Kim Richard Nossal, "Anti-Americanism in Canada," in Brendon O'Connor, ed., *Anti-Americanism: History, Causes, and Themes*, vol. 3: *Comparative Perspectives* (Oxford/Westport: Greenwood World Publishing, 2007), 59–76. (Page turns indicated thus: **[60]**)

At first blush, anti-Americanism in Canada looks much like anti-Americanism elsewhere in the international system.[1] On the street, in university classrooms, in the national media, and in a variety of other forums, Canadians are as likely as others in the international system to embrace the classic characteristics of anti-Americanism. They engage in criticism of Americans as a people or the United States as a country, often resorting to stereotyping, denigration, and even demonisation. They express their concerns about Americanisation—the impact of American culture and the American economy on Canada. Protestors in Canada are as likely as their counterparts in other countries to criticise the government in Washington for its unilateralism on issues such as global warming, the International Criminal Court, National Missile Defense, or American support for global capitalism, or American policies in the Middle East or the Asia Pacific.

To be sure, Canadians generally do not exhibit the kind of virulent anti-Americanism identified by Josef Joffe, who argues that some manifestations of anti-Americanism have the same attributes as any "anti-ism," such as anti-Semitism.[2] Indeed, it should be noted that Canadian attitudes towards Americans feature exactly the same kind of stereotyping common to all "anti-isms," making anti-Americanism in some countries, as Brendon O'Connor reminds us, the "last respectable prejudice."[3] But the hatred that is so evident in so many "anti-isms" is missing in Canadian anti-Americanism. Thus, for example, the hyperbolic arguments of John Gibson that Canada is part of an "axis of envy"—countries that hate the United States out of the frustration that has been created by the "utter inconsequence" of these countries in global politics—simply cannot be sustained by the evidence.[4] Rather, the anti-Americanism dominant in Canada comes closer to the "lite" variety of anti-Americanism identified by Moisés

Naím: "the anti-Americanism of those in the United States and abroad who take to the streets and the media to rant against the country but do not seek its destruction."[5] But even this may be to overstate the case: given the generally positive attitudes of Canadians towards the **[60]** United States,[6] it would probably be more appropriate to classify the anti-Americanism of Canadians as "ultra-lite."

At the same time, however, it can be argued that the kind of anti-Americanism that one finds in Canada is found nowhere else in the international system. There is no other political community where anti-Americanism has been so central to the political culture of the community, and so deeply entrenched for so long. Well might J.L. Granatstein, in his history of anti-Americanism in Canada,[7] conclude that the very longevity of anti-Americanism in Canada makes it a unique case.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the unique nature of anti-Americanism in Canada. I argue that contemporary Canadian anti-Americanism cannot be understood unless the unique characteristics of the phenomenon in Canadian political culture are outlined. And this requires a genealogical examination of the deep historical roots of anti-American sentiments. For anti-Americanism as it manifests itself in a particular political community is necessarily path-dependent.[8] The strong inertial patterns of historical anti-Americanism in Canada were to reassert themselves over and over, entrenching themselves deeply in the body politic, and reflected in contemporary political debates.

At the same time, however, we can see a shift in the nature of anti-Americanism in Canada. In the latter part of the twentieth century, the historically dominant form of Canadian anti-Americanism—a concern with the impact of the American economy on Canada's existence as a separate British American political community—largely dissipated after the signing of two free trade agreements with the United States—the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement that came into force on 1 January 1989 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that came into force on 1 January 1994. To be sure, we still see anti-Americanism in Canada. But it is an ultra-lite kind of anti-Americanism that tends to be galvanised by particular American administrations and American policies. This was particularly the case after the election of George W. Bush in 2000 and the decision of the Bush administration to organise and lead an international coalition to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003: Canadian opposition to the various global policies of the Bush administration has been marked, particularly among French-speaking Canadians in the province of Québec. But because antipathy towards certain aspects of American policies tends to be indistinguishable from other kinds of anti-Americanism, anti-American sentiments have been used by political elites to generate **[61]** political support among an electorate that tends to embrace anti-Americanism as a means of differentiating themselves from Americans.

Locating Canadian Anti-Americanism

Most students of anti-Americanism note that there are numerous strands and types of anti-Americanism; it is therefore important to locate the discussion of anti-Americanism in any country within the theoretical perspectives offered by the burgeoning literature on this phenomenon. This is particularly important in the case of Canada. While many students of anti-Americanism focus on the virulence and hatred of the United States and Americans manifested in many countries, such an understanding would be inappropriate in the Canadian case, where anti-Americanism is weak and bland when compared with anti-Americanism in other regions of the world.[9] In this chapter, therefore, I use an ideational understanding of anti-Americanism that is borrowed from the work of three scholars of the phenomenon: James W. Ceaser, Paul Hollander, and Adam Garfinkle.

Ceaser's work on the philosophical rejection of the American political experiment by European thinkers prompted him to conclude suggests that "Anti-Americanism rests on the singular idea that something associated with the United States, something at the core of American life, is deeply wrong and threatening to the rest of the world."[10] For his part, Hollander defined anti-Americanism as "a particular mind-set, an attitude of distaste, aversion or intense hostility the roots of which may be found in matters unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society or the foreign policies of the United States."[11] In my view, such ideational definitions capture well the essentially multidimensional nature of the phenomenon while avoiding the necessity of including such intense sentiments such as hatred or malevolence in the definition.

