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# *The Rage of Nations: Australia and French Nuclear Testing and Hong Kong and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku-shotō*[1]

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*Are we at a new and less conflictual stage in international relations, a post-nationalist era marked by increasing democratisation and the effects of the 'democratic peace proposition'? This article reports on two cases which cast some doubt on the propositions that nationalism is decreasing and that democratic societies are unlikely to develop serious conflicts. The first is the case of Australian anger at the resumption of French nuclear testing in the South Pacific in 1995; the second is the anger that swept through Hong Kong in September and October 1996 at Japan's decision to defend its claims to islands known as Diaoyutai by Chinese and Senkaku-shotō by Japanese. This article seeks to explain the anger in each case, and to explore what implications they have for our understanding of the role of nationalism and democracy in contemporary world politics. I argue that these cases remind us that the emotionalism of nationalist ideology continues to infuse how publics approach international issues; moreover, they show that the democratic nature of the four countries involved did little to dampen these nationalist emotions.*

At the end of a century of conflicts fuelled by nationalism and differences between political systems, there are those who argue that we are at a new and less conflictual stage in international relations. Some have argued that we have entered a post-nationalist era in which the emotional attachment to the nation is in the process of being replaced by other forms of political identity.[2] Others have suggested that as progressively more political systems become democratised, there is increased likelihood that the effects of the 'democratic peace proposition'—the idea that relations between democracies are fundamentally more peaceful—will take hold.[3] Thus, in this view, we are likely to see a decrease in international conflict and a flowering of cooperation between societies and peoples that are increasingly democratic and post-nationalist.

The purpose of this article is to report on two cases that cast some doubt on the propositions that nationalism is decreasing and that democratic societies are unlikely to develop serious conflicts. The first is the case of Australian anger at the decision of the

1 My thanks to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their support of the research for this paper under grant 410–95–1085; to Denis Stairs for hunting the weasels; and to the journal's reviewers for helpful comments.

2 For an elaboration of the 'post-nationalist' condition, see, for example, Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994).

3 On the 'democratic peace proposition', see, for example, Michael W. Doyle, 'Liberalism in World Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1986), pp. 1151–1169; Clifton T. Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', *International Interactions*, 18 (1993), pp. 197–203; James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition*, (Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1995).

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French government of President Jacques Chirac in 1995 to resume nuclear testing at French facilities in the South Pacific. The decision prompted a storm of public protest across Australia, with hundreds of thousands of people taking part in protest actions that ranged from personal boycotts to mass demonstrations. Indeed, the intensity of the anger led to a deep deterioration in Franco-Australian relations throughout much of 1995 and into 1996.

The second is the case of the anger that swept through Hong Kong in September and October 1996 at the decision of the Japanese government to defend its claim to ownership of an archipelagic chain of uninhabited islets in the East China Sea northeast of Taiwan, called Diaoyutai in Chinese and Senkaku-shotō in Japanese. When the Japanese government refused to dismantle a makeshift lighthouse erected by a rightist Japanese youth group, there were public demonstrations in all parts of China—the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC), and the two territories of Macao and Hong Kong—but it was in Hong Kong that the demonstrations were particularly vociferous. This article seeks to explain the anger in each case, and explore what implications it has for our understanding of the role of nationalism and democracy in contemporary international relations.

## Australia and French Nuclear Testing

When the newly elected president of France, Jacques Chirac, announced on 13 June 1995 that his government would resume nuclear testing at facilities on Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls in the South Pacific, the announcement produced a wave of public protests throughout the Asia–Pacific. Even though the atolls were 6000 km from Australia, the reaction of the public to the resumption of French testing was one of widespread and sustained anger.[4] The nature of those protests is well known: tens of thousands of Australians took to the streets in protest marches.[5] The French embassy in Canberra was inundated with 13,000 letters of protest in two months.[6] There were widespread boycotts of French goods and services, particularly against French restaurants (or merely restaurants with French names).[7] Unions imposed rolling 'black bans' on mail and telephone services to French diplomatic missions; services to French aircraft and French ships were withdrawn; and the president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), Martin Ferguson, endorsed a national boycott of all French products.[8]

