

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES:

Sleeping with a different elephant?

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Prepared for

The Fifth Lester B. Pearson Conference

on

the Canada-United States Relationship

Niagara-on-the-Lake, 14-17 October 1981

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
Sleeping with a different elephant?

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Commentators on current Canadian-American relations seem to agree that the November 1980 elections in the United States marked the beginning of a new stage in the relationship. 'The Reagan era has begun, for better or worse,' one observer noted. 'There has been some trepidation expressed in the press that, so far as Canada is concerned, it will be for worse.'[1] Another reporter concluded in March 1981 that 'Ottawa and Washington are still headed in different policy directions on several fronts.'[2] And yet another stated flatly that 'A number of issues have been aggravated significantly by Mr Reagan's ascension to the White House.' The result, he suggests, has been a 'deep, and deepening, concern about the Reagan administration's actions, intentions, motives.'[3] It can be argued, on the other hand, that the changing forces on the bilateral relationship which arise within the United States are broader and more fundamental than a change in administrations. Of importance are not only the personalities and philosophies of the White House, but also some underlying currents and apparent shifts in the American political system.

The purpose of this paper is to explore a number of these key changes and to assess their impact on the Canada-United States relationship. Among these changes are what some have seen as the rise of a 'new conservatism,' a related shift in attitudes towards the role of government, the rise of special interests and political action committees, the changing balance of congressional-executive relations, and a new style of executive branch management. The paper then turns

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to an examination of these factors in a number of recent cases in the relationship between Canada and the United States.

The 'New Conservatism': A Swing to the Right?

'Let friend and foe alike,' President Ronald Reagan told the graduating class at West Point in May 1981, 'be made aware of the spirit that is sweeping across our land.'[4] According to most analyses, such a spirit had been quite in evidence on the evening of 4 November 1980 when American voters had given Reagan a landslide victory, the Republicans a majority in the Senate, and the Democrats an eroded majority in the House. The election was heralded as the triumph of the American conservatives,* a signal that the elections of 1980, like those of 1932, 1896, 1860, and 1800, marked one of those periodic 'critical realignments'[5] in American politics. Indeed, Reagan himself has overtly spoken of the mandate for a 'conservative revolution' given him by the voters.[6]

Certainly the Right was in full voice after November. The National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), having seen four of the six liberal Senators on its 'hit list' go down to defeat,** wasted no time in

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*'Conservative' is used in this paper in its contemporary American context. While there are elements of conservatism in the ideological orientation of 'conservatives' in the United States - the romantic nostalgia for a lost past is the most prominent - the term has lost much of its distinctive meaning. An odd mélange of policy preferences ranging from strong support for Israel to opposition to gays and titillation on television are said to mark the 'conservative.' Improbable bedfellows such as William F. Buckley, Rev. Jerry Falwell, Alexander Haig, and Irving Kristol are sloppily thrown together under the same 'conservative' umbrella. Disciples of Friedman, Stockman, and Laffer tout 'conservative' laisser-faire economic policies that are firmly rooted in the liberal thought of Locke, Smith, and Mill. However inappropriate, the word has become a useful catch-all to describe those various factions on the right.

**Birch Bayh, Frank Church, John Culver, and George McGovern - all on NCPAC's hit list - lost their seats in November 1980

announcing a new and expanded list of liberal targets for 1982. Claiming that the November vote represented a mandate for 'moral reform,' Moral Majority intensified its campaign to suppress books and television programmes it found objectionable.[7] President Reagan's Cabinet-level nominees were all of the Right. David Stockman, darling economist of the neoconservative faction of the Right,* was appointed director of the Office of Management and Budget; James Watt, former head of Mountain States Legal Foundation, a group specialising in fighting federal environmental regulations, was installed as secretary of the interior. With Regan at Treasury, Haig at State, and Weinberger at Defense, President Reagan's management team was solidly conservative.

In the first one hundred days of his administration, Reagan had approved plans to cut one million people from the food coupon rolls, to terminate the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act which involved 300,000 jobs. A task force on regulatory reform was reviewing strip mining rules and cotton dust standards. Watt at Interior had opened controversial sites in California for oil exploration.[8] In addition, the Reagan administration had begun to institute 'block grant' transfers to state and local governments under what was termed the 'New Federalism.'[9] By the summer of 1981, the administration had dealt with an illegal strike by air traffic controllers by firing 12,500 controllers, jailing a number of the leaders and moving to decertify their union. It had also cajoled a modified version of the Kemp-Roth tax cut scheme through Congress - with a little help from the 'boll Weevils' who hold the balance of power in the House of Representatives.

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* A number of factions can be identified: the Republican party 'establishment,' well represented in the Reagan Cabinet; the 'Old Right' including William F. Buckley and Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, and Tower; the 'New Right' including the NCPAC and Rep. Jack Kemp and Senator Jesse Helms; Moral Majority and Eagle Forum and individuals such as Jerry Falwell and Senator Jeremiah Denton comprising the 'Religious Right'; and the neoconservatives including Irving Kristol, Senators Moynihan and Jackson and the Committee on the Present Danger.

In short, the common conclusion has been that the United States - governed and governors - have taken a marked stride rightward. That the governors are of the Right is evident; that the political values of the governed have shifted as dramatically is too often taken for granted or assumed. The purpose of this section is to assess the degree to which public opinion in the United States mirrors the attitudes and policies of the conservative leadership.

Can the victory of the Right in 1980 be interpreted as the inevitable consequence of a 'new spirit' sweeping across the United States, a swing to the right by American voters? However tempting it may be to infer from the results that the electorate (or at least that small portion who bothered to vote) has undergone a radical weltanschauung since 1976, the evidence gleaned from public opinion polls does not support such a conclusion.

On 4 November, the New York Times and CBS News conducted a poll of 10,000 voters as they left the booths; the results of this 'exit poll' suggest that one should treat the rightward-swing thesis with some caution. First, there is little indication that those who voted Republican in 1980 are aligned - perfectly or imperfectly - with the Right. Only 28 per cent of all respondents claimed that they considered themselves conservative.[10] Furthermore, only 10 per cent of those who voted for Reagan said that his conservative Republicanism was the deciding factor in their vote. Such data suggest that ideological orientation was not a key reason for a Republican vote.