In addition, Garfinkle's classification of the varieties of anti-Americanism in Europe is useful for a discussion of the Canadian case. Garfinkle argues that we have seen three distinct, though interrelated, strands of anti-Americanism in Europe: *philosophical anti-Americanism*, the rejectionism of the nature of the American polity by European thinkers;[12] *cultural anti-Americanism*, a concern over the impact of Americanisation on local culture and mores; and *contingent* **[62]** *anti-Americanism*—"the dislike of particular policies or personalities in any given U.S. administration."[13]

I will argue that, in Canada, we have not seen the appearance of philosophical anti-Americanism. This is perhaps not surprising, since the vast majority of people who live in Canada, whether aboriginal peoples or newcomers, English-speaking or French-speaking, are in ideology and culture far more *American* than they are *European*. As John W. Holmes put it archly in 1981: "It is … nonsense to talk about Canada being Americanised when it has always been just as much an American nation as the United States … and there is no reason to claim that the United States way is any more natively North American than the Canadian."[14] Nor have we seen purely cultural anti-

Americanism. Rather, as J.L. Granatstein argued in his history of anti-Americanism in Canada, this sentiment has been historically grounded in a unique variety of concerns about Americanisation that includes, but goes well beyond, the cultural anti-Americanism outlined by Garfinkle. In particular, for much of Canada's history, we have seen the dominance of what we might call *economic anti-Americanism*—a concern over the Americanisation of Canada's economy. However, we have persistently seen the importance of *contingent anti-Americanism*—opposition to particular American policies and administrations.

A Unique Anti-Americanism? An Historical Excursus

One key difference between anti-Americanism in Canada and the kind of anti-Americanism one finds in other societies lies in the deep historical roots of the sentiment in Canada. After all, Canada is the only political community in the world which exists as the result of a conscious rejection of the United States of America. For Canada's existence as a separate political community has its origins in the American revolution.[15] When the Continental Congress convened by the leaders of the thirteen colonies decided to launch an armed insurrection against the authority of the imperial government in London, it was hoped that the other British North American colonies—in particular the provinces of Nova Scotia (which at the time included much of present-day New Brunswick) and Canada and its dependencies, which had been ceded by France to Britain by the Treaty of Paris, 1763,[16]—would join the revolutionaries, or the "Patriots," in the creation of a new nation.

[63] However, both Québec and Nova Scotia showed little interest in joining the American Revolution; neutrality is a more apt characterisation of the dominant sentiments in those provinces.[17] In Québec, the French-speaking elites who had not returned to France after the British seizure of Montreal in 1760—the Roman Catholic clergy and the *seigneurs*, the holders of rural land grants in New France—and the new English-speaking merchant class who arrived after the Conquest remained generally loyal to British authority. The loyalty of the French-speaking elites should not be surprising. Not only were the first two English governors of the newly-created Province of Québec both sympathetic to the *Canadiens*,[18] but in 1774 the imperial government in London passed new legislation that was designed to counter the growing disaffection of the thirteen colonies by unambiguously wooing the French-speaking elites in Québec. The Quebec Act of 1774 formally restored the privileges that the Church had enjoyed under French rule, such as a legal right to tithes. The *seigneurs* were likewise pleased that the Act also restored their privileges by re-instituting the old civil law in place of English common law. Moreover, both groups were pleased by the Quebec Act's provision that there would be no elected assembly, which would necessarily exclude all Catholics, but

rather a governor and an appointed council. Members of the English-speaking merchant class were highly displeased at all these provisions of the Quebec Act, but the legislation sought to mollify them by joining the Ohio lands to the province and thus closing them off to westward expansion by the thirteen colonies, adding a vast expanse of territory for the Montreal entrepôt trade. While some of the English-speaking merchants in Québec had ties to the thirteen colonies, in the main they were too deeply tied to the imperial fur trade centred in London to consider joining the American revolutionaries.

Attitudes were similar in Nova Scotia, although for different reasons. While there was some sympathy for the Patriot cause in the thinly-populated coastal areas of the province (many of whose residents were from the thirteen colonies who had moved to Nova Scotia to occupy farms and villages left vacant when the British expelled the French-speaking Acadian population of the region in the 1750s), the elites in Halifax who controlled Nova Scotia politics were firmly tied to the British imperium. Halifax received massive imperial subsidies for the heavily-fortified naval base and the merchant class did well from war contracts and the imperial sea-borne trade in the Caribbean. In addition, **[64]** there were few economic connections to the continental hinterland. In short, the elites had too much to lose by joining the revolution.

For this reason, the Continental Congress ignored Nova Scotia entirely but it did send an appeal to the people of Québec to send delegates to the Philadelphia congress in May 1775. However, the response from both English-speaking and French-speaking Canadian elites was less than enthusiastic: one of the Montreal merchants attended the Philadelphia congress as an unofficial observer. Later in the year, the Continental Congress sent two revolutionary armies north to capture Montreal and Québec in an attempt to eliminate the military threat posed by the imperial forces and to rally the rest of British North America to the revolutionary cause. While Montreal was captured, the siege of Québec City ended in failure. The French-speaking elites urged the *habitants*—the small farmers and yeomen of Nouvelle-France—to rally to the British imperial cause (the bishop even threatening to withhold the sacraments from recalcitrants). But the *habitants* were indifferent to both the pleas of their elites or the blandishments of the American revolutionaries—at least until the Americans began raiding their farms. And although the new American state enshrined a special welcome for Canada in its first constitution,[19] the invitation was never accepted.

The overt rejection of the revolutionary cause by those in the provinces of Québec and Nova Scotia in the opening stages of the war was even more deeply entrenched by what happened to those in North America who chose not to side with the Republican revolutionaries but to remain loyal to the Crown. Some "Loyalists" (or "King's Men") formed militias and took up arms against the Patriots; others sought refuge in New York City, which remained in British hands throughout the Revolutionary War; still others

fled as refugees. Many had had their property seized or had been persecuted for their objections or for fighting on the British side. Between 60,000 and 100,000 people from the thirteen colonies fled the new republic during or after the Revolution; approximately 40,000 went north, including about 2000 free African-Americans and 1000 Iroquois. Of this number, 32,000 made their way to Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, trebling the population of those colonies and prompting the creation of two new provinces, New Brunswick and Cape Breton Island. Approximately 8,000 came to the province of Québec, crossing at Niagara Falls, at Kingston, and up the Hudson valley south of Montreal. They were given land grants and subsidised tools and settled the north shore of Lake Ontario and the **[65]** Ottawa valley, forming the nucleus of what would eventually become the province of Ontario.

