



Kim Richard Nossal, "A Thermostatic Dynamic? Electoral Outcomes and Anti-Americanism in Canada," in Richard A. Higgott and Ivona Malbašić, eds., *The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism* (London: Routledge, 2008), 129-41. (Page turns indicated thus: [130])

Anti-Americanism in Canada is unique (Granatstein 1996, Daniels 1998). There is no other country in the world which owes its existence to a conscious act of anti-Americanism: Canada emerged as a separate political community because of the refusal by elites in the other British North American colonies to accept the invitation of the American revolutionaries to join in the new republican experiment. Second, there is no other political community in which anti-Americanism is so deeply established as part of the political culture. At the same time, however, there is no other political community where such deeply entrenched anti-Americanism is generally so bland that Harvey M. Sapolsky (2005) has termed it "low grade anti-Americanism" — akin to Moisés Naím's argument that there is a "lite" anti-Americanism that can be contrasted with more virulent forms of this sentiment (Naím 2003). Indeed, for all the deeply-rooted and pervasive anti-Americanism in Canada, one would be hard-pressed to find among Canadians the kind of virulent attitudes reported in most contemporary studies of the phenomenon of anti-Americanism (e.g., Hollander 2004, Gibson 2004, Rubin and Rubin 2004, Ross and Ross 2004, Sardar and Davies 2002, Hertsgaard 2002).

There is one further unique quality to anti-Americanism in Canada, however: in no other country can one so consistently see a connection between sentiments about the US and the outcomes of general elections. I will show that over the last half-century, we can see what appears to be a thermostatic dynamic at work in Canadian politics that serve to regulate the impact of the anti-Americanism that is so deeply entrenched in Canadian political culture: if a political party in power pursues policies or exhibits attitudes that distance Canada too far from the US or a particular administration, it will soon find itself out of power, replaced by a party which has campaigned, *inter alia*, on the promise to repair or restore good relations with the US; by the same token, however, if a political party in power pursues policies or exhibits attitudes that align Canada too closely with the US or the policies of a particular administration, it will also soon find

itself out of power, replaced by a party which has promised the electorate, *inter alia*, that, if elected, it will see greater distance and independence for Canada.

In this chapter, I will examine this dynamic by surveying the last 50 years of electoral contests when anti-American attitudes towards the US or particular [130] presidents played an important role in electoral outcomes. To do this, however, we need to frame Canadian anti-Americanism more broadly.

Types of Canadian Anti-Americanism

As Inderjeet Parmar (2004: 5–7) has noted, there is little agreement on how to define anti-Americanism; and how one defines it “is not without consequences” for the ensuing analysis. Thus, for Parmar, anti-Americanism is a “multifaceted and complex phenomenon,” and thus “it is important that its varied meanings are explicated.” While much of the literature focuses on the virulent (and murderous) elements of some strands of anti-American (e.g., Joffe 2004: 29), in fact, most definitions in the contemporary literature try to grapple with the obvious multidimensionality of anti-Americanism. In this chapter, I use an ideational definition, borrowed from both James W. Ceaser and Paul Hollander. Ceaser (2003) suggests that “Anti-Americanism rests on the singular idea that something associated with the US, something at the core of American life, is deeply wrong and threatening to the rest of the world.” For his part, Hollander (1992: viii) defined anti-Americanism as “a particular mind-set, an attitude of distaste, aversion or intense hostility the roots of which may be found in matters unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society or the foreign policies of the United States.” In my view, such pithy ideational definitions capture well the essentially multidimensional nature of the phenomenon in Canada while avoiding the necessity of including such intense sentiments such as hatred or malevolence in the definition (cf. Rubin and Rubin 2004: ix).