State and local governments added their voices to the protests. In New South Wales, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) premier, Bob Carr, denounced the tests as an 'unforgivable act of environmental vandalism', and the state government organised a series of 'protest picnics' in cities and towns around the state on 17 September.[9] In Victoria, the premier, Jeff

4 See Kim Richard Nossal and Carolynn Vivian, *A Brief Madness: Australia and the Resumption of French Nuclear Testing*, Canberra Papers 121 (Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1997); Trevor Findlay, 'Explaining Australasian Angst: Australia, New Zealand and French Nuclear Testing', *Security Dialogue*, 26,4 (1995), pp. 373–381; Karin von Strokirch, 'The Political Fallout from French Testing in the Pacific', *Pacific Research*, 8 (August 1995), pp. 5–8; Glen St John Barclay, 'Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January–June 1995', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 41,3 (1995), pp. 339–355; Richard DeAngelis, 'Australian Foreign Policy Review 1995: Middle-Level Power Overstretch?' *Flinders Journal of History and Politics*, 18 (1996), pp. 117–125; Ramesh Thakur, 'The Last Bang before a Total Ban: French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific', *International Journal*, 51 (Summer 1996), pp. 466–486; and Stewart Firth, 'The Road to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Responses to French Nuclear Testing during 1995', *Australian Quarterly*, 68 (Autumn 1996), pp. 77–87.

5 For example, the Sydney protest on Bastille Day drew 25,000 people: *Weekend Australian*, (15–16 July 1995).

6 According to Dominique Girard, France's ambassador to Australia: *The Bulletin*, (10 October 1995), p. 26.

7 *The Australian*, (9 July 1995).

8 *Sydney Morning Herald*, (7 September 1995).

9 *Sydney Morning Herald*, (7 September 1995).

Kennett, responded to the first test by calling it 'a bloody disgrace' and in the state parliament supported a resolution introduced by the ALP opposition calling on France to halt all future tests.[10] The mayor of Cairns shipped a stuffed cane toad to Chirac, and Jim Soorley, the ALP mayor of Brisbane, publicly ripped up his sister-city agreement with Nice.[11]

Symbolic defilements of things French became a regular feature of the protests. French patisseries had their storefronts smashed; French cakes purchased in a Brisbane suburban supermarket were found to be sprinkled with shards of glass; French cars had their tyres slashed; Glen Barclay reports that a couple in Sunnybank, a suburb of Brisbane, out walking their French poodle, was set upon by hoodlums and their dog beaten to death.[12] The worst case of violence was the firebombing of the premises of the honorary consul of France in Perth.[13] Often the attacks consisted of overt racist slurs with a distinctly anti-French idiom. For example, playwright Bob Ellis wrote in the *Telegraph Mirror* of Sydney that the French were 'a dense and arrogant people—idle, pretentious and rabbit-slaughtering'.[14] In the House of Representatives, Bob Chynoweth, the ALP member for Dunkley, Victoria, began his remarks on nuclear testing with 'Talking about frogs ...'.[15]

The Australian news media were at the forefront of the anti-testing protests; indeed, it can be argued that the media seized on the story in large part because of its inherent sensationalism.[16] The electronic media devoted considerable airtime to the testing issue. Radio call-in shows helped to galvanise opinion, and many announcers were unabashedly gleeful in encouraging anti-French protests: an announcer in Melbourne, for example, openly urged his listeners to disrupt the French consulate by tying up its phone and fax lines. Likewise, the print media provided full and often overtly partisan coverage. *The Australian* ran a regular feature entitled 'Fallout from the Nuclear Testing'. At key junctures, such as the first test in September 1995, it was not uncommon for newspapers to devote several pages of coverage to the issue under banner headlines. At times, the coverage was overtly partisan. When the tests were announced, the *Sydney Morning Herald* ran stories under headlines like 'Tests Linked to Thyroid Cancer', 'Radiation Sprayed all over Australia', or 'Merci, for Our Radioactive Blanket'. Another article was devoted to a university lecturer's fear that Australia's teenage suicide rate, already high, would climb as a result of 'renewed teenage despair' over the testing.[17] Likewise, after the first test in September, *The Advertiser* in Adelaide ran a graphic description of what would happen if the city were hit with a 20 kilotonne nuclear bomb, under the melodramatic headline 'Bringing the Horror Home'.[18] And, as in other facets of the protests, overt racist sentiment was ubiquitous. Editorial cartoons were heavily laden with Gallic stereotypes, supposed French accents, and references to frogs. One of the leading national newspapers, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, even went so far as to run an article under the headline 'Pourquoi les français sont des connards' [Why the French are fucking idiots].[19]