There was also a northward flow of refugees from the Ohio valley. When the British decided in 1782 to sue for peace after a series of defeats at the hands of the Americans and the French, who had intervened to assist the revolutionaries in 1778, the entire trans-Allegheny region was still in British hands, held by Loyalist militias, British regular troops, and their First Nations allies, primarily the Iroquois. Despite this, during the negotiations that led to the Peace of Paris of 1783, British negotiators decided to offer the Ohio valley to the Americans, prompting an exodus of Loyalists and Iroquois to what would become southern Ontario.

The "United Empire Loyalists," as those Loyalists who sought refuge in Canada were known, tended to bring with them much more negative views about the new republic. Unlike the colonists of Québec and Nova Scotia, who were on the whole unenthusiastic about the Revolution but not necessarily fiercely loyal to the Crown, the Loyalist elite tended to be highly antagonistic towards the political regime that was the cause of their dislocation. While United Empire Loyalist attitudes were by no means homogenous, at bottom there was a common rejection of the American republican model of government in favour of a British monarchical model.

In short, as this brief excursus into North American history demonstrates, the people who occupied the remaining British North American colonies at the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 had fundamentally rejected the idea of union with the United States. The separate political community that developed to the north of the United States of America in a series of legislative/constitutional steps from 1774 to 1982[20]—was thus, in a very real sense, an on-going act of anti-Americanism like no other in the international system.

Economic Anti-Americanism in Canada, 1783-1989

But the anti-Americanism in Canada after the Revolutionary Wars was not the kind of *philosophical anti-Americanism* outlined by Garfinkle, even though some Loyalists

maintained that their opposition to the new republic was grounded in ideological differences. Rather, it was an anti-Americanism grounded in opposing the spread of a particular kind of political formation and a particular kind of economic integration. **[66]** Indeed, it can be argued that the kind of anti-Americanism we saw develop in Canada was more akin to *cultural anti-Americanism*, though, as I will argue below, its focus was on the economic aspects of Canadian-American relations.

There can be little doubt that anti-American sentiments were very much part of the political culture in British North America in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War. As Kenneth McNaught has suggested, the arrival of the United Empire Loyalists "tipped the 'Canadian' scales decisively beyond the mere point of neutrality on the central question of continental union."[21] The Loyalists created in Canada a mythology of rejectionism of the American experiment, fostering an almost stereotypical view of the United States as "Satan's Kingdom,"[22] a land of republican anarchy, where money and the democratic mob ruled, where violence and brute strength prevailed. "The bitterness was profound," Granatstein and Hillmer have written, "the determination to make of Canada something different from the United States almost fanatic in the tenacity with which it was held."[23]

Over the two hundred years after the Revolutionary Wars, however, Canadian attitudes towards the United States took a fundamentally paradoxical form. On the one hand, Canadians persistently embraced ever-increasing levels of economic and cultural integration with the United States. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Canadian economy became increasingly integrated with—and dependent on—that of the United States. Moreover, this integration occurred despite periodic efforts by the Canadian government to forge a different path, such as the National Policy of 1878, designed to foster the growth of a manufacturing sector behind high protectionist tariff walls,[24] or the Third Option in the 1970s, designed to diversify the Canadian economy and reduce the growing dependence on the United States.[25] By the 1980s, two hundred years after the fracturing of British North America, over 80 per cent of Canada's trade—and thus a huge percentage of Canadian wealth—was dependent on the United States. At the same time, there was an increasing embrace of American culture, particularly accelerated in the latter part of the twentieth century as a result of movies and television. Again, this cultural integration occurred despite periodic efforts of Canadian governments to advance some distinctive Canadian culture. In short, over this period, Canadians, both English-speaking and French-speaking, became progressively Americanised, both economically and culturally.

[67] At the same time, however, Canadians persistently rejected the United States as a model society, persistently rejected American republicanism as an inappropriate means of governance, and persistently characterised the United States and Americans as

a threat to the existence of Canada. The Loyalist ideology of anti-Americanism, built over the course of the nineteenth century, was entrenched every generation by fresh quarrels with the United States. Thirty years after the end of the Revolutionary War, the United States and Britain fought a second war, fuelled by American grievances over British policies in North America. As in 1775, Americans invaded Canada in an effort to spread the benefits of republicanism. The brief but brutal battles of the War of 1812, and the exposure of divided loyalties among many in Canada,[26] created a second layer of anti-Americanism as the Loyalists used the invasions to confirm their argument that the United States posed a threat to British North America. In addition, this war legitimised the efforts of the Loyalist elite to marginalise the later arrivals from the United States by depriving them of the rights given to the original Loyalists, arguing that no one who had been educated in republican principles could possibly embrace British political principles.[27]

A third layer of anti-Americanism was added in the late 1830s as the dominance of Upper Canada politics by the Loyalist elite produced a reaction in the form of a reform movement; comparable reform movements appeared in Lower Canada and the Maritimes. In 1837, this movement culminated in separate rebellions in both Upper Canada and Lower Canada. In Lower Canada, the leader of the rebellion, Louis-Joseph Papineau, the speaker of the Legislative Assembly, openly advocated joining the United States. In Upper Canada, William Lyon Mackenzie, the leader of the Reformers, had met President Andrew Jackson and admired the American system of government. When Mackenzie sought to topple the provincial government in Upper Canada by staging an uprisings in Toronto and London, Ontario, supportive invasions were launched from the United States. The uprising was unsuccessful, and Mackenzie fled to the United States, where he established a provisional government in exile, prompting an increase in anti-Americanism, manifested in assaults on Americans and in an attack by the Upper Canada militia across the border into the United States to burn a boat used by the rebels.