According to the exit poll, the major reason for the large shift of voters to the Republican ranks was a desire for change. A majority of those polled indicated that this was the reason for their vote for Reagan. The essentially negative phenomenon of voting governments out of office is hardly new; but nor is the temptation to treat a negative vote as positive endorsement of the government voted in. If desire for change motivated voters, then the record of the previous administration becomes an important part of the analysis: the perceived

failures of Jimmy Carter in both foreign policy and the economy should be weighed carefully in any assessment of Ronald Reagan's victory. Certainly there was a measure of pocketbook discontent in 1980. The Reagan campaign's repeated question to the electorate - are you better off now than you were four years ago? - appears to have struck a responsive chord. Thirty-five per cent of the exit poll respondents said that their family situation was worse in 1980 than in 1979; a full two-thirds of this group voted Republican.[11]

Similarly, foreign policy concerns appeared to have played an important part in the calculus. Two-thirds of the respondents wanted a 'tougher' American foreign policy - presumably tougher than Carter's policies. According to the New York Times, the Iranian hostage crisis weighed heavily in the outcome. Carter's inability to secure the release of the American hostages - they had been captive for exactly a year on election day - confirmed for the American voter the campaign rhetoric from the Republicans that there had been a weakening of the United States since 1976.[12]

Other analyses have been advanced to explain the Reagan victory: they include a shift of the political nexus to the more conservative Sunbelt states;[13] a defection in blue-collar support from the Democrats to the Republicans;[14] or a collapse of middle-class support for Carter in the north-eastern states.[15] Such analyses are, however, little more than descriptions of the actual outcome, and therefore they explain little. They do not tell us why, for example, blue-collar workers defected between 1976 and 1980. Similarly, account should be taken of the fact that barely a majority of eligible voters turned out in November, and what impact this low turn out had on the outcome.[16] It should be noted that this analysis, focussing on the presidential election, does not assess other developments evident in the November 1980 elections. Republicans made significant gains in the Senate, the House, in state governorships and legislatures in 1980, leading to speculation that rather than mere disaffection with the Carter administration, there was at work a wider dissatisfaction with the Democratic party.

While the available evidence suggests that it would be imprudent to conclude that the outcome of the 1980 elections was the result of a shift to the right by the American electorate, one can see some evidence of Reagan's 'new spirit' in how Americans view their government and the role of the United States in the world. The evidence to be had from public opinion polls is admittedly clouded by inconsistencies in values and beliefs. But the polls provide an insight, however fragmentary, into the dynamics of contemporary opinion.

On the one hand, there is evident disenchantment with the role of government writ large. Indeed, a Republican keynote speaker at the GOP convention in Detroit went so far as to compare the contemporary relationship between citizen and state with that in the 1770s. Calling for a 'new uprising,' Guy Vander Jagt claimed that 'Then, as now, they felt over-regulated, over-interfered with, and over-taxed.'[17] Podium bombast this might have been, but it appears to reflect a widely-felt disaffection that is manifested in political action and opinion.

The frustration of mounting taxation - federal and state income tax receipts have increased by 98 per cent since 1975 - has given rise to Proposition 13-style taxpayer revolts: in the consistently Democratic state of Massachusetts, for example, 60 per cent of the voters endorsed 'Proposition $2\frac{1}{2}$,' so-called because it would limit property taxes to 2.5 per cent of market value. The frustration is also evident in public opinion polls on questions ranging from the broad issue of the role of the state to the narrow concerns over specific programmes. For example, 70 per cent of Americans polled in May 1981 felt that the range and scope of government interference in 'people's lives' had grown too broadly; 71 per cent agreed that 'the Supreme Court and Congress have gone too far in keeping religious and moral values out of our lives;' 62 per cent of the same sample believe that 'the government should stop regulating business.'[18]

Another poll, conducted in February 1981, indicated that a significant minority - 32 per cent - believe that inflation, the primary problem facing the

United States, is a direct result of government overspending. Concern over the size and spending patterns of government is reflected in popular attitudes towards specific programmes. While Social Security remains sacrosanct (as the president's massive loss in the Senate on this issue indicated), programmes that are highly visible are not. Fully 61 per cent of the February 1981 sample, for example, felt that too much was being spent on the food stamp program.[19]

On the other hand, there is little to indicate that a majority are agreed on the policies espoused by the Reagan administration to deal with this perceived malaise. Only 32 per cent of the May 1981 sample approved of Reagan's three-year tax cut proposal; 36 per cent wanted no more than a one year cut, while 22 per cent wanted no cut at all. Of those polled, 71 per cent believed that the tax cut would benefit only some segments of society, and hurt others - notably the elderly and the poor.

Nor is there any indication of widespread support for the causes of the so-called Religious Right. Not only are their political action groups held in disfavour - 60 per cent of those who said they have heard of Moral Majority have an unfavourable attitude towards that organization[20] - but most Americans are in disagreement with the Religious Right on a number of key issues. Handgun registration, sex education, the Equal Rights Amendment and legal abortion are opposed by groups like Moral Majority, but are favoured by a majority in the May 1981 poll. Only on the wider use of the death penalty do the views of a majority of Americans accord with those of the Moral Majority.[21]

On an issue of specific concern to Canadians - the environment - public opinion is inconsistent. On the one hand, there is support for broad environmentalist objectives. Fifty-eight per cent of a June 1981 poll agree that government regulation and protection of the environment are worth the costs; 75 per cent believe that economic growth and high environmental standards are not mutually exclusive. On the other hand, feelings about specific programmes are

mixed. Forty-eight per cent favour and 39 per cent oppose easing restrictions on strip mining for coal; 55 to 36 per cent favour relaxing clean-air requirements for coal-burning generating plants. (However, 53 per cent oppose auto-emission regulations.) Over three-quarters of the sample favour increased oil exploration on federal lands, and 70 per cent favour enlarging offshore drilling for oil on the east and west coasts.[22]

In short, the evidence surveyed here would suggest that the American public, in the words of Ben Wattenberg of the American Enterprise Institute, is being 'selective' about conservatism, desiring what he calls a 'conservative welfare state.'[23] Clearly the public is not enamoured with the truest of the true believers, nor with Reagan's larger social vision. The Republicans are still the minority party, despite the Reagan landslide, a Senate majority, and widespread gains at the State level. The 1982 mid-term elections and the 1984 presidential elections will demonstrate whether the Republican party will in the long term profit from short-term defections in 1980.