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10 *The Age*, (7 September 1995).
11 Barclay, 'Problems in Australian Foreign Policy', pp. 352–353.
12 Ibid.
13 *Globe and Mail*, (1 September 1995).
14 Quoted in *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), (29 August 1995).
15 During Statements by Members, Richard Evans (Liberal: Cowan, WA) rose to salute the establishment of an ecological 'Frog Watch' campaign in Western Australia to monitor declining frog species; the next member to be recognised was Chynoweth. Australia, Parliament, *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, Representatives, (18 September 1995), p. 1078.
16 Indeed, many, including Chirac himself, argued that the anti-nuclear protests were the result of the 'media-isation' of the issue: *Sydney Morning Herald*, (9 July 1995).
17 *Sydney Morning Herald*, (15, 16 June 1995).
18 *Advertiser*, (7 September 1995). A similar feature ran on the same day in the *Sun-Herald* showing the hypothetical damage to Melbourne.
19 *Sydney Morning Herald*, (15 June 1995). See the account of Daniele Caraty's complaint of racial vilification brought before the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board, *The Australian*, (13–14 July 1996).

However, there was also a distinctly good-humoured edge to much of the 'rage' levelled against France by Australians. This manifested itself in myriad ways: the essentially friendly atmosphere of the large public protests; the humorous one-liners on protest signs; the imaginative indignities visited on Peugeots; a billboard appeared in the heart of Melbourne's central business district featuring a bare-bottomed woman giving Chirac the finger;[20] the celebration of 'Bast-ard Day' on 14 July by 2000 protestors in Surfers Paradise; any number of self-parodying editorial cartoons;[21] radio ads promoting the just-released film *Forget Paris* which jokingly refused to mention France or the name of the French capital; radio competitions featuring prizes for protest songs set to the tune of 'Frère Jacques';[22] or a tongue-in-cheek promise by the Canberra association of legal prostitutes that they were planning to boycott French underwear and hosiery.[23]

The reaction to the testing took the ALP government of Paul Keating by surprise. The minister for foreign affairs, Gareth Evans, greeted the French announcement philosophically—saying that it could have been worse. The prime minister noted matter-of-factly that he would contact other countries about registering a protest. Greeted by the rising tide of public anger, however, the government abandoned its efforts to dampen that anger; instead, it sharpened its response in line with the public mood, little concerned about the relatively small two-way trade with France—Au$1.8 billion, about 2 per cent of all Australian trade.[24] Instead, the French ambassador was called in and the Australian ambassador to Paris was recalled temporarily; Keating wrote an open letter to the French people, published in *Le Monde* on 28 June; an interview with Evans appeared in *Le Figaro*. An all-party parliamentary delegation was despatched to Paris to lobby for a halt to the tests, and nearly 50 state and federal politicians from all parties announced that they would join a protest flotilla to the test site. Canberra bruited the possibility of expelling France from the South Pacific Forum or suspending its observer status. Defence cooperation with France was suspended; the French company Dassault Aviation was not permitted to bid for an Australian defence contract. More importantly, the government did little to dissuade Australians from protesting. And, as Karin von Strokirch notes, by refusing to override union bans on the provision of services to French diplomatic missions, the Keating government put itself in breach of its obligations under the Vienna Convention.[25]

But even the progressive stiffening of the government's position did not satisfy public opinion,[26] and pressure continued for the embrace of a more militant and radical posture towards the French government. 'What am I supposed to do?' Evans eventually asked in exasperation when questioned about what he would do in an upcoming meeting with French foreign minister Hervé de Charette. 'Spit in his face?'[27] The French government clearly believed that that is what the Australians were doing, and relations between the two

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20 The billboard showed the bare bottom of a woman with the tricolour painted across it, the woman's finger raised in salute, and the message 'Language is *no* barrier to our anger Mr Chirac.' See *The Australian*, (13 September 1995).