The entrenchment of anti-Americanism in the first half of the nineteenth century was crucial in the process of forming a unified **[68]** Canada. One of the consequences of the 1837 rebellions—and the involvement of Americans—was to convince imperial officials that the annexation of the British North American colonies by the United States could best be avoided, in the words of Lord Durham's 1839 *Report*, by "giving their inhabitants a country which they will be unwilling to see absorbed into one more powerful." To be sure, giving British North Americans a country would take another generation, and would not occur until the United States was plunged into civil war.

The achievement in 1867 of self-governing Dominion status within the British Empire did not diminish the well-entrenched Loyalist anti-American ideology that claimed the United States as the primary threat to the well-being of Canadians. Despite

the Fenian Raids of the mid-1860s,[28] and despite the loose talk by Americans about "Manifest Destiny,"[29] there was a diminishing fear that the United States would seek to annex Canada by force, particular when it became clear that the governments in both London and Washington were little interested in fighting a third war. Rather, the focus was on the threat posed by the Americanisation of the Canadian economy and of Canadian culture.

Much of this concern turned on the issue of free trade between Canada and the United States (or, as it was called in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "reciprocity"). In both the 1891 and 1911 general elections, free trade with the United States was the key issue, and on each occasion, those whose economic interests would have been negatively affected—primarily the manufacturers who were protected by high tariff walls—helped generate an anti-Americanism that would see reciprocity defeated. In 1891, the campaign inspired a torrent of anti-American sentiment, as manufacturing interests distributed propaganda with slogans like "Keep Out the Wolves."[30] Indeed, in 1911, the Liberal government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, which had negotiated a free trade agreement and fought an election on the issue, went down to defeat in a wave of anti-American sentiment generated in large part by the business community (and helped by incredibly loose talk by Americans about how the agreement would hasten the absorption of Canada by the United States[31]).

The victory of the Conservatives under Robert Borden in the 1911 elections cast a long shadow in Canadian politics, legitimizing the anti-Americanism in Canada that viewed free trade as the harbinger of the death of the nation. Its impact can be seen in the reactions of William Lyon Mackenzie King, prime minister from 1921 to 1930 and 1935 **[69]** to 1948, when presented with a draft free trade agreement in 1948 that had been negotiated by Canadian and American officials. Although he had approved the negotiations, King, who was merely months away from retirement, worried that the agreement would spell the end of Canada, and he would go down in history as the prime minister who was responsible for the end of the nation. He rejected the draft agreement.[32] Likewise, in 1983, running for the leadership of the Progressive Conservative party, Brian Mulroney explicitly rejected the idea of a free trade agreement with the United States, citing the 1911 elections. "That's why free trade was decided on in an election in 1911," Mulroney said in June 1983. "It affects Canadian sovereignty, and we'll have none of it, not during leadership campaigns, nor at any other times."[33] On another occasion, he told reporters that Canada "could not survive with a policy of unfettered free trade."[34]

Mulroney won both the leadership of the Progressive Conservative party in 1983, and the prime ministership of the country, leading the PCs to a massive parliamentary majority in the general elections of September 1984. Within a year of gaining office,

however, Mulroney changed his mind on free trade. He was persuaded that given the depth of protectionist sentiment in the United States Congress, Canada should seek guaranteed access to the American market via a comprehensive free trade agreement. An agreement was negotiated with the administration of Ronald Reagan, and signed in 1987. In 1988, the general election was fought on the issue of the free trade agreement, with the 1911 positions reversed: the Conservatives proposed free trade, and the Liberals (and the social-democratic New Democratic Party) vociferously opposed the agreement. Although 52 per cent of the electorate voted for candidates of parties opposed to the agreement, the Conservatives received 43 per cent of the vote, which under Canada's first-past-the-post electoral system translated into a large majority in the House of Commons. The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement came into force on January 1, 1989.

Granatstein has argued that Canadian anti-Americanism between the 1770s and 1980s was in large part driven by those in Canada with a vested interest in the particular political outcomes that anti-American sentiments would produce. The Loyalist myths of the 1800s, focussing on the putative ills of American "mob" democracy and the supposedly superior qualities of a more conservative monarchical system, suited the oligarchs of Upper Canada well. Likewise, the characterisation of the **[70]** United States as grasping wolves, eager to swallow the British dominion, served the interests of a particular groups in Canada. The argument is not new: as Granatstein himself notes, the historian Frank Underhill wrote in 1929 that "the same interests are preparing to wave the old flag and to make their own private profit, political and economic, by saving us once more from the United States."[35]

But the wisdom of Granatstein's argument can be determined by examining what happened when dominant elites in Canada stopped pushing economic anti-Americanism as an acceptable ideology.[36] By the early 1980s, there was a growing elite consensus, reflected in both the private sector and within the state apparatus, that the historical opposition to closer economic integration with the United States was obsolete.[37] Changes in behaviour quickly followed: although in 1911 business interests in Canada lined up squarely against free trade, in 1988, business was very much in favour of free trade, joining with the Conservatives in deriding the opposition of the Liberals and the New Democrats as out-moded anti-Americanism. More importantly, as the free trade agreements with the United States and then Mexico began to have an impact on the huge growth of Canadian wealth in the 1990s,[38] economic anti-Americanism within the broader public died almost completely, strongly suggesting that economic anti-Americanism in Canada has indeed needed the oxygen provided by dominant elites.