It is with respect to the role of the United States in the world that one can point with the most confidence to the existence of Reagan's 'new spirit.' And what appears to be sweeping the land is a mood of resurgent nationalism. One can see it in what presidential aides have called Reagan's 'red meat' speeches - his fervent nationalistic appeals that underscore not only Reagan's political abilities, but also his own devout patriotism:

> The world one day will once again look on in awe at us, astounded by the miracles of education and freedom, amazed by our rebirth of confidence and hope and progress ... and when that happens, we'll be able to say to the world, 'Well, what did you expect? After all, we're Americans.'[24]

His evocation of the patriotic spirit has been evident in most of the major addresses Reagan has given - as candidate and as president.[25]

Such patriotic appeals are neither unusual nor unexpected from a national leader. But the context of evocative rhetoric is critical. In 1980, the

humiliation of the Iranian hostage-taking was constantly in the public eye; there was the persistent echo of warnings from the Right about the erosion of the very security of the United States at the hands of an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union; the disaster of Vietnam has not yet dissolved into dim memory. In the context of the perceived decline in American power in the 1970s, it is perhaps inevitable that the president's nationalism becomes overlaid with elements of chauvinism when it is reflected in the American public. Reagan himself has described it as 'a hunger on the part of the people to once again be proud of America.'[26] Writing in Foreign Affairs, Daniel Yankelovich has put it less presidentially but no less succinctly: 'The conviction that we have in the past few years permitted ourselves to be manipulated, bullied, humiliated and otherwise abused, has given rise to a powerful urge to vindicate the national honor.'[27]

Evidence of such an urge is not hard to find. Whether it is in the jingoistic reactions of the public to the too-easy despatch of Libyan Fitters in the Gulf of Sidra or in the more prolix results of public opinion polls, the message is the same: in Yankelovich's words, a 'call for a new U.S. assertiveness in world affairs.'[28] The New York Times/CBS News exit poll in November 1980 revealed that 66 per cent of the voters wanted a 'tougher' foreign policy, 'even if it increased the risk of war.' Indeed, such a finding is not inconsistent with public expectations: 77 per cent of Americans believe that it is a president's duty to 'see to it that the U.S. is respected by other nations.'[29] Assertiveness involves the use of statecraft, and the public is not averse to using its tools: 73 per cent approve using American strength 'whenever necessary for our national interests, even if other nations complain.'[30] Similarly, 56 per cent of Americans favour using trade as a diplomatic weapon in pursuit of national interests.[31]

Because of the link that tends to be made between American strength and military might, these Avis-like urges for supremacy are, not surprisingly, reflected in a growing desire for more defence spending and greater military preparedness. Though Reagan has always disclaimed overt hawkishness, preferring to

couch his policy objectives in such terms as 'peace through strength' and 'a margin of safety,' the public is unabashed: 73 per cent agreed with the statement that 'we must build up our military strength so that we are clearly no. 1.'[32] Similarly, there has been a shift in opinion about spending. At the height of the Vietnamization process in 1971, only 11 per cent of Americans favoured increasing the defence budget. By December 1978, that figure had risen to 42 per cent. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the seizure of the hostages in Iran, the figure had risen to 74 per cent by January 1980.[33] Opinion on peacetime conscription has fluctuated, according to the polls. In 1977, 36 per cent favoured a draft; by August 1980, this figure had risen to 78 per cent.[34] However, a June 1981 poll shows only 43 per cent in favour, with 49 per cent opposed.[35]

It should be noted, however, that public opinion differs with the Right on a number of key policies. Americans appear to be indifferent to or in disagreement with the Right's attempts to differentiate between authoritarian and totalitarian régimes: of the May 1981 sample, 67 per cent claimed they were opposed to giving economic or military support to anti-communist allies who violated human rights. Only 35 per cent - with 47 per cent against - favoured sending military advisers to El Salvador. And despite indications that a majority of Americans appear to want military 'superiority' over the Soviet Union, two thirds of the May 1981 poll favour reopening the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.[36]

That there has occurred a shift in the values of the political leadership in the United States is clear from the policies pursued by the Reagan administration since January 1981. Attempts to trim the size of both the government itself and the budget deficit; a willingness to give supply-side economics a try; the beginnings of a reversal of regulatory growth; a slightly more laisser-faire attitude towards the role of the state in both the economy and the life of the citizen - such are the indications of change. And while all of this does not,

in our view, a 'conservative revolution' make, nor is it business as usual. What Wright has called the 'rhetorical posturings and gossamer wisps of policy'[37] of the campaign trail are not being allowed to die a quiet death until the next leap year. Motivated by an obvious idealism (but with a realistic eye on the 1982 mid-terms and even re-election in 1984), the Reagan administration has shown itself to be committed to domestic change of radical proportions.

It is true that these domestic initiatives are having a marked impact externally. For example, the use of high interest rates to dampen the growth of the money supply has had an effect on the economies of the major trading partners of the United States. Reagan's commitment to increased energy self-sufficiency and to deregulation has meant a more relaxed attitude towards environmental protection. This, in turn, threatens to exacerbate Canadian-American environmental relations. Similarly, the premium now being placed on economic growth and the re-industrialization, particularly in the export sectors, portends a resurgence of American economic nationalism which will surely affect Western Europe, Japan, and the peripheral capitalist countries like Canada and Australia.

However, despite the trend towards a more 'assertive America' discovered by Yankelovich and his colleagues, and despite the equally assertive tone of the Republican party platform adopted in Detroit,[38] the Reagan administration has been less prone to alter United States foreign policy as radically as it is changing domestic policy. That is not to suggest that there have not been a number of pronounced shifts. The rejection of the United Nations Law of the Sea draft agreements and the de-emphasis of human rights as a primary concern of external policy are two key examples. Similarly, that is not to suggest that there has not also been a shift in tone: the Reagan administration has been able to achieve somewhat more consistency in its dealings with friend and foe alike than the Carter administration. But the expectations of some - largely predicated on the stated preferences and objectives of the unelected Right - that a Reagan

presidency would augur a reversal of de facto Sino-American co-operation, a reversal on Middle Eastern policies, a more pronounced interventionist stance with regard to the Soviet Union's problems in Poland, a militarily aggressive policy against Marxist groups and régimes in Central America, or a more overtly lenient attitude towards South Africa have not yet been borne out. Rather, the president's personal beliefs are more evident in spontaneous statements than they are in American behaviour.*

The purpose of this section was to assess the degree to which the shifts in American policies and the shifts in American public attitudes mirror each other. The results of this broad sketch suggest a curious conclusion about a swing to the right in the United States. On domestic policy, the Reagan administration is out in front of public opinion, in the sense that the policies now being pursued go beyond what the polls indicate the public at large supports. But in foreign policy behaviour (as opposed to mere rhetoric), this administration lags behind what Yankelovich's 'assertive America' appears to want.