21 Such as the Nicholson cartoon (*The Australian*, 15 June 1996), in which a passenger in a car, spotting a pedestrian carrying a distinctively shaped loaf, says to the driver, 'Look. A man with a baguette. Run him over!'

22 For the winning entry, see *Canberra Times*, (29 June 1995); also reproduced in *Pacific Research* 8 (August 1995), p. 8.

23 *Toronto Star*, (30 September 1995).

24 For a survey of the evolution of Australia's economic relations with Western Europe, see J. L. Richardson, 'Australia and Western Europe', in P. J. Boyce and J. R. Angel (eds), *Diplomacy in the Marketplace: Australia in World Affairs, 1981–90*, (Sydney, Longman Cheshire, 1992), pp. 208–224.

25 Von Strokirch, 'Political Fallout', p. 6.

26 A September poll revealed that 75 per cent favoured stopping uranium exports to France; 60 per cent believed that Australia should send a naval vessel to the test site in protest; and half believed that the Australian ambassador to Paris should be recalled permanently. *The Age*, (19 September 1995).

27 Quoted in Barclay, 'Problems in Australian Foreign Policy', p. 353.

governments deteriorated to the point that in mid-September 1995, the French ambassador was recalled to Paris and the Chirac government was reportedly considering invoking trade sanctions against Australia.

However, the widespread public protests in Australia died down after the first test in September 1995. Even before the French government finally announced in January 1996 that it was ceasing its nuclear testing program, the rage had largely subsided. Five more tests were held between September and January, but each subsequent test drew less and less public attention in Australia.

## Hong Kong and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku-shotō Dispute

The public anger that erupted in Hong Kong in 1996 centred on the ownership of several uninhabited rocky islets in the East China Sea which lie approximately 200 km northeast of Taiwan and 300 km west of Okinawa in the Ryukyu Islands (or, as they are known in Japan, Nansei-shotō, the Nansei archipelago).[28] However, the islands are not geologically part of the Ryukyus, being separated from that chain by a deep oceanic trench; rather, they are located at the margin of China's continental shelf. Depending on how one counts them, there are up to eight distinct geographical features, but only a few are marked on maps. The westernmost and largest island is Uotsuri Shima (Uotsuri island), known in Chinese as Diaoyutai, which is 1.6 km wide, 3 km in length and rises 362 m above sea level. Approximately 30 km to the northeast is Kobi Sho (Kobi islet), or Huangweiyu island in Chinese, which rises 117 m above sea level. Finally, some 90 km due east is an islet that rises 84 m, known as Sekibi Sho in Japanese and Chihweiyu in Chinese. Uotsuri Shima is surrounded by a group of reefs and rocks, known as Sento Sho (Sento reef). Collectively, the eight features are known as Diaoyutai in Chinese (the three characters mean 'fishing platform'), and Senkaku-shotō (Senkaku archipelago) in Japanese. (See Figure 1.)

Ownership of these uninhabited islets is deeply contested. Historical research suggests that they were traditionally used as a base by Chinese fishing boats, and down to end of the nineteenth century they were implicitly administered as part of Taiwan province, even if not explicitly claimed by the Chinese empire.[29] Certainly they were not considered part of the kingdom of Liuqiu (Ryukyu), which, until it was seized in 1879 by Japan and annexed as Okinawa Prefecture, was a nominally independent suzerain which paid tribute to the Chinese emperor. However, in 1895, after the first Sino–Japanese war, the island of Taiwan was ceded to Japan, along with the Diaoyutai. At this juncture, a Japanese businessman from Nansei-shotō (the Ryukyus) sought to lease the Diaoyutai in order to exploit the abundant albatross feathers found on the islands. The lease was approved by the Okinawa government in September 1896, and the islands were, *de facto* and *de jure*, absorbed administratively into Ishigaki, a village on an island in the Sakishima group located at the tail end of the Ryukyu chain, about 200 km south of the Diaoyutai. They were named Senkaku in 1900.[30]

When Japan was defeated in 1945, it was required to return Taiwan and other territories seized from China. However, the Senkakus were not included in these territories; they remained with the Ryukyus, which were occupied by the United States as part of the

28 Their precise location is 25° 45' North latitude, between 123° 25' and 124° 35' East longitude.

29 A highly partial historical survey can be found in Kiyoshi Inoue, 'The Tiaoyu Islands (Senkaku Island) are China's Territory', *Peking Review*, 15 (12 May 1972).