Contemporary Anti-Americanism in Canada

The embrace of continental free trade caused the collapse of the form of anti-Americanism that had dominated Canadian politics since the arrival of the United Empire Loyalists. Indeed, as Granatstein argued, the anti-Americanism that had been so central to the 1988 general election was the "last gasp" of a once-powerful force in Canada. Instead, in his estimation, "anti-Americanism will likely continue in an attenuated, powerless form as a useful and instinctive device that Canadians will employ to differentiate themselves from their neighbours."[39]

And indeed this is exactly what has happened. Economic anti-Americanism — the opposition to being taken over or absorbed by the United States that had fuelled such sustained opposition to the forces of continentalism and economic integration —is indeed dead, at least for the moment. Judging by their behaviour in both the marketplace and the **[71]** ballot box, and by their rhetoric, the vast majority of Canadians appear to have made peace with the deep economic and cultural integration between Canada and the United States that has taken place over the last two centuries, accelerating in spurts after the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, World War I, World War II, the Auto Pact of 1965, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement that came into force on January 1, 1989 and the North American Free Trade Agreement that came into force on January 1, 1994. And while many of those who were part of the ultranationalist movement of the 1970s and 1980s are still active in Canadian politics, that movement transmogrified in the 1990s into a broader movement opposed to global capitalism rather than to a putative American takeover of Canada.[40]

But Granatstein was also correct in his prognosis that anti-Americanism in Canada would continue to be a feature of Canadian political culture and political practice, although in a greatly attenuated form, and designed primarily as a means to differentiate Canadians from Americans. What Harvey M. Sapolsky has termed "low grade anti-Americanism"—cultivating an image of Canada as a "kinder, gentler, more nuanced" country than the United States[41]—continues to be very much in evidence. This attempt to differentiate manifests itself in the contingent anti-Americanism identified by Garfinkle.

We can see this most clearly in the efforts of the Liberal governments of Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) and Paul Martin (2003-2006) to use anti-American sentiments as a means of generating political support for the Liberal Party of Canada, particularly in the period after the arrival of the administration of George W. Bush in January 2001, and during the 2004 and 2006 general elections in Canada. Unlike most Canadian governments, which generally have tried to manage and downplay the anti-Americanism that has always manifested itself in Canadian politics, both the Chrétien

and Martin governments in effect oxygenated anti-Americanism in Canada, legitimizing and indeed in ways actively encouraging anti-American sentiments.

Much of the encouragement of anti-Americanism during the Chrétien years was driven by a desire to pursue a different approach to the United States than Chrétien's Progressive Conservative predecessor, Brian Mulroney. During the 1993 general election, Chrétien promised that he would abandon what he claimed had been the excessively close relationship that Mulroney had enjoyed with both Reagan and George H.W. Bush.[42] Chrétien was as good as his word—up to a point. **[72]** He abandoned the annual summit meeting with the president that Mulroney had instituted, and never publicly celebrated his relationship with Bill Clinton. At the same time, however, Chrétien developed a good relationship with Clinton, often playing golf with him and telephoning him frequently over the seven years they were both in office together.

But Chrétien also used anti-Americanism for domestic political purposes. His attitude towards the political importance of anti-Americanism was revealed quite inadvertently in July 1997. While attending a NATO summit, Chrétien and Jean-Luc Dehane, the prime minister of Belgium, were chatting with one another in French—without realizing that their microphones were open. Chrétien confided to Dehane that he had made defying the United States "my policy. The Cuba affair, I was the first to stand up [unintelligible]. People like that." (But Chrétien also added: "You have to do it carefully, because they're friends.")[43]

But with the arrival of George W. Bush in the White House in January 2001, much of the "care" was abandoned. On numerous occasions, Chrétien left in little doubt his negative sentiments for the Bush administration and his generally sceptical view of the United States in global politics. For example, one small but telling measure of Chrétien's attitudes about the United States came in a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) television documentary on the events of September 11, 2001 that was broadcast on September 12, 2002. In the interview, Chrétien claimed that 9/11 was the result of a widening chasm between the rich and the poor, between the weak and the powerful. The West, claimed Chrétien was "looked upon as being arrogant, self-satisfied and greedy and with no limits." He went on to say that:

> You know you cannot exercise your powers to the point of humiliation for the others… That is what the Western world—not only the Americans—has to realize. I do think that the Western world is getting too rich in relation to the poor world and this is silly.[44]

These comments were widely interpreted, in Canada and particularly in the United States, as arguing that the Americans themselves were responsible for 9/11.

The crisis over Iraq, which intensified in the fall and winter of 2002-2003, created a major strain in Canadian-American relations as the Chrétien government's opposition to the emerging war melded **[73]** with a growing antipathy towards Bush. This antipathy was particularly evident in the province of Québec, and was mirrored in the Liberal party. At times it was difficult to distinguish between antipathy for the Bush administration and anti-American sentiments in the government and its backbench. For example, on November 20, 2002, Chrétien's director of communications, Françoise Ducros, was watching Bush make a speech by Bush at a NATO summit in Prague that called for American allies to spend more on defence and to concentrate more on the evolving crisis in Iraq. In front of two reporters, Ducros said of Bush: "What a moron." The prime minister did not condemn the comment, instead saying that Bush was "a friend of mine. He is not a moron at all." American talk shows picked up the comment and replayed it for five days. Finally, on November 26, Ducros resigned. Chrétien accepted her resignation, commending her for her service and wishing her good luck. However, as opposition critics and media commentators noted, the delay in her resignation and the refusal of the prime minister to respond harshly to her characterisation left the impression that her view was more widely held within the Chrétien government.[45]