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*For example, asked at a press conference on 16 June 1981 whether the situation in Poland meant the beginning of the end of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, Reagan avoided a direct answer, but did add that 'Communism is an aberration. It's not a normal way of living for human beings.' CBS News, 16 June 1981; partial transcript in U.S. News and World Report, 25 June 1981, pp 22-3.

Whether or not there has been a shift in the mood of American public opinion, there has been a major shift in the manner of articulating it. The last half-decade has witnessed an enormous increase in the number and influence of single issue interest groups directing their activities at the election and subsequent behaviour of legislators at the state and especially the federal levels. Such interest groups are not new of course. The pluralistic articulation of interests has always been part of the American political process. What is new is the number of these groups and the professionalism of their operation. The number of Political Action Committees formed by interest groups to direct their lobbying efforts and channel their financing grew from 516 in 1974 to 650 in 1975 through to 1,709 in mid-1978 and 1,910 in 1979.[39]

There are two main reasons for this tremendous growth: changes in campaign financing laws and changes in the organizational capabilities of the groups themselves. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, amended in 1974 and 1976, limits contributions to a candidate in each primary or general election to $1000 from individuals and $5,000 from organizations. It also limits expenditures in presidential election campaigns, and effectively imposes a smaller ceiling on contributions to presidential campaigns by placing a $250 limit on contributions to be matched by federal funds. This all has the effect of encouraging interest groups to concentrate their financial efforts on congressional and senate electoral races rather than the presidential contest. It also weakens the role of the parties because they had characteristically raised most of their funds by relatively large contributions from relatively few contributors. The new laws place a premium on the ability to raise very large numbers of small contributions, by techniques such as direct-mail solicitation which are more suitable for nonparty groups dedicated to ideological or particular

interests.[40] Interest groups and their political Action Committees make contributions directly to candidates rather than to parties, which further increases the responsiveness of congressmen to special interests rather than to broad coalitions of interests. In the 1978 elections, less money was contributed to candidates by the two political parties than by Political Action Committees.[41]

The increase in the activity and influence of special interest groups also results from their enhanced professionalism and organizational capabilities. Through such techniques as direct mailings, computerized mailing lists, polls and surveys, and focussed advertising campaigns, coupled with the grassroots participation of individuals dedicated to the particular regional, economic, or ideological concern of the group, these bodies are able to mobilize impressive numbers of votes and dollars in individual constituencies. This impact is all the greater in areas or races of low voter turnout.

The ability of a growing number of special interest groups to deliver major campaign funding and large blocks of votes has made legislators increasingly responsive to these regional and special interests. In his farewell address on 17 January 1981, Jimmy Carter warned the American people about the rampant spread of particular interest groups, and cautioned that the national interest was not necessarily the same as the sum of forcefully articulated particular interests. Whether or not his warning is heeded, the structural conditions contributing to the rise in influence of such groups seem unlikely to wane in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, legislators are likely to be increasingly subject to single issue demands from regional and special interest groups insensitive to other issues, and so are likely to be increasingly parochial in their responsive behaviour.

This apparent transformation of the domestic political process matters for Canadian-American relations because those senators and congressmen who are in-

creasingly responsive to regional and special interests are themselves increasingly influential in United States foreign policy.[42] The greater role of Congress in foreign policy questions is not just a reflection of the ineptitude of the Carter administration. It reflects a more fundamental structural shift in the balance between the legislative and executive branches. Reaction against presidential dominance of foreign policy, especially in the Vietnam War period, led to the 1973 War Powers Act which limited to sixty days the president's commitment of troops to future conflicts without congressional authorization, and provided that such troops could be disengaged by a concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress. Congress went even further in its 1976 prohibition on United States military or paramilitary operations in Angola unless and until Congress authorized such assistance by law. Concurrent changes in staffing and organization contributed to the reawakening of congressional foreign policy activity.

Increasingly in the last decade, Congress has used its traditional and constitutional authority to ratify treaties and pass appropriations to constrain executive foreign policy action, to block undesired action, and to support desired outcomes. The Senate's power to ratify treaties has been used to delay consideration and ultimately to block acceptance of treaty commitments entered into by the administration, as in the cases of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) and the Canada-United States east coast fisheries treaty. It has also been used to attach reservations or amendments, as in the case of the Panama Canal Treaty, with potentially disruptive or crippling effect on the negotiated positions accepted by the United States and foreign governments. The power of Congress to block or amend appropriations and authorization bills has been used to limit undesired action. The Turkish arms embargo and broader restrictions on arms sales, and the restrictions on CIA covert activities are two examples. Congress has also legislated favoured goals, as in amendments

encouraging Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union by linking it to economic credits and exchanges, or encouraging the observation of human rights or non-proliferation policies by linking them to foreign aid. Congress is also capable and willing to initiate legislation on foreign policy questions apart from amendments to administration-supported bills as in the Senate resolution calling for an end to compliance with the UN embargo on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The power of congressional committees to conduct investigations and enquiries has resulted in congressional activity on a variety of foreign policy issues not related to administration policy desires, such as hearings on the proposed takeover of an American company by a private Canadian firm. The congressional process of fluid coalition-formation on each issue invites trade-offs of support (or log-rolling) which are particularly vulnerable to regional, ethnic, or special interest pressures. Such linkage of issues frequently runs counter to the wishes of the executive branch, and almost surely is opposed by the foreign governments involved.

Canada's response to this greater role of Congress has been to increase its efforts at congressional liaison, and to seek prior assurances of congressional support before entering into agreements with the United States administration (for example, the Northern gas pipeline and the west coast fisheries treaty). Nevertheless, a shift in the congressional-executive balance in the United States government continues to pose problems for Canada, which faces the prospect of renegotiation during ratification of agreements accepted by the administration, and of increasing linkage of issues to its disadvantage.