30 It should be noted that in 1893, before the war, the Qing empress dowager Cixi had given the Diaoyutai to one of her royal herbalists as a gift for service. The herbalist's descendants moved to the United States and on the strength of Qing documents claim to be the rightful owners of the islets. That ownership is held by Chinese authorities to be evidence of Chinese sovereignty over the territory.




**Figure 1.** The Diaoyutai/Senkaku-shotō.

postwar settlement. Washington did not return the Okinawa or Sakishima areas of the Ryukyus to Japanese control until 1972, but when it did, the terms of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty of 1969 included the Senkaku-shotō.

By that time, however, the claims to sovereignty had multiplied, as had the importance of the islands. There were now two rival Chinese claims to the islands—both the government of the PRC in Beijing, and the government of the ROC in Taipei, claimed sovereignty. Second, by the early 1970s, the waters around the islands had increased in importance for both Chinas: a report by the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East had been published in 1968 suggesting that there were large oil deposits in the continental shelf around the islands, of considerable interest to the PRC; and the waters around the islands were important fishing areas for the Taiwanese. Perhaps because of these economic interests, both the PRC and ROC governments vigorously protested the reversion in the early 1970s. However, despite the formal diplomatic protests, Japanese ownership of the islands is widely recognised.[31]

The reversion also sparked the beginning of a mass protest movement, the Bao Diao ('defend Diaoyutai') movement, involving Chinese communities in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the United States, and elsewhere in the world. In 1971, there were mass rallies calling for the return of the Diaoyutai. The formal reversion of the islands to Japan in 1972 also began a long-simmering dispute that would flare periodically over the following two and a half decades as Chinese and Japanese sought ways to symbolically assert ownership of the uninhabited islands. For example, in 1978, a makeshift lighthouse was erected by an

31 One measure of this is the degree to which non-Chinese maps that mark the islands refer to them by their Japanese name, and do not even indicate the rival claims of the Chinese governments.

ultranationalist Japanese group, Nihon Seinensha, on the main island of Uotsuri Shima, and in August 1979, a helipad was built there.[32]

Indeed, it was another Nihon Seinensha lighthouse that proved to be the immediate catalyst for the protests of 1996. The group landed on Uotsuri island on 14 July 1996 in order to install a new solar-powered 'lighthouse'—actually a slender 6 m aluminium pole with a beacon on top. This landing, by itself, probably would not have prompted much response. But shortly afterwards, the Japanese prime minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, made a highly controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on 29 July 1996 to pay his respects to those who died in the Second World War. Because this shrine is widely seen as a symbol of Japanese militarism, Hashimoto's visit prompted strong protests from China. While the Japanese government had nothing directly to do with the Senkaku-shotō landings, the new lighthouse and the Hashimoto visit were seen by many Chinese as symbolically interrelated, and indicative of a return of Japanese militarism.

The concern over militarism was not assuaged by two more landings on the islands in the late summer of 1996. On 18 August, another right-wing group, this one from Okinawa, travelled to the Diaoyutai to plant a Japanese flag and a war memorial on Kobi Sho. And on 9 September, Nihon Seinensha returned to Diaoyu island, this time to repair the lighthouse, which had been bent to a 45 degree angle by a typhoon in August. Although China and Taiwan protested that Japan should prevent such landings, the Japanese Foreign Ministry took the position that it could do nothing about the Nihon Seinensha landings: the islands were privately owned by a Japanese family, and the family had consented to the landings.

