadian foreign policy was to project “Canadian values” abroad, Canadians, it would seem, had grown so accustomed to the idea that they no longer questioned it—much less considered that such a vision of foreign policy might be deeply flawed, or might fly in the face of decades of a particular “Canadian way” of seeing the world and Canada’s place in it.

¹ Bill Graham, speech to the International Press Freedom Awards, Toronto, 13 November 2002, quoted in Steve Lee, “Canadian Values in Canadian Foreign Policy,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 10:1 (Fall 2002), 1.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the government's "values-projection" project in Canadian foreign policy. It looks at the origin of the project—the 1995 Government Statement on foreign policy that enshrined this objective as one of Canada's foreign policy goals—and some of the key pronouncements made since then. The paper concludes by questioning the wisdom of embracing such an objective, arguing that the propagation of Canadian values involves a marked departure from traditional Canadian approach to world affairs, an "un-Canadian" policy by a Liberal government that is at odds with Canada's traditionally liberal approach to global politics.

The Projection Abroad of "Canadian Values"

Like all reviews of Canadian foreign policy since the late 1960s, the review of foreign policy undertaken by new Liberal government of Jean Chrétien in 1994 produced a statement of the broad objectives of Canadian foreign policy. The government statement, entitled *Canada in the World*, published in 1995, remained the formal defining foreign policy statement throughout the Chrétien government's tenure. According to *Canada in the World*, three broad objectives: the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of Canadian security, within a stable global order; and the projection of Canadian values and culture.²

The first two of these foreign policy objectives—the pursuit of wealth and security—were entirely unremarkable. These are about as close as one can get to universal goals in foreign policy: embraced by all political communities at all times. Indeed, in one of the first explorations of international relations, written almost 2500 years ago, the Greek historian Thucydides had the Athenians remind their friends and foes alike that they were hardly exceptional: their foreign relations were impelled by the "very powerful motives" of security and self-interest.³ In the eons since, governments and peoples have demonstrated by their behaviour and their attitudes that these two objectives are, as Thucydides claimed,

² Canada, *Canada in the World: Government Statement* (Ottawa, 1995).

³ Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), 80.

very powerful political motives. Certainly the formal statements about Canada's foreign policy aims that had preceded *Canada in the World*—the Green Paper issued by the government of Brian Mulroney in 1986, entitled *Competitiveness and Security*, and the paper on foreign policy issued by the government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1970, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*—had highlighted the search for wealth and security as key foreign policy goals for Canada.⁴

But in embracing the projections of values as one of the fundamental goals of foreign policy, the Chrétien government introduced a radically new departure in Canadian foreign policy. The Statement asserted that the government had received a “clear message” from the Canadian public during the consultations it had held as part of the review: “Canadians are confident in their values and in the contribution these values make to the international community... Canadians wish these values reflected and advanced internationally.”⁵ Moreover, the Statement asserted that Canadians “want to promote [Canadian values] for their own sake, but they also understand that our values and rights will not be safeguarded if they are not enshrined throughout the international environment.”⁶

What “Canadian values” were these? In 1995, the values listed included “respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the environment.”⁷ Each of these values was to be projected internationally and reflected in Canadian foreign policy.

First, universal respect for human rights, the Statement asserted, is a “fundamental value” that is “a crucial element in the development of stable, democratic and prosperous societies at peace with each other.”⁸

⁴ See Canada, Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Competitiveness and Security* (Ottawa, 1986); Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (Ottawa, 1970). For an excellent examination of Canadian foreign policy reviews from the perspective of an insider, David M. Malone, “Foreign Policy Reviews Reconsidered,” *International Journal* 56:4 (Autumn 2001), 576–577.