The difficulties posed for Canada by uncertainty over the ability of the executive branch to deliver on its commitments, or even to speak for the United States government, because of the changing pattern of congressional-executive relations, are compounded by the organization and functioning of the executive branch itself under the Reagan administration. The operating style of that ad-

ministration poses particular problems of co-ordination which have not yet been visibly overcome.

Ronald Reagan's personal 'chairman of the board' style is to set the tone and broad direction of policy, and leave it to his subordinates to work out the specific details of policy. This implies a relatively autonomous cabinet with extensive authority in the assigned areas of responsibility. This in turn implies a crucial problem of policy co-ordination to be performed by the president himself or by the White House staff, lest decentralization result in several separate United States governments with different policies on different issues. In this 'pure' chairman of the board model, a foreign government like that of Canada may be faced with the need for separate simultaneous negotiations with different parts of the United States government on different policy questions, thus transferring the co-ordination problem from Washington to Ottawa.

The chairman of the board model, as put into effect in the first few months of the Reagan administration, is, however, not as pure as described above. Problems of co-ordination are compounded by the absence of clear lines of demarcation between areas of responsibility of different cabinet secretaries, and by the intrusion into the process of policy formulation of senior members of the White House staff. In an effort at policy co-ordination that has been referred to as cabinet style government, cabinet committees have been created in which collective review and discussion of policy effectively invite cabinet members to involve themselves in each other's responsibilities. The absence of clear delimitation of those responsibilities has resulted in conflicting foreign policy pronouncements by the secretaries of state, defense, commerce, and the treasury and the special trade representative, not to mention the White House Counsellor.[43] This inconsistent policy chorus within the executive branch suggests that even if policy co-ordination can be made to eliminate the decentralized prospect of different United States governments on different issues, Canada may still have

to deal with a United States government speaking different messages with different voices.

Consequences for Canada-United States Relations

If the intention of this paper were merely to analyse developments and trends in the American body politic, it might well end here. The intent, however, was also to assess the impact these developments and trends have had and will have on Canadian-American relations. Any such assessment is obviously prone to all the attendant difficulties of attributing particular causes to effects. It is also clearly prone to even greater difficulties in forecasting future consequences. Perhaps the greatest danger though lies in focussing so much on emerging factors and recent political forces that relatively constant factors and continuing political patterns are ignored, in over-emphasizing current changes and under-emphasizing constant conditions. After looking very briefly at a number of selected issues in the Canada-US relationship, an attempt will be made to assess the impact on politics not only of the American political shifts discussed above but also of basic, structural bilateral realities. The issues selected here include two relatively long-standing ones (the east coast fisheries agreement and the so-called border broadcasting question), one current issue (Canadian energy and foreign investment policies), and two emerging ones (Great Lakes water quality and transboundary air pollution). These cases can be treated here only in very summary fashion.

East Coast Fisheries Agreement The proclamation in 1977 of 200-mile fishing zones by both Canada and the United States heightened the need for a new bilateral management régime on all three shared coasts. An interim agreement in 1978 fell apart largely due to the lack of congressional ratification, and led to a temporary closing of respective zones to fishermen of the other country. Finally, after eighteen months of intensive negotiations, an omnibus agreement

was concluded for the Atlantic coast (especially Georges Bank) area comprising both a Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty and an East Coast Fishery Resources Agreement. Ratification of these accords by the United States Senate was held up, however, for a number of reasons, including the opposition of certain New England senators and the need for consideration of the SALT II treaty. Canadian pressure to proceed with ratification was resisted. During the resulting delay regional US interests opposed to the latter agreement formed the American Fisheries Defence Committee to lobby against passage and the extent of American fishing in the disputed area continued to increase. The success of the lobbying effort and the degree of senatorial opposition was evident in April 1980 when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took up the question. A compromise was ultimately worked out which required substantial amendments. The Canadian government refused to consider these and, rather belatedly, began a campaign to promote ratification of the original negotiated settlement. It met with little success. Following the fall presidential and congressional elections, there were brief signs that the new administration might try to push the original agreement through the Senate. Apparently realizing such an attempt would be politically costly or to no avail, the White House decided in March 1981 to withdraw the fisheries agreement and to support ratification of the related boundary treaty on its own.

Border broadcasting The rapid expansion of cable television service in Canada during the early 1970s brought US television networks to many Canadian viewers previously beyond the range of normal signals. Given the popularity with Canadians of American programming, there followed a considerable increase in Canadian-oriented advertising on those US near-border stations available via cable. The resulting overall diversion of advertising revenues from Canadian outlets was estimated at anywhere from $20-$60 millions annually.[44] Concerned both about the losses in revenue and, potentially, the diminution of the already

small resource base for Canadian programming, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission began requiring deletion by cable company operators of commercials carried by American stations. The resulting advertising revenue losses led the border television operators to begin to pressure executive and congressional officials in Washington. Despite State Department protests and requests for talks on the issue, Ottawa refused to reconsider. Despite, or perhaps because of, mounting American pressure, in July 1976 the Trudeau government passed Bill C-58 which in part made the advertising costs incurred by Canadian companies on non-Canadian stations aimed at the Canadian market non-deductible for tax purposes.

In the same year, in an unrelated move, the US Tax Reform Act was approved by Congress, one section (602) of which effectively limited deductions for expenses from conventions outside the United States. The Canadian government, responding to protests from hotel conventions interests who had begun losing American business, raised the issue of section 602. Sensing an opportunity, the United States border broadcasters enlisted the strong support of especially New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington state senators and persuaded Congress to link the two issues. The US Senate passed two resolutions during 1977 requesting that Canadian broadcasting policies be changed while turning back efforts by particular senators to exempt Canada and Mexico from section 602. Hearings on the Canadian measures were held by the US Special Trade Representative (STR) in late 1978 in order to determine whether they amounted to trade discrimination. The broadcasters were also active at Senate subcommittee hearings on the convention expenses tax deduction question in July 1979, opposing an exemption for Canada without the perceived appropriate quid pro quo. Opposition to such exemption also came from the executive branch: Treasury Department officials actively encouraged congressmen to maintain the linkage while the two countries were still in the process of negotiating a new bilateral tax agreement. After

these negotiations were concluded in mid-1980 and, following the STR's recommendation, the Carter administration had proposed American advertising deduction legislation, a compromise among the Senators cleared the way for amendments granting Canada its convention expenses deduction exemption. However, the border broadcasters whose lost revenues remained unrestored fought on. They presented their case once again during Senate ratification hearings for the bilateral tax treaty in late September 1981.