We can also see that anti-Americanism in Canada does not exhibit the same varieties that we see in other places, such as Europe. As Adam Garfinkle (2004: 316–17) has noted, European anti-Americanism comprises three distinct, though interrelated, strands. One is *philosophical anti-Americanism*, associated with the rejectionism of the nature of the American polity by European thinkers over the two centuries after the American Revolution (Ceaser 1997, 2004). A second type is *cultural anti-Americanism*, a concern over Americanization of local culture and mores. The third is *contingent anti-Americanism*, “stimulated by the dislike of particular policies or personalities in any given U.S. administration” (Garfinkle : 317). Anti-Americanism in Canada has not been grounded in any comparable philosophical critique—perhaps not surprisingly, since the vast majority of people who live in Canada, whether aboriginal peoples or newcomers, English-speaking or French-speaking, are in ideology and culture far more *American*

than they are *European*. As John W. Holmes (1981: 114) put it archly, “It is in any case nonsense to talk about Canada being Americanized when it has always been just as much an American nation as the United States … and there is no reason to claim that the United States way is any more natively North American than the Canadian.”

Rather, as Granatstein argued, anti-Americanism in Canada has been historically grounded in a unique variety of concerns about Americanization that includes, but goes well beyond, the cultural anti-Americanism outlined by Garfinkle. I argue that the comparable form of anti-Americanism we see in Canada is economic anti-[131]Americanism—a form of economic nationalism (Nossal 1985) that was driven by the fear that the US, with its vast economy, would absorb its smaller neighbour, and thus bring the British North American community to an end.

Granatstein has argued that Canadian anti-Americanism between the 1770s and 1980s was in large part driven by those in Canada with a vested interest in the particular political outcomes that anti-American sentiments would produce. The ideas that the “United Empire Loyalists”—those American colonists who remained loyal to Britain and either fled or were expelled from the new republic and came north—brought with them focused on the putative ills of American “mob” democracy and the supposedly superior qualities of a more conservative monarchical system, suited the oligarchs of British North America well. Likewise, the characterization of Americans as grasping wolves, eager to swallow Canada, served the interests of those elites in Canada whose wealth was dependent on maintaining high tariff barriers and deep opposition to economic integration with the US. The argument is not new: as Granatstein himself notes (Granatstein 1996: 266), the Canadian historian Frank Underhill wrote in 1929 that “the same interests are preparing to wave the old flag and to make their own private profit, political and economic, by saving us once more from the United States.”

The pervasiveness of economic anti-Americanism in Canada can be seen from the number of occasions when Canadians rejected the idea of closer economic integration with the US. The most important occasion came in 1911, when the Liberal government of Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier negotiated a free trade agreement—the Reciprocity Treaty—with the US. In the general election of that year, the Laurier Liberals were defeated by the Conservatives under Robert Borden. The so-called “free trade election” of 1911 cast a long shadow in Canadian politics: until the late 1980s, free trade with the US was widely avoided because it was widely assumed that the party advocating free trade would go down to electoral defeat. Thus, for example, when a free trade agreement that had been negotiated between Canadian and American officials after the Second World War was presented to Prime Minister Mackenzie King, he could not bring himself to sign it. Although he had approved the negotiations, King worried that the agreement would spell the end of Canada, and that he would go down in

history as the prime minister who was responsible for the end of the nation (Granatstein 1985). Likewise, when he was campaigning for the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1983, Brian Mulroney rejected the idea of a free trade agreement with the US: “That’s why free trade was decided on in an election in 1911... It affects Canadian sovereignty, and we’ll have none of it, not during leadership campaigns, nor at any other times” (quoted in Martin 1993: 44).

However, by the early 1980s, there was a growing elite consensus, reflected in both the private sector and within the state apparatus, that the historical opposition to closer economic integration with the US was obsolete. Changes in behaviour quickly followed. Mulroney led the PCs to a massive parliamentary majority in the general elections of September 1984, and, within a year, changed his mind on free trade (Tomlin 2001). He was persuaded that given the depth of protectionist sentiment in the US Congress, Canada should [132] seek guaranteed access to the American market via a comprehensive free trade agreement. An agreement was negotiated with the administration of Ronald Reagan, and signed in 1987. In 1988, the general election was fought on the issue of the free trade agreement, with the 1911 positions reversed: the Conservatives were proposing free trade, and the Liberals (together with the social democratic party, the New Democratic Party) vociferously opposed to the agreement. And whereas in 1911 business interests had lined up squarely against free trade, in 1988, business was very much in favour of free trade, joining with the Conservatives in deriding the opposition of the Liberals and the NDP as out-moded anti-Americanism. The Conservatives were returned to office, and the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement came into force on 1 January 1989.