⁵ *Canada in the World*, 10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

Second, democracy was deemed crucial for the achievement of both stability and prosperity: “Democratic tradition has been fundamental to Canadian values and underpins our prosperity. We believe that **participatory democracy** should be allowed to work for others as well.”⁹ But this was not just about elections. Rather, “Canadian values” included the development of a “democratic culture—one that is pluralistic and participatory, that allows for the expression of diverse views and that offers its members the opportunities and resources to participate in the life of their community and country.”¹⁰

Third, the Government Statement asserted that “Canadian values” included the idea that the international system must be ruled by law, not power. The rule of law—“the essence of civilized behaviour both within and between nations”—was seen as crucial not only for the ability of nations to plan, but, more importantly, as a way to redress the imbalances of power that are so much a part of global politics. As the Statement put it, “agreed rules help to diminish the capacity of those with the greatest raw influence to bend society—and the international community—to their own ends.”¹¹

Finally, the Statement asserted that sustainable development had become “a central component of the Canadian value system,” and thus “we will ensure that Canadian foreign policy promotes sustainable development globally through the careful and responsible balancing of trade, development and environmental considerations.”¹²

In the years since 1995, Canadian government officials, both elected and non-elected, have reiterated these themes in different forms, often re-articulating or refining them, but always remaining “on message.” Lloyd Axworthy, who was appointed foreign minister in 1996, became the idea’s main

⁹ Ibid., 35; bold in original.

¹⁰ Ibid., 36.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 36-37.

booster, seeking to put into practice the projection of these values with such zeal that two scholars were prompted to dub his approach to foreign policy “pulpit diplomacy.”¹³

The values-projection project survived Axworthy’s retirement from politics in 2000 and the radical shifts in global politics that occurred after the events of 11 September 2001. In November 2002, Steve Lee, the executive director of the government’s main bureaucratic apparatus for the promotion of these ideas, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, was arguing that “Canadian foreign policy should promote core Canadian values: the ideals of democracy, such as human rights and fundamental equality; a respect for diversity and civil society; the promotion of fair labour and business practices; support for universal social programs and public education; and support for sustainable development.”¹⁴

The latest iteration of the values-projection project has been the “Dialogue on Foreign Policy,” a *fin-de-régime* exercise conducted by the foreign minister, Bill Graham, in 2002-2003 that was intended to mark time until Chrétien’s successor initiated the fully-fledged foreign policy review that every new prime minister since 1968 has set in motion upon coming to office. The results of Graham’s “dialogue” with Canadians—a mixture of “town hall” meetings and internet submissions—revealed, not surprisingly, that the essential message of the 1995 Statement remained unchanged. Canadians, the Dialogue on Foreign Policy purportedly revealed, continue to believe that:

Canada’s foreign policy agenda must reflect the nation we are: a multicultural, bilingual society that is free, open, prosperous, and democratic. The experiences of immigrants from around the world and the cultures of Aboriginal peoples are woven into the fabric of our national identity. Respect for equality and diversity runs through the religious, racial, cultural and linguistic strands forming our communities.... In using our position to champion Canadian values abroad, we are advancing humanitarian concerns that Canadians have long cherished, and are promoting social

¹³ Fen Osler Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, “Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine,” *International Journal* 53:3 (Summer 1998), 379-406.

¹⁴ Steve Lee, “Canadian Values.”

models endorsed by many of our allies. At the same time, we are helping to foster global conditions conducive to our own security and prosperity. As we try to realize our social and political values more fully at home, we can benefit ourselves by also promoting these values abroad.”¹⁵

These quotations demonstrate the degree to which this expansive vision of foreign policy goals has been driven by the government over the last decade. While some of the roots of this approach to foreign policy can be traced to the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney,¹⁶ it was not until the election of the Chrétien Liberals in 1993 that there was a full-bore embrace of the values-projection project, particularly by Lloyd Axworthy and Bill Graham. As a result, it is a project that has been bureaucratically entrenched in the spending programs of both the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and in the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

In addition, the idea of values-promotion has been persistently fed and supported by the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, a unit of DFAIT. One of CCFPD’s main missions has been to promote the values-projection agenda, mainly by funding activities that are explicitly designed to push the values-projection project among graduate students, such as conferences and round-tables with titles like “Can Democracy and Open Societies Overcome the Causes of Conflict in a Divided World?” Moreover, the CCFPD has regular access to the pages of the journal *Canadian Foreign Policy*, which it uses for unabashed propagation of the faith.¹⁷

¹⁵ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2003).