The NEP and FIRA The federal elections of February 1981 which brought the Trudeau-led Liberal party back into power was fought in part on the questions of government involvement in and foreign control of the Canadian economy. The stated intention of strengthening the Foreign Investment Review Act and the Cabinet appointment of Herb Gray seem to have touched off early expressions of concern within the US during the summer of 1980 about a renewed Canadian economic nationalism. These concerns were fuelled in the autumn when the Trudeau government unveiled its sweeping National Energy Program (NEP). And they were then heightened further when there developed, partly as a result of the NEP announcement, an apparent pattern of takeovers of foreign-controlled oil companies by Canadian enterprises, both private such as Dome Petroleum and public (Petro-Canada). The response in the United States reflected American oil company fears of further takeover bids and both business community and political officials' unhappiness with what they saw as clearly discriminatory Canadian policies. The combination of the NEP and a more active Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) was particularly bothersome.

After unsuccessful attempts at informal consultations, Washington made the unusual move of delivering a 'report' on its concerns to the chairman of the House of Commons committee which was looking at the NEP (Bill C-48). This report criticized the Canadian violation of the principles of open investment and of non-discriminatory treatment of foreign companies, the government's reserving of

a 25-per-cent interest in oil rights on the so-called 'Canada lands,' its 'buy Canadian' provisions and its 'discounting' of domestic oil prices which represented a subsidy to Canadian industry. By June and July press reports emanating from Washington made clear there was widespread congressional and executive branch dissatisfaction and even hostility to emerging Canadian policies. 'If Ottawa wants to play hardball' one trade official noted, 'we can play hardball.'[45] And former State Department under-secretary George Ball was quoted as warning that 'discrimination begets retaliation.'[46] By mid-August the 'Canadian problem' or the 'Canadian disease' as the Wall Street Journal called it,[47] had been a major agenda item of no less than six Reagan administration cabinet-level meetings and the focus of a number of bills introduced in an aroused and even angry Congress, all of which were in some sense retaliatory in nature. These included the imposition of margin requirements for takeovers of United States firms, the closure of federal lands to foreign oil exploration, and a moratorium on foreign acquisitions of American energy companies. Administration officials were reportedly doubtful about most of these proposed measures - but, it appeared, more doubtful about their efficacy as retaliatory measures than about their aims. Additional, more far-reaching, options were under active consideration in the executive branch. The administration's own campaign was escalated in late September when Myer Rashish, under-secretary of state for economic affairs, warned publicly that 'sentiment is strong in favor of countermeasures against Canadian investment and energy policies. The dangers are real.' Calling for a change in these policies, he claimed that bilateral relations 'are sliding dangerously toward crisis.'[48]

Great Lakes water quality Under the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Canada and the United States agreed to undertake co-operative, though not joint, programmes to control water pollution in the Lakes. The key provision of the agreement was a commitment by each side to reduce overall phosphate loadings

to specified levels by agreed target dates. At the time a replacement agreement was negotiated in 1978 neither country had met fully the letter of this commitment. But while almost 80 per cent of Canadian municipalities had attained their required level of reductions, barely 40 per cent of US municipalities had attained theirs, and the delinquents included the largest American cities on the Lakes. The more explicit phosphorus loading commitments of the new agreement nonetheless were based on the expectation that all major United States sewer and treatment plant construction projects would be completed by the end of 1982. This forecast, in turn, was based on the assumption that federal funding programmes would be maintained at existing levels. The 1978 agreement also committed both countries to co-ordinate scientific research and monitoring programmes in the Great Lakes region.

Although the ultimate extent and precise effects of the Reagan administration's budget cuts on these Great Lakes activities is not certain at the present time, there is little doubt that the impact will be substantial. The regional head of the Environmental Protection Agency estimated that control programme funding would likely be halved and that for research cut even more. A number of the federal research laboratories engaged in Great Lakes-related work seemed destined to close down. The former Canadian co-chairman of the International Joint Committee charged publicly, and many Canadian and American government officials concluded privately, that the net effect would be such as to put the United States substantially in violation of the 1978 bilateral accord.

Transboundary Air Pollution The most prominent environmental issue in current Canadian-American relations is that of long-range transport, or more specifically, acid rain. The bulk of the sulphur and nitrogen oxides which are emitted from thermal generating plants, smelters, and other sources, and which when transported and changed chemically in the atmosphere produce acid rain, originate in the United States. While Canadian sources contribute to a sub-

stantial degree, particularly in the INCO plant outside Sudbury, Ontario, the prevailing wind patterns of North American ensure that the lakes, soils, and forests of New England and Eastern Canada are the main distant recipients of acid rain from the American industrial heartland, and particularly the Ohio Valley. The scope and severity of this phenomenon is such that a former federal minister has called it 'the worst environmental problem [Canada has] ever had to face.' Another observer (presumably with pun in cheek) has termed acid rain 'one of the most corrosive problems in Canadian-American relations.'

Informal and formal bilateral talks on transboundary air pollution at both the scientific and official levels have been going on at least since 1977. These have led to two joint scientific reports (in 1979 and 1980), a bilateral Statement of Principles in July 1979, and a joint Memorandum of Intent in August 1980. The latter agreement established a number of technical working groups, which produced their first interim reports in early 1981, and committed both countries to begin negotiations on a bilateral air quality agreement by June 1981. The present state of this effort seems uncertain; its future even more so. Although the second phase interim reports of the working groups have been virtually completed, the Environmental Protection Agency appears resistant to finalizing and releasing them. Some Canadian officials are doubtful the reports will be released at all. More importantly the initial meeting of the prospective negotiating teams in June was quite inconclusive. The American side made clear they could neither speak to the substantive problem nor even definitely schedule another meeting until the administration determined what its basic position would be. Few observers on either side of the border have expressed much optimism that the Reagan administration would compromise its anti-regulation philosophy or prove to be environmentally concerned. Since a substantial reduction in acid rain could only be effective by a strengthening and broadening of the regulations in the United States Clean Air Act, and since the administration's proposed

amendments to this act appear to weaken it substantially, it seems highly unlikely that an effective bilateral agreement will emerge in the near future.