More importantly, as the free trade agreements with the US and then Mexico began to have an impact on the huge growth of Canadian wealth in the 1990s (Fagan 2003), economic anti-Americanism within the broader public died almost completely, leaving only contingent anti-Americanism as a force in Canadian politics.

Contingent Anti-Americanism in Canadian Politics


While we have seen the disappearance of economic anti-Americanism in Canada since the early 1990s, we have not seen the disappearance of the third kind of anti-Americanism identified by Garfinkle, *contingent anti-Americanism*—in other words, the dislike of particular policies or personalities of any given US administration. This form of anti-Americanism can (and does) co-exist with other forms of anti-Americanism; but it also can (and does) co-exist with essentially positive attitudes towards the US, allowing us to explain, in Canada’s case, why anti-Americanism takes the “low-grade” or “lite” form it does. While for many years contingent anti-Americanism co-existed with economic anti-Americanism in Canada, it can be argued that with the

disappearance of economic anti-Americanism since the late 1980s, this has emerged to be the dominant form.


The contingent nature of Canadian anti-Americanism can perhaps best be illustrated by examining the results of a global poll conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation in the wake of the decision of the US administration of George W. Bush to invade Iraq and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein. As Figure 1 shows, Canadians have generally favourable feelings towards America, second only to Americans themselves, and well ahead of the predominantly positive attitudes in other countries that have been traditionally “friendly” towards the US such as Britain, Israel and Australia. But when asked about their feelings towards Bush or the US invasion of Iraq, Canadians responded far less positively. While not demonstrating the degree of antipathy for Bush or the invasion of Iraq evident in France or Jordan, Canadians nonetheless suggested in their responses to the BBC poll that their generally positive sentiments about the US are not automatically reflected in their views of specific American leaders or their policies.

Figure 1. Contingent Anti-Americanism

General attitudes towards America Q1 In general, how would you say you feel towards America?




General attitude towards President George W Bush



Q2 Thinking specifically about President Bush of America, would you say your attitude towards President Bush is...?

Invading Iraq Q: Do you think America was right or wrong to invade Iraq?



SOURCE: "What the world thinks of America," British Broadcasting Corporation, 17 June 2003. Available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/wtwt/default.stm>

The results of the BBC poll are generally in line with other poll results for [133] Canadian attitudes towards the US. For example, an Environics Research Group/Focus Canada (2003) poll revealed that 62 per cent expressed “very favourable” or “somewhat favourable” opinions of the US; 35 per cent expressed “somewhat unfavourable” or “very unfavourable” opinions. Another poll (Leger Marketing 2003) conducted in April-May 2003 revealed that 50 per cent of Canadians believed that American foreign policy had a negative effect on Canada, with 41 per cent believing that the invasion of Iraq was not justified. A November 2004 poll commissioned by a Canadian advocacy group, Friends of America, revealed similar results. While some of the questions were clearly designed to elicit certain responses (“Deep down, I know that Americans are our closest friends”), the poll nonetheless revealed a basic division between warm feelings for the US and criticism of the foreign policies of the Bush administration (“71% Rate U.S. as ‘Closest Friend,’” *National Post*, 29 November 2004).

In short, the dichotomy evident in the 2003 BBC poll is by no means a new phenomenon. Canadians have always had negative views about particular American presidents and about particular policies of the US. Canadians generally responded very differently to American presidents: Democratic presidents such as Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) and Bill Clinton (1993-2001) were viewed more favourably in Canada than Republican presidents, such as Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974), Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), and George W. Bush (a phenomenon that has led some observers to suggest that if Canadians had the vote in American presidential elections, they would overwhelmingly vote the Democratic ticket). For example, it is instructive to compare the generally unfavourable attitude that Canadians held towards George W. Bush and his policies on Iraq in the mid-2000s with the generally favourable attitudes that Canadians had of his predecessor, Bill Clinton, and Clinton’s decision to bomb terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998: Canadians gave Clinton a 68 per cent approval rating, with 51 per cent of Canadians approving of the air strikes and fully 55 per cent agreeing with the question “If the United States launches similar attacks against terrorist facilities in the future would you approve or disapprove of your country’s military participating in those attacks?” (Gallup 1998).

Throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, we saw similar displays of contingent anti-Americanism in Canada—primarily in the form of opposition to aspects of American global policy, or US policy towards Canada. This contingent anti-Americanism tended to manifest itself in public anger against an American president and/or some act of commission or omission of the US government, sometimes involving direct Canadian interests, sometimes involving American policy on issues that do not have a direct bearing on Canada or Canadians. Often the flare of public anger or opposition was brief; normally, it did not have a marked impact on the policy of

governments in Washington or Ottawa; and rarely did it have an impact on cross-border trade.

There are numerous examples of contingent anti-Americanism in Canada driven by opposition to specific policies or personalities. Some were major events, such as the escalation of the war in Vietnam by President Lyndon B. Johnson in the mid-1960s. The massive opposition to the Vietnam War in the US had [134] major spillover effects in Canada, producing a kind of miniature replica effect: Canadians held similar protests, engaged in similar denunciations, and indeed used the same slogans as their American counterparts. But the war galvanized Canadian anti-Americanism as no other event has, and not simply because of the draft resisters, dodgers, deserters and others who sought to migrate from the US during the conflict.

Some contingent anti-Americanism was prompted by relatively isolated incidents that would flare up, give rise to an expression of anti-American anger in Canada, and disappear, relatively briefly. Among these incidents could be included: the accusations by James G. Endicott, a Canadian missionary and leader of a Soviet front organization, the Canadian Peace Congress, that the US military was using germ warfare during the Korean War¹; the suicide of Herbert Norman, the Canadian ambassador to Cairo, in April 1957,² or the 1971 decision by the US to conduct underground tests of nuclear

¹ [This footnote was published as an endnote, p. 140] Endicott held a rally at Maple Leaf Gardens, at the time the largest venue in Toronto, on 10 May 1952, attended by a crowd of supporters all but a few of whom (who were quickly hustled out by the organizers) cheered his denunciations of American “wickedness” (*Toronto Star*, 12 May 1952, 15). His claims were widely rejected at the time, and no evidence has ever been adduced in the five decades since to support his charges. However, as Granatstein (1996: 107–108) notes, “What was most significant in this whole episode was that, in the middle of a war in which Canadians were fighting and dying, ten thousand people turned out to cheer a man who was spreading stories that only the most credulous could have believed.”

² [This footnote was published as an endnote, pp. 140–41] Norman had been a student at Cambridge in the 1930s and a member of the Communist Party. He had gone on to join the Canadian Department of External Affairs in 1939 and had been investigated by the US Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security chaired by Senator Joseph McCarthy in both 1951 and 1952, but had been cleared. His name surfaced again in March 1957. After the subcommittee published its testimony, Norman committed suicide. For reporters, a smiling Robert Morris, the committee’s chief counsel, held up a newspaper whose headline read “Envoy Accused as Red Kills Self.” As Donald Creighton noted (1976: 291), Canadian “grief and anger were great; and these strong feelings were aroused not merely by the outrage of Norman’s death,” but also “by the casual, unconcerned, perfunctory fashion in which both the Canadian and American governments treated it.”

weapons on the Aleutian island of Amchitka.³ Likewise, the decision of the Mulroney government to participate in the US-led coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait during the Gulf War in 1991 generated a great deal of anti-Americanism (Nossal 1994).

In some cases, a particular administration's policies on a variety of policy issues galvanized opposition. For example, the administration of Ronald Reagan attracted strong opposition in Canada over the course of the 1980s for its environmental policies—in particular the issue of acid rain from the US (Munton and Castle 1992), its defence policies (the Strategic Defense Initiative, the decision to test cruise missiles over Canada in 1982), its Arctic policies that challenged Canadian sovereignty (Griffiths 1987), or its use of force against others in the international system (Libya, Grenada, Nicaragua).