¹⁶ In particular, the Mulroney government’s embrace of “good governance” as a goal of Canadian foreign policy predated the Chrétien government’s emphasis on values; see Tom Keating and Paul Gecelovsky, “Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Good Governance Initiative,” in Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal, eds., *Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1993* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001). Likewise, Jennifer Ross argues that the roots of the “human security” agenda pressed by Lloyd Axworthy, discussed below, can be found in Joe Clark’s concerns about security in Central America in the mid-1980s: see Ross, “Is Canada’s Human Security Policy Really the ‘Axworthy’ Doctrine?” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 8:2 (Winter 2001), 75-93.

¹⁷ The Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development subsidizes *Canadian Foreign Policy* by purchasing one of its issues each year.

What's Wrong with Projecting "Canadian Values"?

The argument here is not that there is no relationship between the values that are dominant in a political community and that country's foreign policy. On the contrary: a country's foreign policy will always reflect a community's particular values. Each country's history, its founding myths, its ideology, and its political culture will all affect how a country defines its interests, and therefore its foreign policy goals. Thus, for example, Canadians have for many decades demonstrated an interest in how other governments treat their citizens, an empathetic reflection of the value that most Canadians place in the observance of human rights.¹⁸

But what has happened in Canada is that values, instead of just *determining* Canada's foreign policy objectives, have been *turned into* Canada's foreign policy objectives by the government in Ottawa.¹⁹ And in the process, the government has introduced a novel disconnect into the equation. In the Government Statement, Canada's values *became* Canada's foreign policy objectives, but those foreign policy objectives were no longer to be driven by Canada's *interests*. On the contrary: the government moved to make the very idea of *national interests* in foreign policy as invisible as possible. While the Government Statement does use word "interest" on several occasions (most often in reference to economic or material interests), there is but one reference to Canada's "national interest"; instead, the Statement tends to prefer the idea of "Canada's global interests," a phrase that appears three times.

What are the implications of losing sight of interests in foreign policy, and having interests replaced by values? Why is the pursuit of such an expansive set of foreign policy goals so problematic? While many objections can be raised,²⁰ five are particularly important.

¹⁸ For a discussion of "empathetic interests" in Canadian foreign policy, see Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3d ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997).

¹⁹ For a useful commentary on the values/interests dichotomy in Canadian foreign policy, see Hector Mackenzie, "Defining And Defending a Place in the World: Canada's Vital Interests in International Affairs," *Canadian Issues* (September 2002).

²⁰ For example, Denis Stairs has argued that the values-projection project encourages excessive moralizing: "Canadians, in their approach to international affairs, have grown alarmingly smug, complacent, and self-deluded.

Trying to project “Canadian values” abroad sets impossible tasks for Canadian foreign policy.

Establishing the projection of “Canadian values” as a foreign policy goal means establishing an enormously ambitious foreign policy agenda. If the world we want truly is much like the Canada we want, as the government has been claiming, then Canadian foreign policy-makers face vast and daunting tasks.

If we take the Liberal government’s statements over the last decade at face value—and in my view we should take these pronouncements seriously²¹—it is clear that the “values” approach to Canadian foreign policy commits Canadians to improving the prosperity of all human beings, particularly those who now live lives marked by deprivation, hunger, and disease. Certainly such an approach commits Canada and all Canadians to dealing seriously with the structural conditions that underlie the marked chasm in conditions between and among the world’s six billion human beings.