These five cases - the east coast fisheries agreement, border broadcasting, NEP-FIRA conflict, Great Lakes water quality, and transboundary air pollution - provide no lack of evidence that recent changes in the American political system have had an impact on Canada-United States relations. The new conservatism reflected in and championed by the Reagan administration, but also reflected in Congress, explains much about the current hostility towards Canada's National Energy Program and over Ottawa's use of FIRA. The prevailing pro-business, pro-free trade mood in Washington and an antipathy toward government intervention in the economy lead quite naturally and directly to a bevy of complaints. The combination of NEP's discrimination against foreign oil enterprises and FIRA restrictions, it has been said, have 'changed the rules of the game,' have produced 'a kind of fire sale' of American companies, and even, according to one spokesman, amount to 'expropriation' of United States assets.[49] Canada's 'protectionist and nationalistic approach' are said by senior administration officials to be both 'a violation of our bilateral agreements' and 'inconsistent with an enlightened international investment policy and international obligations.'[50]

A strong commitment to the 'free market' and an equally strong antipathy toward governmental regulation are also clearly major influences, for example, in the east coast fisheries agreement, border broadcasting, and acid rain issues. American and Canadian domestic policies with respect to their fishing industries differ dramatically. While few regulations or constraints on entry exist in the US, the Canadian industry is heavily regulated regarding not only entry but also numbers and sizes of boats, quantity of catch, and so on. This difference in philosophy has a very concrete, practical consequence - what government and industry spokesmen in Canada alike regard with great concern as overfishing on the United States side. 'The Americans,' one Canadian official has been quoted

as saying, 'think that economics can take care of conservation.'[51] In the acid rain case, Canadians are much alarmed that the Reagan administration's conservative philosophy and keen desire to 'unleash industry' will result in greater production rather than greater control of transboundary air pollution. A similar philosophical divergence can be found in the border broadcasting issue. There, on the other hand, the concrete consequences of concern - by Americans - were the constraints on Canadian advertisers regulated by the Canadian government. As noted earlier, another integral part of the new administration's programme, the federal budget cuts, seem destined to have a substantial impact on United States pollution control efforts along the Great Lakes and thus, inevitably, on the tenor and substance of bilateral politics in this area.

Perhaps the most obvious but most complex shift of consequences has been in congressional-executive relations. The resurgence of Congress through the 1970s is perhaps as evident in America's dealing with Canada as anywhere else. Whether frustrating executive branch-negotiated treaties, linking issues involving Canada, or leading the attack, at least rhetorically, on disfavoured Canadian policies, Congress has been playing a key role.

It would seem difficult to deny that changing forces in the American political system are having a profound impact on Canadian-American relations. Nevertheless, it would be quite wrong to imply, let alone assert, that these factors are the only ones at work. They may indeed not even be the dominant factors. To highlight recent shifts such as the new conservatism and Reagan budget cutting without also bringing into focus the wider historical context would be quite misleading. Although the present paper is hardly the place to attempt an exhaustive broad-brushed analysis of the multiplicity of factors operating in the American political system, it can point out certain features and note examples.

The conservative thrust of the Reagan administration is, after all, hardly an aberration or novel element in American politics. Whatever novelty there is lies in its degree of political success, not in its underlying values or public messages. At least insofar as Canada is concerned much of the message has been heard before. American concerns, for example, about the free flow of international investment have been voiced virtually every time Canadian restrictions on that flow have been proposed. The arguments raised with respect to the 1963 Gordon budget, the 1968 Watkins report, the 1971 Gray report, the eventual establishment of FIRA, and more recent Ottawa initiatives have all been basically similar in major respects. Such policies, it is said, violate international norms and obligations. These concerns stem also from a relatively clear perception of American national interests, whatever that term means, even if the public rhetoric tends to be cast in broader terms. The important point here is that both America's evident commitment to these principles and to its economic interests transcend presidents and administrations, transcend shifts in congressional-executive relations, and transcend shifts in political values and fashions.

The current anti-regulation mood in Washington can, in the same way, be seen as a heightening of, rather than a departure from long-standing orientation. In Jeffersonian America government regulation has never been much in fashion. Domestic fisheries policy, in place long before the Reagan White House, is but one manifestation. Even in the environmental area, and notwithstanding the often aggressive regulatory stance of the EPA, effective regulation has proven difficult. Unlike Ontario, where reluctant municipalities were muscled into building sewage treatment facilities, Washington has long found it extremely difficult to pressure or force cities like Detroit into line. Sustained opposition to federal clean air statutes, particularly by Ohio polluters and by the state government itself, has also proven largely successful throughout the

1970s. Interestingly enough, given the emphasis often placed on federal-provincial relations as a factor in Canadian foreign policy, there is a fairly strong federal-state dimension in United States policy which appears closely related to anti-regulatory traditions. In the fisheries case, for example, a key impediment to any federal resource management plan is the fact that such a measure would be challenged as intervention by regional fisheries councils. And the tough stance on air pollution controls traditionally taken by Ohio and some other states is as much anti-federal as it is anti-controls. Ronald Reagan is not even the first president in recent years to favour deregulation. Faced with political pressures and policy imperatives, Jimmy Carter took a similar position at least with respect to oil prices. Moreover under his administration EPA moved toward greater consideration of the economics of pollution controls - a key Reagan campaign position on environmental issues.

Conclusion

To argue that recent developments and trends in American politics are not all-important to Canada-US relations is not to argue that they are unimportant. It is to make the case they should be seen in context. To assess the present state and future direction of the relationship we must not ignore relatively enduring factors, emphases, and conditions of the American political system. The elections of November 1980 did not, in one blow, create a new era in Canadian-American affairs. To be sure, the Reagan and conservative victories have harshened the rhetoric a little and altered somewhat, in John Holmes's words, 'the atmospherics.' But so far they have not amounted to a new beginning.