Interestingly, the numerous trade disputes that Canadians have with Americans tend not to produce the kind of anti-American sentiments that differences over other policy areas do. Those who have been inclined to demonstrate their anger against the US government for some aspect of American global policy have demonstrated little consciousness of, or sympathy for, their fellow nationals whose livelihoods have been affected by American actions, such as the closure of the border to beef or the imposition of countervails on some product. Likewise, those whose economic interests are affected by American protectionism have not been inclined to demonstrate their anger by protesting outside the American embassy or US consulates. As a result, trade issues, while they produce just as much anger (if not more, since they affect concrete rather than symbolic interests), do not play an important part in anti-Americanism in Canada.

However, because anti-Americanism is so deeply rooted in Canada, some political leaders have found it tempting to try to tap into this sentiment for electoral/political purposes. While most Canadian governments have sought to downplay or minimize contingent anti-Americanism, there are three clear examples of this dynamic at work: under John Diefenbaker, the Progressive Conservative prime minister from 1957 to 1963, under Pierre Trudeau and the Liberal government from 1980 to 1984, and under the Liberal governments of Jean Chrétien (1993–2003) and Paul Martin (2003–2006).

³ [This footnote was published as an endnote, p. 141] The Amchitka test was denounced by church groups and by conservation groups worried about the possibility that the underground explosion would trigger earthquakes or tsunamis. There were large-scale protests held in front of American consulates, and three international bridges were blockaded by protestors. Two Members of Parliament travelled to Washington and picketed the White House. The Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau decided to reflect the growing anger by introducing a resolution in the House of Commons calling on the president to cancel the test; 100 MPs subsequently sent a last-minute appeal to the White House. Nixon was unperturbed by the protests; the test went ahead on 6 November (Dobell 1976: 400–401).

[135] John Diefenbaker was elected as leader of the Progressive Conservatives in December 1956. In the 1957 election campaign, Diefenbaker used the anti-Americanism that had been stirred by the suicide of Herbert Norman to maximum electoral advantage, arguing that the Liberals were too pro-American and that Canada was sure to become “a virtual 49th state of the American union” (Granatstein 1996: 125). Part of the reason for the Conservative victory in the 1957 election that yielded a minority government, and then the 1958 election that resulted in a Conservative majority, was the appeal to the anti-American sentiment in Canada. But Diefenbaker’s anti-Americanism did not fully flower until John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency of the US in January 1961. In 1961 and 1962, a series of deep quarrels divided Diefenbaker and Kennedy over defence policy and policy towards Cuba. The most severe split came over the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Diefenbaker not only refused to put the Royal Canadian Air Force units of the North American Air Defence (NORAD) Command on high alert, but he also gave a public speech calling for a United Nations investigation into American claims that the Soviet Union was installing missiles in Cuba. Needless to say, Kennedy and other members of the administration were not amused at having their honesty publicly questioned by the Canadian prime minister (Lyon 1968: 27-64; Robinson 1989, chap. 28). Diefenbaker tried to play the anti-American card in the 1963 election campaign; indeed, as Robinson (1989: 307) notes, as the 1963 elections approached, Diefenbaker was “relishing the prospect of an anti-American election campaign.”

A comparable appeal to popular anti-American sentiment was evident in the period of Liberal governments between 1980 and 1984 and between 1993 and 2006. After Pierre Trudeau won the 1980 election, his government enacted a series of economic nationalist policies that targeted the US and American interests. The National Energy Program and the revitalization of the Foreign Investment Review Agency generated considerable opposition in the US (Clarkson 1985)—and because of this were intensely popular in Canada. Compounding these economic quarrels were disputes over the damage in Canada being caused by acid rain emanating from the US and a deepening division between Reagan and Trudeau over the Cold War and American global policy, with Trudeau increasingly willing to disagree publicly with Washington (Granatstein and Bothwell 1990; Bromke and Nossal 1983-84). While Trudeau himself was not anti-American (McCall and Clarkson 1994: 203), there can be little doubt that the obvious disputes with Washington fed and legitimized anti-Americanism in both the Liberal party and in the country at large.