The promotion of values in the area of security—particularly when it was articulated as the “human security” agenda by Lloyd Axworthy²²—commits Canadians to bring security to vast numbers of

The fault is largely their own. But they have succumbed to it with the active encouragement of their leaders. More specifically, they have come to think of themselves, not as others are, but as morally superior.” He worries that such moralizing risks doing significant damage to the effectiveness of Canadian diplomacy. See his “Myths, Morals and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy,” *International Journal* (2003).

²¹ One could, of course, take the cynical perspective that the values-projection project should not be taken at face value at all. In this view, both the very impossibility of the project, together with the patent unwillingness of the Canadian state to devote serious resources to the project (discussed below), tell us all we need to know about the real purpose of this exercise: in other words, these high-minded pronouncements are nothing more than a manipulative exercise by the government to make Canadians feel good about themselves (and thus about the government which feeds them such feel-good ear candy). However, for a variety of reasons—including the fact that the Canadian policy-makers who are peddling this line actually appear to believe their own rhetoric, not to mention the fact that millions of dollars are spent each year actually pursuing these lofty goals—my view is that we should take these pronouncements at face value.

²² The “human security” perspective argued that the focus of security should be on the individual rather than on the state. Axworthy articulated the formal policy in 1999 in Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World* (Ottawa, April 1999). Interestingly, this document has been “disappeared” from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s “Human Security” website (<http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/psh-en.asp>); it was, however, posted to a number of other sites where it can still be accessed: for example, <http://www.summit-americas.org/Canada/HumanSecurity-english.htm>. There is a considerable literature on human security: for example, Peter Stoett, *Human and Global Security: An Exploration of Terms* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Heather Owens and Barbara Arneil, “The Human Security Paradigm Shift: A New Lens on Canadian Foreign Policy?” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 7 (1999), 1–12; George MacLean, “Institution and Projecting Human Security: A Canadian Perspective,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54:3 (2000), 269–76; Robin Jeffrey Hay, “Present at the Creation? Human Security and

human beings in a variety of other places who at present live in insecurity and fear of injury or death, threatened by an equally wide diverse range of actors. New brides in India and Pakistan burned to death by their in-laws in kerosene “accidents”; labour organizers in Colombia; adulterers in Saudi Arabia; villagers in Congo targeted by militias; street kids in São Paulo *favelas*; businesspeople in Russia who run afoul of the *Mafya*; reformers in Ukraine; Palestinian protestors in Gaza; Israeli shoppers in Tel Aviv; diners in a Baghdad restaurant; Falun Gong practitioners in China; rebel fighters in Grozny; Lendu farmers in Congo; Cambodian children playing in a long-forgotten minefield—all must fall under the sweeping vision of the Canadian government if Ottawa’s human security rhetoric is taken seriously. Indeed, Canadian foreign policy professes concern for all those who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, all those who happen to be at risk of harm for having the wrong ideological beliefs, the wrong skin colour, the wrong sexual orientation, or the wrong religious beliefs. In this expansive scheme, there is no sparrow too small.

The promotion of Canadian values also means that Canadians must be committed to trying to change the minds of those hundreds of millions of people who are deeply intolerant of those who do not share their own ethnicity, religious beliefs, language, culture, nationality. It also means that Canadians must be willing to change the behaviour of those who are fearful or hateful of others, often with sufficient intensity that they are moved to kill or maim their enemies.

Finally, the active pursuit of such goals means that Canada must be committed to the reshaping the politics of every political community which does not have the features of a liberal, democratic polity. By insisting that Canadian practices should be “allowed to work for others,” the government in Ottawa gives itself a wide-ranging to-do list, since the vast majority of political communities have neither liberal politics nor democratic practices.

Canadian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century,” in Fen Osler Hampson, Michael Hart, and Martin Rudner, *Canada Among Nations 1999: A Big League Player?* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000), 215-32; the contributions in Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) and the contributions to Rosalind Irwin, ed., *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001). For a critique, see Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” *International Security* 26:2 (Fall 2001), 87-102.