Protests in Hong Kong gathered steam at the end of August when Yukihiko Ikeda, Japan's foreign minister, visited Hong Kong and publicly and unapologetically asserted that the Senkakus belonged to Japan. His statement was met with immediate formal protests by both the PRC and ROC governments, and with informal public protests in Hong Kong and Taiwan. These protests mainly took the form of the presentation of petitions,[33] consumer boycotts of Japanese products or Japanese department stores such as Sogo, brief occupations of the Japanese consulate in Hong Kong, candlelight vigils, and naval demonstrations by boats sent to the islands to challenge Japanese claims.[34] But most of the public anger in Hong Kong was vented in street demonstrations. The first major protest, involving approximately 3000 people, occurred on the weekend of 7–8 September 1996. It was followed the next weekend by a larger one: approximately 10,000–15,000 people attended this rally, which featured a march to the Japanese consulate in Central District (or, more accurately, past the building in which the consulate is located, for the Japanese mission has its premises on the 47th floor of Exchange Square, a downtown office tower complex). A rally at Chater Garden followed: a Japanese military flag was unfurled and set alight to chants of 'Burn, burn, burn'.

These demonstrations tended to turn into an exercise in national unity. Chinese patriotic songs were played at Victoria Park, the rally assembly point; representatives from Taiwan and Macao joined Hong Kong organisers on the podium; some groups of protestors waved Taiwanese flags while others had PRC flags. And even the bitter political quarrels between the democratic and pro-Beijing forces were temporarily set aside. The 15 September

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32 In response, Chinese groups tried to assert Chinese sovereignty: in October 1990, a group of Taiwanese athletes tried to plant an Olympic torch on the islands, but were repelled by 12 Japanese coastguard vessels.

33 So many different petitions, collectively bearing hundreds of thousands of names of Hong Kong residents, were delivered to the Japanese consulate, occasionally prompting scuffles, that the consulate eventually demanded that petitions be mailed in. Reuters News Service, (11 October 1996).

34 See the accounts in 'Rocks of Contention', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (19 September 1996), pp. 14–15; 'Controlling Interest', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (26 September 1996), p. 11.

demonstration was organised by the Democratic Party; the head of the party, Martin Lee Chu-ming, and vice-chairman, Yeung Sum, both spoke at the rally. Lee and the Democrats are highly critical of the Central People's Government (CPG) in Beijing; and the Democrats, in turn, are much despised by both the mainland authorities and the pro-Beijing forces in Hong Kong.[35] However, during the Diaoyutai protests, there were elements of cooperation and national unity between the two groups. For example, the Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong—the mainland government's unofficial 'embassy' in Hong Kong during the colonial period—had Zhu Yucheng put out a statement endorsing the protest: the authorities in Beijing, Zhu said, 'support the demonstrations by compatriots from all fronts'.[36]

Protests became almost a daily ritual during the following week as 18 September approached. This was a key date for Chinese protests against Japan, for it was on 18 September 1931 that the first shots were fired in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria which precipitated a 14 year war in which millions of Chinese were killed. Anti-Japanese protests planned for that date included demonstrations at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, the Japanese consulate in Hong Kong, and Japan's *de facto* diplomatic mission in Taipei, the Japanese Interchange Association.

Other protest actions included more internationally focused demonstrations. For example, a delegation from the 1–2–3 Democratic Alliance, a pro-Taiwan party, set off for New York and Washington on 19 September with the intention of lobbying US government officials and foreign ministers of the 'Permanent 5' due to arrive at the United Nations for the annual General Assembly session. While in the United States, the delegation held a hunger strike, and attempted to present letters of protest to President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto. As Lawrence Yum Sin-ling, a member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council (Legco) and leader of the 1–2–3 delegation, put it, 'We would like to raise this to an international level'.

Much of the protest in September was organised by either existing political parties in Hong Kong, or by *ad hoc* groups that were quickly formed on the issue. All of the political parties in Hong Kong developed positions on the Diaoyutai, ranging from the hardline position of the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, which unabashedly advocated the use of force by the PRC to settle the dispute, to the more moderate position of the main party in Legco, the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party sought to channel popular protest in more standard ways, forming an Action Committee for the Protection of the Diaoyu Islands under the leadership of Albert Ho Chun-yan and Tsang Kin-shing, two Legco members. As noted above, the Action Committee organised the major protest in Hong Kong on 15 September, and during early September was working on organising a flotilla that was scheduled to sail to the Diaoyutai in early October to press the Chinese claim.