Jean Chrétien was one of Trudeau’s cabinet ministers, and was selected Liberal leader in 1990; the Liberals under Chrétien won the 1993 general elections. During the 1993 campaign, Chrétien promised that he would abandon what he claimed had been

the excessively close relationship that the Conservative prime minister, Brian Mulroney, had enjoyed with both Reagan and George H.W. Bush. While Chrétien did abandon the annual summit meeting with the president that Mulroney had instituted, and while he did not celebrate his relationship with Bill Clinton the way that Mulroney had made much of his relations with Reagan and Bush, [136] Chrétien nonetheless developed a good relationship with Clinton, often playing golf with him and telephoning him frequently over the seven years they were both in office together.

But Chrétien also used anti-Americanism for domestic political purposes. His decision to reinstitute good relations with Cuba (after Canada's relations had been purposely downgraded in the late 1970s as a result of Cuban military adventurism in Africa) was based on his assessment that not only would Cuba be an excellent recipient for Canadian International Development Agency contracts, but that the divergence between Canadian and American positions on Cuba could entrench his own claims to be more distant from Washington. Indeed, Chrétien's attitude towards the political importance of anti-Americanism was revealed inadvertently in July 1997. While attending a NATO summit in July 1997, Chrétien and Jean-Luc Dehane, the prime minister of Belgium, were chatting with one another in French—without realizing that their microphones were open. Chrétien confided to Dehane that he had made defying the US "my policy. The Cuba affair, I was the first to stand up [unintelligible]. People like that." But Chrétien also added: "You have to do it carefully, because they're friends" (*Globe and Mail*, 10 July 1997; *Maclean's*, 21 July 1997).

But with the election of George W. Bush, much of the "care" was abandoned. On numerous occasions, Chrétien left in little doubt his negative sentiments for the Bush administration and his generally skeptical view of the US in global politics. For example, in a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation television documentary broadcast on the anniversary of 9/11 in 2002, Chrétien was quoted expressing the view that 9/11 was the result of Western—and particularly American—policy. The West, claimed Chrétien was "looked upon as being arrogant, self-satisfied and greedy and with no limits." He went on to say that "You know you cannot exercise your powers to the point of humiliation for the others," he said. "That is what the Western world—not only the Americans—has to realize. I do think that the Western world is getting too rich in relation to the poor world and this is silly" (BBC News On-line 2002). These comments were widely interpreted, in Canada and particularly in the US, as arguing that the Americans themselves were responsible for 9/11.

The anti-American pitch increased in the fall and winter of 2002-2003 as the Chrétien government's opposition to the emerging war melded with both an antipathy towards George W. Bush and a deep strain of anti-Americanism in the Liberal cabinet and particularly its backbench, sometimes obscuring which was dominant. For example,

on 20 November 2002, Chrétien's director of communications, Françoise Ducros, watching Bush speak at the NATO summit in Prague, muttered in front of two reporters: "What a moron." But Chrétien did not demand her resignation nor did he condemn the comment. Rather, his response was simply to deny that Bush was a moron ("[He is] a friend of mine. He is not a moron at all"). American talk shows picked up the comment and ran with it for five [137] days before Ducros finally resigned. And even then, Chrétien never rebuked her, but accepted her resignation, commended her for her service and wished her good luck. However, as opposition critics and media commentators noted, the delay in her resignation and the refusal of the prime minister to respond harshly to her characterization left the impression that that view was more widely held within the Chrétien government (CBC News 2002).

If Ducros's comments were more properly anti-Bush than anti-American, the comments of a backbench Liberal MP, Carolyn Parrish, were clearly anti-American. On 26 February 2003, while leaving a meeting on Parliament Hill, Parrish was caught by a microphone responding angrily to a question from the media by saying: "Damn Americans! I hate those bastards." Although she apologized afterwards—claiming, quite illogically, that the words did not represent her views—she immediately appeared on *The Mike Bullard Show* on the Comedy Network, where the news clip was replayed to the delight of the largely youthful crowd, and Parrish unapologetically claimed that she couldn't promise not to do it again. Although the opposition called on the prime minister to expel her from the Liberal caucus, Chrétien refused to discipline her, leading Andrew Coyne (2003) to comment that:

After so many similar episodes, the conclusion is inescapable: Liberal anti-Americanism is not a problem for Mr. Chrétien to manage, but rather an outgrowth of his own attitudes and beliefs. As with its counterparts elsewhere, the Liberal "street" is less a spontaneous popular phenomenon than the unofficial voice of the regime. She may put it in cruder terms, but by and large, Ms. Parrish says what Mr. Chrétien thinks.