The expansive foreign policy vision requires far more resources than Canadians are willing to commit. The very impossibility of the values-projection project is compounded by the manifest lack of concern that Canadians have demonstrated about what their government spends on international affairs. Over the course of the 1990s, Paul Martin, as minister of finance, was determined to bring federal spending under control after two and a half decades of profligacy and deficit spending; not surprisingly, he selected those parts of the federal budget that offered him the most discretion: the military budget, the foreign affairs budget, and the development assistance budget. As a result, the capacity of Canada's military was reduced, development assistance programs were slashed, and the foreign affairs department shrank in size and capacity.²³ But as Canadian capacity to act globally was slashed, Canadians themselves appeared completely unconcerned. There were no widespread protests of Canadians urging their governors to spend more of their national treasure on projecting their values abroad; there was, instead, support for Martin's efforts to balance the budget.

Values-projection too quickly turns into an exercise in hypocrisy. Because Canadians are so manifestly unwilling to demand that the government expend national treasure on actually trying to meet the lofty foreign policy goals set out by their governors, the embrace of such wide-ranging goals easily opens Canadians to charges of hypocrisy. Foreigners who are the targets of Canadian preaching might reasonably ask why there is such a yawning gap between Canadian rhetoric and Canadian behaviour.

For example, if Canadians are so committed to "equal opportunity" for all human beings, why does Canada maintain such an exclusive immigration policy, keeping its borders firmly closed to all but a small handful of those in other parts of the world who might share in the "opportunity" of a life in Canada?

If Canadians are so committed to the prosperity of all human beings, why is the Canadian government one of the stingiest developed countries when it comes to development assistance? And why

²³ For a full exploration, see Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2003).

does the government in Ottawa insist on tying what little development assistance it does provide to the purchase of Canadian goods and services—a policy that benefits Canadians first and foremost?

If Canadians are so concerned about human security in other parts of the world, why has the Canadian government been so slow and cautious to actually assist in the achievement of human security when the need arises? When militias backed by the Indonesian armed forces unleashed a wave of killing in East Timor in early September 1999, why did the government in Ottawa only commit 175 soldiers to INTERFET, the international force sent into the territory to restore order—and why did those soldiers not manage to arrive until the last week of October, long after the threat to “human security” had been eliminated by American diplomacy and Australian-New Zealand-British force of arms? And why does the government in Ottawa so often put the economic interests of some Canadians ahead of concerns for human security, as it did in the case of the operation of Talisman Energy, a Canadian firm which the foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, persistently refused to sanction for operating in a war zone in Sudan?

If Canadians are so committed to the rule of law internationally, why is the government in Ottawa so quick to embrace unilateral solutions when Canadian self-interests demand it, as occurred in the case of the arrest of the Spanish fishing vessel *Estai* in 1995—a move that was in complete defiance of international law, but which garnered the government huge popular support at home?

Moreover, preaching to the world about the superiority of Canadian values invites the rest of the world to wonder about how Canadians practice their values at home. For example, if Canadians are so committed to participatory democracy, why does the Canadian government—and the governing Liberal party in particular—continue to embrace an electoral system that routinely and self-consciously ensures that the electoral preferences of a plurality of voters in each electoral district will be privileged over the preferences of the majority? Why do First Nations in Canada continue to be governed by paternalistic legislation and often anti-democratic practices? If Canadians are so enamoured of diversity, why has the federal governments felt the need to coerce the citizenry into accepting equity programs that are based on racial criteria? If Canadians are supposed to be so tolerant, why do gays and lesbians continue to face all manner of discrimination, both formal and informal? If Canadians are so keen on sustainable

development, why are their day-to-day practices so destructive of the environment? If Canadians are so committed to the values of opportunity and “equal justice for all,” why are so many Canadians forced to live out their lives in relative squalor and deprivation in the midst of the immense wealth enjoyed by their fellow citizens?