If Ducros's comments were more properly anti-Bush than anti-American, the comments of a backbench Liberal MP, Carolyn Parrish, were clearly anti-American. On February 26, 2003, while leaving a meeting on Parliament Hill, Parrish was caught, by an open microphone, responding angrily to a question from the media by saying: "Damn Americans! I hate those bastards." Although she apologised afterwards—claiming, quite illogically, that the words did not represent her views—she immediately appeared on *The Mike Bullard Show* on the Comedy Network, where the news clip was replayed to the delight of the largely young crowd, and Parrish unapologetically claimed that she couldn't promise not to do it again. Although the opposition called on the prime minister to expel her from the Liberal caucus, Chrétien refused to discipline her, leading Andrew Coyne, of the *National Post*, to comment that:

> After so many similar episodes, the conclusion is inescapable: Liberal anti-Americanism is not a problem for Mr. Chrétien to manage, but rather an outgrowth of his own attitudes and beliefs. As with its counterparts elsewhere, the Liberal "street" is less a spontaneous popular phenomenon than the unofficial voice of the regime. She may put it in cruder terms, but by and large, Ms. Parrish says what Mr. Chrétien thinks.[46]

[74] The antipathy towards Bush—if not for Americans more broadly—in Chrétien's Ottawa had an impact. Bush cancelled a visit to Ottawa that had been planned for May 2003, and pointedly refused to extend an invitation to the Canadian prime minister to his Crawford ranch. Relations between the two leaders through much of the remainder of 2003 remained chilly.

When Paul Martin took over from Chrétien as prime minister in December 2003, he promised that he would work to improve relations with the United States. However, he found the temptation to play the anti-American card too irresistible. During the 2004 general election, he made sure that he characterised the opposition Conservatives as proposing an "American-style" health system and "American-style" tax cuts.[47] And, returning to power with a minority government, Martin proved unwilling to rein in the anti-Americanism in the Liberal backbench. For example, when Carolyn Parrish continued to express anti-Bush and anti-American views, he did nothing to discipline her. In August 2004, for example, she derided those supporting Ballistic Missile Defense as a "coalition of the idiots," mocking Bush's "coalition of the willing."[48] After the 2004 presidential elections in the United States, she expressed shock that Americans would re-elect Bush, claiming that they "were out of touch with the rest of the free world." Shortly afterwards, she appeared on a satirical CBC program, *This Hour Has 22 Minutes*, and as a joke stuck voodoo pins in the head of a George Bush doll ("where it would do the least damage"), and then stomped on it for the cameras (but then also kissed it). None of this was enough to attract prime ministerial discipline. What got her expelled from the Liberal caucus was not her anti-Americanism, but what she said in confidence to a reporter about the prime minister. Angered by Martin's refusal to support her renomination bid in her constituency, she declared that the prime minister "could go to hell." "If [Martin] loses the next election and has to resign, I wouldn't shed a tear over it." The reporter broke confidence and reported her words the following morning; Martin expelled her from the Liberal caucus within hours.[49]

Likewise, Martin proved unwilling to challenge anti-American sentiment in his caucus by joining the Ballistic Missile Defense scheme. Although the Martin government had given the Bush administration that it would join BMD, in the end it backed away. Liberal MPs from Québec, mirroring popular views in that province, expressed strong opposition to BMD. While it is unclear whether Québec Liberals **[75]** threatened to bring the government down over the issue, Martin's behaviour suggested that he was fearful of such an outcome. In February 2005, without warning the United States or offering any reasoned justification for its decision, the government abruptly announced that it would not join the BMD scheme.

Finally, in the general election campaign of December 2005-January 2006, Martin once again played the anti-American card. In December, at an international conference

on climate change in Montreal, Martin excoriated the United States for its stance on the Kyoto Accords. Ignoring the fact that Canada was further away from meeting its Kyoto obligations than the United States was, Martin called on the United States to heed the "global conscience" on climate change.[50] In a move designed to signal its distance from the Bush administration, Martin also made a point of arranging a photo opportunity with Bill Clinton, who remains popular in Canada. In a similar vein, the Liberal Party ran a series of attack ads appealing to anti-American sentiment in Canada.

In short, Canadian leaders have found it useful to use anti-Americanism for domestic political purposes. And, as Chrétien and Martin demonstrated, it works—at least up to a point. For there is a pendulum dynamic at work in Canadian politics. On the one hand, prime ministers who get too close to American presidents tend to find themselves out of power; by the same token, those prime ministers who court anti-American sentiment too eagerly also find themselves out of power.[51] While the victory of the overtly pro-American Stephen Harper and the Conservatives over the anti-American Liberals under Paul Martin in the general elections of January 2006 was not *caused* by the respective orientations of the two main parties towards the United States, there is little doubt that the pendulum dynamic was at work.

Conclusion

I have argued in this chapter that the kind of anti-Americanism we see in Canada today is neither the philosophical variant so evident in continental Europe or the economic anti-Americanism that was so much a part of Canadian political culture for two centuries. As Granatstein has argued, that variant is no longer dominant, having been abandoned by Canada's elites in favour of an integrationist perspective. Rather, the strand that is dominant in Canada today is contingent anti-Americanism, **[76]** where opposition and antipathy to George W. Bush and his administration's policies co-exist with generalised feelings of friendship, warmth and closeness to Americans and the United States. And while we have seen political leaders in Canada—even those who claim to want to improve Canadian-American relations—play the anti-American card, thus oxygenating contingent anti-Americanism, we do not see any shift from those generalised positive feelings.