The antipathy towards Bush—if not for Americans more broadly—in Chrétien's Ottawa had an impact. Bush cancelled a visit to Ottawa that had been planned for May 2003, and pointedly refused to extend an invitation to the Canadian prime minister to the ranch at Crawford. Relations between the two leaders through much of the remainder of 2003 remained chilly.

After Paul Martin took over from Chrétien as prime minister in December 2003, he claimed he was going to make a conscious effort to improve relations with the US. However, he continued the tradition of playing the anti-American card in both the 2004

and 2005/2006 general elections. During the 2004 elections, he consistently characterized the opposition Conservatives as proposing an “American-style” health system and “American-style” tax cuts (CTV News 2004). In the election campaign of December 2005-January 2006, the Liberal Party unabashedly portrayed the Conservatives as pro-American and the Liberals as the upholders of Canadian independence, running a series of attack ads that characterized Harper as Bush’s lap dog. Most importantly, at an international conference on climate change held in Montreal in the middle of the election campaign, Martin sought to score political points by publicly excoriating the US for its stance on the Kyoto Accords, calling on Americans to heed the “global conscience” on climate change (choosing not to mention the fact that Canada was [138] much further away from meeting its Kyoto obligations than the US was) (*Globe and Mail* 9 December 2005). And in a move designed to signal to Canadian voters his distance from the Bush administration, Martin also made a point of arranging a special photo opportunity with Bill Clinton, who remains popular in Canada.

Moreover, during his two years in power, Martin made little effort to improve relations with the Bush administration. First, he made no move to squelch the anti-Americanism that continued to be on display among Liberal backbenchers. For example, although Carolyn Parrish continued to express anti-Bush and anti-American views, Martin refused to discipline her. In August 2004, she characterized anyone supporting Ballistic Missile Defense as being part of a “coalition of the idiots,” mocking Bush’s “coalition of the willing” (CBC News 2004). After the 2004 presidential elections in the US, she expressed shock at Bush’s re-election and claimed that “Americans were out of touch with the rest of the free world.” Shortly afterwards, she appeared on a satirical CBC program, *This Hour Has 22 Minutes*, and as a joke stuck voodoo pins in the head of a George Bush doll (“where it would do the least damage”), and then stomped on it for the cameras (but then also kissed it). None of this was enough to attract prime ministerial discipline. However, when she expressed her anger at Martin’s failure to support her bid for renomination in her local constituency, declaring that Martin “could go to hell” and claiming that “If he loses the next election and has to resign, I wouldn’t shed a tear over it,” the prime minister expelled her from the Liberal caucus within hours of the story appearing (Conologue 2005).

Second, on important substantive issues, Martin proved unwilling to challenge anti-American/anti-Bush sentiment in his caucus. For example, although Martin himself was personally in favour of Canada joining the Ballistic Missile Defense scheme, and although his government had given the Bush administration some clear signals that Ottawa would join BMD, in the end Martin backed away. Liberal MPs from Québec, mirroring popular views in that province, expressed strong opposition to BMD. While it is unclear whether Québec Liberals threatened to bring the government down over the

issue, Martin's behaviour suggested that he was fearful of such an outcome. In February 2005, without warning the US or offering any reasoned justification for its decision, the government abruptly announced that it would not join BMD.

In sum, contingent anti-Americanism remains alive and well in Canada. As the cases of the Conservatives from 1957 to 1963, the Liberals from 1980 to 1984, and the Liberals from 1993 to 2006 show, this contingent anti-Americanism is periodically used for political purposes, just as economic anti-Americanism used to be used by Canadian elites over the two centuries before the 1980s.

A Thermostatic Dynamic? The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism

The contingent anti-Americanism so evident in Canadian politics must, however, be put in the context of its essential "liteness." The antipathy that many Canadians feel towards some administrations in the US; the anger that many feel about [139] some policies of the US; or the willingness of large numbers of Canadians to indulge in the kind of anti-American sentiments that Brendon O'Connor (2003) has called the "last respectable prejudice"—all must be put into the context of the essential warmth that the majority of Canadians feel towards the US and things American.