Values-projection is at bottom not only an illiberal project, but also a radical departure from Canada’s traditional liberal approach to global politics. Among the many values the government in Ottawa claims to be championing abroad are the values of liberalism. But the government trumpets this without the slightly hint of irony, ignoring the fact that presuming to tell others how to live their lives is deeply *illiberal*. Of course, such illiberalism is hardly new: the propagation of the Christian faith beyond Europe in the last five hundred years was based on paternalism and the willingness of evangelists to press their own “true way” on others, either by persuasion or coercion. Likewise, the story of European empire is the story of “civilizing” the heathen/savage/barbarian, denigrating indigenous ways and culture and foisting European “values” on others—always, of course, for their own good, or so it was claimed. And in the modern era we continue to see this tendency at work. For example, what we call the “neo-liberal” agenda is in fact deeply illiberal, since it involves Western governments and international financial institutions telling others how they must live their lives and organize their communities.

It is particularly ironic that in order to actually press “Canadian values” on the world, Canada would have to become what Robin Hay has aptly called a “Boy Scout imperialist,”²⁴ since the values-projection project involves telling others how they should live, think, organize their communities, and practice their politics. The irony, of course, is that Canadians themselves tend to despise such paternalistic and imperialist practices when they observe it in others.

Moreover, Denis Stairs reminds us that what he calls the “imperialism of values” involves a rejection of Canada’s traditionally liberal approach to global politics. One of the defining features of Canadian foreign policy in the years after 1945 was the willingness of those who made Canadian foreign

²⁴ Hay, “Present at the Creation,” 228.

policy to take an unabashedly liberal approach to global politics—that in a world of sovereign states, without an overarching authority to define right and wrong and justice and injustice, there was no one true way. Instead, each political community had to be allowed the liberty to pursue their own way in the world. Differences between states were an understood consequence of such a liberal, live-and-let-live approach to global politics, but that was what foreign policy was all about: trying to find ways of dealing with conflict between sovereign states in ways that preserved the broader peace.²⁵

The foreign policy project that seeks to champion Canadian values is an essential rejection of this liberal approach. The values-projection project asserts that there is one true way—the Canadian way—and that the rest of the world should see the light, just as Canadians have. And it can be argued that for a small and relatively weak country, rejecting a liberal approach to international politics is actually a rather dangerous policy option, for it encourages the view that it is perfectly legitimate and appropriate for anyone (or everyone) to try to create the “world they want.”

Conclusion: Values, Interests, and Basic Choices

Finally, by focusing on the importance of *values* in Canadian foreign policy, the government in Ottawa encourages Canadians to ignore the importance of *interests* in the making of foreign policy. By encouraging the idea that the objective of our foreign policy is to show others in the world the superior virtue of the “Canadian way,” the government discourages Canadians from thinking about the hard choices that have to be made about defending and protecting their country’s interests in a world where others are trying to create the world *they* want. The essence of the anarchical condition of global politics, where no one has the right to command and no one has the obligation to obey, has not changed with the end of the Cold War or the spread of globalization. In such a condition, every country needs to defend its interests, which include those ideas and practices it values, against the efforts of others to impose their interests and values on the international system. In an anarchical world, smaller and less powerful

²⁵ See Denis Stairs, “Canada in the 1990s: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig,” *Policy Options* (January-February 2001), 47-48.

countries, if they are wise, encourage everyone to live and let live, for such a liberal solution allows smaller countries to enjoy the kind of existence that they want.

In short, conceiving of Canadian foreign policy as the protection of Canadian interests instead of the projection of Canadian values encourages us to think about the need to make strategic choices about how we spend our resources and where we devote our energies in global politics, so that we can have the kind of Canada that Canadians want, even if we do not necessarily get the world we want.

Kim Richard Nossal is professor and head of the Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.

Word count: 4900