This suggests that the anti-Americanism that remains in Canada—low-grade and ultra-lite contingent anti-Americanism—is indeed *contingent* on political developments in the United States. As I have argued above, Canadian expressions of opposition to Bush—"anti-Bushism"—and expressions of anti-Americanism tended to be all too often intertwined and not easily separable. One implication of this is that the rise in anti-Americanism that many Canadians themselves have reported feeling[52] may be temporary and limited to George W. Bush's tenure in office to January 2009, or to the

conduct of the war in Iraq, which may be considerably longer. At the same time, however, it is unlikely that the essentially positive feelings that Canadians have for Americans and for the United States will remain unaffected. For while some Americans may lump Canadians into an "axis of envy," the kind of sentiments that Canadians have for the United States and for Americans remain as mixed as that original—and unique—act of anti-Americanism in the 1770s.

NOTES (pp. 319–322)

[1] For comparative explorations, see Paul Hollander, ed., *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004); Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, *Hating America: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross, eds., *Anti-Americanism* (New York: New York University Press, 2004); Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, *Why Do People Hate America?* (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2002); and Mark Hertsgaard, *The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World* (New York: Picador, 2002).

[2] Josef Joffe, "The Demons of Europe," *Commentary Magazine* 117 (January 2004), 29.

[3] Brendon O'Connor, "The Last Respectable Prejudice?" *Australian Book Review* (October 2003), 21-22.

[4] John Gibson, *Hating America: The New World Sport* (New York: ReganBooks, 2004). Gibson is the host of Fox News Channel's *The Big Story with John Gibson*. His hyperbolic title, it might be noted, is not original, nor is the "sport" he purports to identify so "new": in 1970, a German reporter, Erwin K. Scheuch, published an article in *Die Welt* in Hamburg entitled "Hating America—the World's Favorite Pastime," translated in *Atlas* 19 (September 1970), 18-21 (though unlike Gibson, who locates the cause of anti-Americanism in the envy of others, Scheuch argued that the anti-Americanism of the late 1960s was in fact a sentiment exported from the United States by self-hating young bourgeois Americans and eagerly lapped up by Europeans).

[5] Moisés Naím, "The Perils of Lite Anti-Americanism," *Foreign Policy* (May/June 2003).

[6] See "What the world thinks of America," British Broadcasting Corporation, 17 June 2003; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/wtwta/default.stm. The percentage of Canadians responding favourably to the question "In general, how would you say you feel towards America?" was 65, second highest after Americans themselves (88 per cent), and well ahead of Britain (57 per cent), Israel (47 per cent) and Australia (35 per cent).

[7] J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996).

[8] Kenneth Arrow, "Increasing Returns: Historiographic Issues and Path Dependence," *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 7 (2000), 171-80 and Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review* 94 (2000), 251-67; James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," *Theory & Society* 29 (2000).

[9] For all the deeply-rooted and pervasive anti-American sentiments in Canada, one would be hard-pressed to find the kind of virulent attitudes reported in many of the contributions to Hollander, ed., *Understanding Anti-Americanism*, or Ross and Ross, eds., *Anti-Americanism.*
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[10] James W. Ceaser, "A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism," *The Public Interest* (Summer 2003).

[11] Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Homes and Abroad, 1965-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), viii; this book was updated as *Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995).

[12] Ceaser, "Genealogy of Anti-Americanism"; a variant of this article appears as "The Philosophical Origins of Anti-Americanism in Europe," in Hollander, ed., *Anti-Americanism*, 45–64. For a fuller discussion, see his *Reconstructing America: The Symbol of America in Modern Thought (*New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

[13] Adam Garfinkle, "Peace Movements and the Adversary Culture," in Hollander, ed., *Understanding Anti-Americanism*, 316-17.

[14] John W. Holmes, *Life With Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 114.

[15] For details on this period in Canadian history, see Desmond Morton, *A Short History of Canada*, 5th ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2001); J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991); John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994).

[16] The Treaty of Paris ceded to Britain all of Nouvelle-France except the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon off the southern coast of Newfoundland: this included what was then known as Canada (much of the present-day provinces of Québec and Ontario) and its dependencies, the islands in the Gulf of the St Lawrence River, including Île Saint-Jean (subsequently renamed St John's Island, and then, in 1799, Prince Edward Island) and Cape Breton Island; the lands of the Ohio valley and the lands of Louisiane east of the Mississippi River.

[17] Thompson and Randall, *Ambivalent Allies*, 13.

[18] For example, after the bishop of Québec died, General James Murray, the first governor of the newly-conquered province, helped arrange the consecration of a new bishop of Québec, even though the Catholic Church was illegal. Murray not only helped find a successor but also sent him to France so that he could be consecrated. Since without a bishop, no priests could be ordained, Murray's action generated considerable support from the Church.

[19] Article XI of the original Articles of Confederation of 1778 read: "Canada acceding to this confederation, and adjoining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States."

[20] The key acts of the British Parliament that forged the development of Canada as an independent polity after the Quebec Act of 1774 include: the Canada Act, 1791, which divided Québec along the Ottawa River into Upper Canada and Lower Canada; the Act of Union, 1840, which reunited Upper and Lower Canada into a single United Provinces of Canada East (formerly Lower Canada, or Québec) and Canada West (formerly Upper Canada, or Ontario) with a legislature that featured exactly equal representation for each of the Canadas; the British North America Act, 1867, which created a self-governing Dominion from the united province of Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia; the Statute of Westminster, 1931, which granted Canada and the other self-governing dominions sovereignty; and the Canada Act, 1982, which "patriated" the constitution by terminating the practice of amending the Canadian constitution via acts of the British Parliament. After Confederation, Canada grew to its present boundaries by the acquisition **[321]** of the Northwest Territories from the Hudson's Bay Company in 1870, the islands in the Arctic archipelago in 1880, and the addition of six new provinces: Manitoba (1870), British Columbia (1871), Prince Edward Island (1873), Saskatchewan (1905), Alberta (1905), and Newfoundland (1949).

[21] Kenneth McNaught, *The Penguin History of Canada* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1988), 59.