Although the Democratic Party tried to create a single peak association to organise and coordinate public protest in Hong Kong, and although there was some cooperation between the Democrats and pro-Beijing forces, the long-running dispute did lead to the fragmentation of the Diaoyutai protests. A rival organisation to the Action Committee created by the Democratic Party was the 'Global Defend Diaoyutai Alliance', which was formed on 6 September by David Chan Yuk-cheung, a 45-year-old businessman and public relations

35 The Central People's Government (CPG) in Beijing has consistently sought to ensure that the party would be marginalised after the 1 July 1997 reversion. For example, even though the Democratic Party received the most votes in the 1995 Legislative Council elections, not a single Democrat was appointed to the Provisional Legislature created by the CPG for the transition.

36 On 18 September, a Xinhua official participated in a symbolic removal of the Japanese flag from a model of the islands built by the Sha Tin branch of the Action Committee.

consultant who had been active in the Bao Diao movement of the early 1970s, and who was more avowedly pro-Beijing than the leaders of the Action Committee.[37]

Despite his pro-Beijing leanings, Chan nonetheless tried to create a pan-Chinese movement that united activists in Hong Kong, Macao, mainland China, and Taiwan. Thus, on 8 September, Tong Zeng, a researcher in the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing who had a record of high-profile anti-Japanese activities,[38] announced the formation of the 'Chinese Defend Diaoyutai Alliance'; and on the following day, in Taiwan, the right-wing New Party announced the formation of the 'ROC Defend Diaoyutai Alliance'. These three groups tried to coordinate various protest activities, such as boycotts of Japanese products and Japanese stores, and demonstrations at Japanese diplomatic missions in Beijing, Hong Kong and Taipei.

Chan and the other Alliance groups decided to pre-empt the Action Committee's flotilla planned for October by pushing for a seaborne invasion of the Diaoyutai in September, with the expressed intention of destroying the lighthouse and erecting the Chinese flag. The Hong Kong Bao Diao leased a 2800 tonne tanker, the Kien Hwa 2, and on Sunday, 22 September 1996, Chan's group set off for the Diaoyutai, with a media contingent of 42 which outnumbered the 18 protestors and 19 crew members. At the same time, the Bao Diao movement in Taiwan also organised a flotilla, and invited leaders of the Hong Kong Action Committee to be part of its protests. Early on Monday, 23 September, seven Taiwanese protest vessels sailed for the islands with nine activists, including Tsang and Ho, the Action Committee leaders, and a huge contingent of 71 journalists. Arriving at the islands later that day, the protestors found that the Japanese government had despatched 17 patrol boats and a helicopter to keep foreign boats out of the 12 nautical-mile territorial sea around the islands. Although the Taiwanese flotilla split up into three groups and tried to outmanoeuvre the Japanese Maritime Protection Agency vessels, the raid was unsuccessful. Most boats were forced back, though one managed to get within 70 m of the main island before being surrounded by Japanese speedboats. After two hours, the protest was called off.

Early on Thursday, 26 September, the Kien Hwa 2 carrying David Chan and the Hong Kong protest group arrived in the area. The boat tried to land protestors on the islands, but the seas were too rough, and the boat was quickly surrounded by Japanese naval vessels. When the Kien Hwa 2 was eventually ordered out of the area by the Japanese, Chan and four other protestors secured themselves to the ship with a length of rope and jumped into the water as an act of defiance. Unfortunately for Chan, the seas were too rough: he apparently lost consciousness, was pulled under the boat's wake, and dragged for almost an hour before those on board realised that something was wrong and hauled him back on deck. Another protestor was badly hurt jumping off the ship. Ironically, Japanese Maritime Protection Agency personnel came to the rescue, plucking three of the protestors from the sea unharmed, and dropping a medical team by helicopter onto the Kien Hwa 2 to treat Chan. Efforts to revive him failed, but the Japanese airlifted the other injured protestor to a hospital in Ishigaki.[39]

Some expected that the death of David Chan Yuk-cheung would increase the intensity of the protests.[40] In fact, Chan's death sobered the protest movement. Smaller-scale

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37 As Lo Shui-hing, director of the Hong Kong Transition Project, put it, the differing approaches to the Diaoyutai reflected the divisions within the territory between the democratic and pro-China forces. *New York Times*, (8 October 1996), p. A3.