Indeed, it is that paradoxical nature of Canadian attitudes towards the US—at once an essential warmth and an antipathy that is deeply entrenched in Canadian political culture—that may explain why those political leaders who are overtly anti-American, and who seek to play the anti-American card in Canadian politics, find themselves out of power sooner rather than later. If we look at the three cases examined above, we can see that the pursuit of anti-American policies brings the rise of a counter tendency. Diefenbaker's anti-Americanism gave rise to a promise during the 1963 election by the Liberal leader of the opposition, Lester B. Pearson, that, if elected, the Liberals would restore good relations with the US. Likewise, the deterioration of relations between Trudeau and the Reagan administration saw the leader of the Progressive Conservatives, Brian Mulroney, promise that a PC government would "refurbish" the relationship with the US, as Mulroney put it. And in 2005-2006, the Conservative Party of Canada under Stephen Harper promised that if elected, a Harper government would abandon the anti-Americanism that had been so much a mark of the Liberal governments of Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin.

It should be noted that a comparable tendency has been observed on the other side: that when Canadian governments get too close to the US, or when a Canadian prime minister grows too fond of the American president, a counter-reaction occurs. When the Liberal government of Louis St Laurent grew too close to the US over the course of the early 1950s—encouraging economic integration between Canada and the US; "abandoning" the "mother countries" of Britain and France by taking the American

side in the Suez crisis of 1956; not standing up to the administration in Washington over the suicide of Herbert Norman—the Conservatives under Diefenbaker pushed a line in the 1957 election that promised greater independence from Washington. Likewise, when Brian Mulroney forged an exceptionally close and personal relationship with George H.W. Bush between 1989 and 1992—and openly celebrated that closeness—the Liberals under Jean Chrétien campaigned during the 1993 elections on the promise that if elected, a Liberal government would pursue a more distant, and more independent, line.

Looking back over a half-century, the dynamic looks quite thermostatic: when a Canadian government moves from a presumed norm that fits the “comfort” level of Canadians who like distance but not too much distance from the US, it would appear that an electoral corrective comes into play: when a government in Ottawa becomes too anti-American, it is replaced by the political party promising to restore “good relations”; when a Canadian government becomes too close to the US, it is replaced by a party which comes to power promising more “distance” and “independence.”

However, framing the dynamic as thermostatic suggests intent and causality. And there is no evidence to suggest that sentiments about the US, whether pro or anti, *caused* the observed electoral outcome. On the contrary: like most other [140] peoples, Canadians do not appear to base their voting behaviour on a single issue (Clarke et al. 1984; Nadeau and Blais 1995), and so it is likely that, if concern over the government’s proximity to, or distance from, the US played a role in the calculations of Canadian voters in 1957, 1963, 1984, 1993, or 2006, it was inchoate at best.

Conclusion

I have argued in this paper that the kind of anti-Americanism we see in Canada today is neither the philosophical variant so evident in continental Europe or the economic anti-Americanism that was so much a part of Canadian political culture for two centuries. As Granatstein has argued, that variant is no longer dominant, having been abandoned by Canada’s elites in favour of an integrationist perspective. Rather, the strand that is dominant in Canada today is contingent anti-Americanism, where opposition and antipathy to George W. Bush and his administration’s policies co-exist with generalized feelings of friendship, warmth and closeness to Americans and the US. And while we have seen political leaders in Canada—even those who claim to want to improve Canadian-American relations—play the anti-American card, thus oxygenating contingent anti-Americanism, we do not see any shift from those generalized positive feelings.

However, we have seen that there is a dynamic—not a causal dynamic, but an observable one nonetheless—that moderates even the low-grade and ultra-lite contingent anti-Americanism that exists in Canada. Canadians may be anti-American,

but if the historical record is any guide, they become concerned when that anti-Americanism translates into sour relations between the governments in Ottawa and Washington. And by the same token, Canadian may feel a warmth to the US, but they appear to be discomfited when their government grows too close to the US. In short, the anti-Americanism that is so deeply entrenched in Canadian political culture also appears to be self-correcting to ensure a permanent liteness.

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