[22] Quoted in Thomson and Randall, *Ambivalent Allies*, 16.

[23] Granatstein and Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse*, xiii.

[24] The "NP," as it was known, was introduced by Sir John A. Macdonald, the Conservative prime minister, after the Conservatives won the 1878 elections. An example of classical economic nationalism modeled on both German and American protection, the NP raised tariffs from an average of 17.5 per cent to 28 per cent, with rates on some products like iron set at 35 per cent. Peter Waite, *Canada 1874-96: Arduous Destiny* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971).

[25] The best survey of the Third Option is to be found in J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), chapter 6.

[26] In the years after 1791, when Upper Canada was created, the provincial administration sought to encourage settlement by offering land grants and naturalisation after seven years. Large numbers of Americans migrated north in response: by 1800, the so-called "late Loyalists" outnumbered the original Loyalists, Americanizing many communities in Upper Canada. Some of these joined the American invaders during the War of 1812.

[27] See Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?*, 26.

[28] Irish–American members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Fenians, conducted terrorist attacks in Canada in the 1860s. The purpose of the raids was to provoke another war between the

United States and Britain, which, the Fenians believed, would further the cause of Irish independence.

[29] This phrase was first used by an American editor, John Louis O'Sullivan. In 1845, he wrote that it was America's "manifest destiny … to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions." Quoted in George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, *America: A Narrative History*, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 333.

[30] See Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?*, 48-49.

[31] Champ Clark, the Speaker-designate of the House of Representatives, stated in the middle of the Canadian election campaign that he favoured the free trade agreement because "I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions." Quoted in J.L. Granatstein, "Free Trade Between Canada and the United States: The Issue that Will Not Go Away," in Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects of Canada (Macdonald Commission), *Collected Research Studies,* vol. 29: *The Politics of Canada's Economic Relationship with the United States*, Denis Stairs and Gilbert Winham, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 24.

[32] Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?*, 92–93.

[33] Quoted in Lawrence Martin, *Pledge of Allegiance: The Americanization of Canada in the Mulroney Years* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1993), 44.

[34] Quoted in Thomson and Randall, *Ambivalent Allies*, 286.

[35] Quoted in Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?*, 266.

[36] As the illustrative quotations in Granatstein's history show, some members of different Canadian elites—academics, writers, intellectuals, or those in the media or the performance arts—continued (and continue) to use the language of "hatred" towards Americans and America, seemingly unembarrassed to use such a word in public to describe **[322]** their feelings for Americans. However, in Canada the chattering classes are not the "dominant" elites.

[37] Brian W. Tomlin, "Leaving the Past Behind: The Free Trade Initiative Assessed," in Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal, eds., *Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984–1993* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 45–58.

[38] For one survey, see Drew Fagan, "Beyond NAFTA: Towards Deeper Economic Integration," in David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson and Norman Hillmer, eds., *Canada Among Nations, 2003: Coping with the American Colossus* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003), 32-53.

[39] Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?*, 285; writing in 1998, Bruce C. Daniels, "Younger British Siblings: Canada and Australia Grow Up in the Shadow of the United States," *American Studies International* 36:3 (October 1998), 35, opined that anti-Americanism in both Australia and Canada was at an "all time low."

[40] A example of this dynamic is the Council of Canadians, formed in 1985 by Maude Barlow. The Council's activities in the late 1980s focused on asserting Canadian sovereignty and opposing the free trade agreement with the United States. In the 1990s, the Council shifted its focus, campaigning on other issues, such as genetically modified food, the corporatisation of health care, factory farming, or the bulk export of water: see www.canadians.org.

[41] Harvey M. Sapolsky, "A Nuisance Neighbour," *National Post*, July 27, 2005, A15.

[42] At the first summit meeting between Reagan and Mulroney, on St Patrick's Day in 1985, the two leaders decided to celebrate their common Irish heritage by singing "When Irish Eyes Are Smiling" with their spouses at the summit dinner. This performance, which many Canadians found highly embarrassing, assumed iconic status as representative of the relationship during the Mulroney era. While Mulroney and Reagan got on well, Mulroney and George H.W. Bush developed a close and personal friendship.

[43] *Maclean's*, July 21, 1997; *Globe and Mail*, July 10, 1997.

[44] "Canada PM Criticises 'Arrogant' West," BBC News On-line, September 13, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/americas/2254761.stm.

[45] "Canadian Official Called Bush 'A Moron,'" CBC News, November 26, 2002, http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2002/11/21/moron021121.

[46] Andrew Coyne, "Parrish Says What Chrétien Thinks," *National Post*, March 3, 2003.

[47] "Martin and HarperTrade Barbs on Tax Issues," CTV News, May 25, 2004.

[48] "Parrish Sticks by 'Idiot' Comment," CBC News, August 27, 2004.

[49] Ray Conologue, "Loose Cannon," *Saturday Night* (March 2005), 48–53.

[50] *Globe and Mail*, Toronto, December 9, 2005.

[51] For a survey of this dynamic, see Kim Richard Nossal, "A Thermostatic Dynamic? Electoral Outcomes and Anti-Americanism in Canada," in Richard A. Higgott and Ivona Malbašić, eds., *The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism* (London: Routledge, forthcoming [2008]), 129–41.

[52] When a COMPAS/Global Television Poll conducted between November 25 and November 27, 2004, asked "Speaking personally, have you become a lot more pro-American lately/somewhat more pro-American/stayed the same/somewhat more anti-American/or a lot more anti-American", 8 per cent of the respondents said that they had become a "lot more pro-American lately," 23 per cent were "somewhat more pro-American," 26 per cent "stayed the same, 27 per cent were "somewhat more anti-American," and 21 per cent were "a lot more anti-American." http://www.compas.ca/data/041201-RisingAnti-Americanism-PB.pdf.