On the other hand, there may be some long-term changes taking place of a more subtle nature, but with perhaps crucial consequences for Canada. One of these, reflected in the Reagan victory, is the emerging dominance of the west and southwest in American politics. These regions, traditionally more conservative,

but also traditionally less concerned with the country's northern neighbour may well become increasingly allied politically with the 'Old South' if recent post-election shifts there toward Republican party partisan identification are maintained. Another change is the slow but steady decline in America's once predominant international economic position. The success of OPEC and growing fears within the US about increasing foreign, particularly Arab, investment are but one reflection of this decline. If these and other economic and employment-related concerns should mount and protectionism eventually overcome traditional American commitments to free trade and investment flows, the consequences for Canada would be profound. Similarly, the onset of a 'Conservative Revolution' in American politics, a late twentieth century counterpoint to the New Deal era, would almost certainly at least exacerbate numerous bilateral issues when Canadian and United States philosophies and policy approaches diverge. Thus, however powerful the impact of the Reagan administration itself may be on Canadian-American relations, the period of his presidency is likely to see the beginnings of a new era in the relationship.

NOTES

1 Peter Thomson, Winnipeg Free Press, 22 January 1981

2 Hyman Solomon, Financial Post, 21 March 1981

3 Geoffrey Stevens, Globe and Mail (Toronto), 19 March 1981

4 Vital Speeches 47:17 (15 June 1981), p 516

5 For an examination of critical elections, see Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970).

6 See, for example, text of his speech to the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners in Chicago in September 1981, New York Times, 4 September 1981, p A10

7 U.S. News and World Report, 8 June 1981, pp 45-6

8 Christian Science Monitor, 1 May 1981

9 George F. Will suggests that the New Federalism arises out of 'American conservatives' odd sentimentality about state and local governments, which are supposed to be more noble than the Federal government because they are " closer to the people." ' Newsweek, 11 May 1981, p 100

10 Exit poll results reported in the New York Times, 5 November 1980, p A 18. Ideological orientation does not appear to have shifted much since 1974. The polling firm of Yankelovich, Skelly, and White found in 1974 that 41 per cent considered themselves conservative, 42 per cent 'moderate' and 16 per cent liberal or radical; in a similar poll in 1981, 42 per cent considered themselves conservative, 42 per cent moderate, and 14 per cent liberal or moderate. See Yankelovich poll results in Time, 1 June 1981, p 10

11 There is no indication from the New York Times/CBS poll that this personal discontent was accompanied by a wider sociotripic calculus - where a voter makes a national rather than a personal assessment of economic well-being. See Donald R. Kinder, 'Presidents, Prosperity and Public Opinion,' Public Opinion Quarterly 45:1 (spring 1981) for a discussion of the sociotropic calculus in presidential votes

12 New York Times, 5 November 1980, p A1

13 An interesting analysis of this geographic shift of the political nexus can be found in Stephen Sandelius and Charles R. Foster, 'Economic Shift to Sunbelt Reflected in Foreign Policy,' International Perspectives (May/June 1981), pp 11-14.

14 Although the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industiral Organizations leadership supported Carter, an AFL-CIO poll in the summer of 1980 revealed that over 50 per cent of union members supported the views of Ronald Reagan and 'other right-wing politicians.' See Christian Science Monitor, 28 October 1980

15 New York Times, 5 November 1980, p A1

16 For an excellent analysis of voter turn out, see Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, Who Votes? (New Haven: Yale University Press 1980), esp chap 6

17 Vital Speeches 46:21 (15 August 1980), p 649

18 Yankelovich et al. poll for Time, 1 June 1981, pp 10-11

19 Results of Newsweek/Gallup poll, Newsweek, 23 February 1981, p 19

20 Only 62 per cent of those polled had heard of the Moral Majority; of that number, 24 per cent felt favourably towards the group.

21 Time, 1 June 1981, p 11

22 Gallup poll, Newsweek, 29 June 1981, p 29

23 U.S. News and World Report, 8 June 1981, p 27

24 See the New York Times, 6 November 1980, p A25

25 See Reagan's acceptance speech at the national convention (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 26 September 1980, pp 30480-1); his inaugural address (ibid, 13 February 1981, pp 30709-10); and his speech to the graduating class at West Point in May 1981 (Vital Speeches 47:17 (15 June 1981))

26 Vital Speeches 47:17 (15 June 1981)

27 Daniel Yankelovich and Larry Kagan, 'Assertive America,' Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1980, p 710

28 Ibid, p 708

29 Ibid; exit poll in New York Times, 5 November 1980, p A18

30 Time poll, 1 June 1981, p 10

31 Yankelovich and Kagan, 'Assertive America,' p 708

32 Time poll, 1 June 1981, p 10. See also the results of cross-national poll on defence views in Connie de Boer, 'Our Commitment to World War III,' Public Opinion Quarterly 45:1 (spring 1981), pp 126-34

33 Yankelovich and Kagan, 'Assertive America,' p 706. For an earlier examination of trends in American opinion on foreign policy issues, see William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, 'Nationalism, Not Isolationism,' Foreign Policy 24 (fall 1976), pp 3-26

34 Yankelovich and Kagan, 'Assertive America,' p 706

35 Newsweek poll, 8 June 1981, p 31

36 Time poll, 1 June 1981, p 11

37 Gerald Wright, 'Anxious Days Are Here Again,' International Journal 36:1 (winter 1980-1), p 232

38 Excerpts from the Republican policy platform in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 26 September 1980, pp 30477-9

39 Ambassador Kenneth M. Curtis, Conference on Comparative Executive Leadership: the Prime Minister and the President, Château Laurier, Ottawa, 18 October 1980

40 Austin Ranney, 'The Political Parties: Reform and Decline,' in Anthony King, ed, The New American Political System (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), pp 241-5

41 Curtis

42 I.M. Destler, 'Congress as Boss?' Foreign Policy 40 (autumn 1980); Lloyd Cutler, 'To Form a Government,' Foreign Affairs, 59 (fall 1980)

43 Tad Szulc, 'The Vicar Vanquished,' Foreign Policy 43 (summer 1981)

44 Donald Barry, 'The American Congress and the Conduct of Canada-U.S. Relations,' paper delivered to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, 27-29 May 1981

45 Quoted by Hyman Solomon, Financial Post, 7 March 1981

46 New York Times, 10 July 1981. See also Ball's views in 'Reflections on a Heavy Year,' Foreign Affairs: American and the World 1980, pp 474-99

47 Quoted in Globe and Mail, 18 March 1981

48 Ibid, 23 September 1981

49 William Brock, quoted in Toronto Star, 15 July 1981

50 Malcolm Baldridge, quoted in Globe and Mail, 21 July 1981

51 Quoted by Geoffrey Stevens, ibid, 19 March 1981