38 Because of his anti-Japanese proclivities, Tong had been banished from Beijing during the UN World Conference on Women in September 1995: his passport had been confiscated and he had been sent to the countryside.

39 *New York Times*, (27 September 1996), p. A8.

40 For example, Chan Kin-man, a sociologist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, suggested that the death would 'radicalise' Hong Kong people; likewise, Li Pang-kwong of Lingnan College worried that anger at the death would lead people to 'destructive actions'. Reuters News Service, (27 September 1996); *New York Times*, (8 October 1996), p. A3.

demonstrations did continue into early October and Chinese protestors finally landed on the islands on 7 October, the day after a memorial service for Chan attended by several thousand people. This time the flotilla was larger—some 50 vessels and about 300 protestors—and as a result the Japanese fleet of 60 boats was overwhelmed by waves of protest speedboats trying to make for the shore. The successful landing lasted only long enough for protestors to plant the five-star PRC flag and the blue and red Nationalist flag flown in Taiwan side-by-side; the offending lighthouse remained.

Chan's funeral and the successful landing marked the end of large-scale protests over the Diaoyutai in Hong Kong. While small candlelight vigils continued to be held in the territory, while a small number of activists stormed the Japanese consulate and occupied it for 30 minutes on 9 October, and while a revitalised Bao Diao movement continues to protest Japanese ownership of the islands,[41] there were no further mass expressions of anger over the Diaoyutai.

It should be noted that in the Diaoyutai/Senkaku-shotō case, governments on all sides tried hard to manage public anger over the issue rather than move to accommodate it as the Australian government had done on the nuclear testing issue. From the governments in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong, the message was the same: be cool, be calm, act rationally.[42] The economic linkages between Japan, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong were frequently mentioned as the key reason for caution: by 1996, cumulative Japanese investment amounted to some US$14 billion in Hong Kong, $13 billion in China, and $6 billion in Taiwan.[43] For its part, the Hong Kong government was consistent in its calls for calm. In the aftermath of Chan's death, for example, the Secretary for Home Affairs, Michael Suen, appealed for 'calm from all', urging that Hong Kong people reacted in 'an orderly and responsible manner'. Anson Chan Fang On-sang, the Chief Secretary, who was visiting Australia when Chan drowned, echoed these views: 'I understand the depth of feeling,' she said, 'but I hope that views will be expressed in a calm manner without affecting the relationship between ourselves and Japan.' Although the Xinhua News Agency was not unsupportive of the Hong Kong protests, as we have seen, it too joined the chorus of appeals for calm, urging Hong Kong people to conduct their protests 'in a rational manner'.[44] Hong Kong newspapers controlled by China, such as *Ta Kung Pao*, urged protestors to keep 'cool heads' and consider the 'big picture' in working 'for the good of Hong Kong and the motherland'.[45]

In the event, the various governments concerned used diplomatic channels to defuse the dispute. In October, Taiwanese and Japanese officials met to discuss fishing rights and the Japanese and Chinese sides discussed the dispute at an annual meeting of deputy foreign ministers in Tokyo; in November, Jiang Zemin and Ryutaro Hashimoto met in advance of

41 For a good example of a Diaoyutai protest site, see http://www.yitch.com/Baodiao.

42 Thus a spokesman of the Japanese foreign ministry urged that 'both peoples should deal with this matter calmly'; a similar call for 'rational, clear-headed, and peaceful' measures was made by Taiwan's foreign minister, John Chang. See *New York Times*, (16 September 1996), p. A8; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (26 September 1996), p. 11; also Reuters News Service, (7 October 1996).

43 See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (26 September 1996), p. 11. For a broader survey, see Richard Stubbs, 'The Political Economy of the Asia–Pacific Region', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, (Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1994), pp. 366–377.

44 It should be noted that the PRC was more forgiving of public protest in Hong Kong than in China itself. If the Central People's Government in Beijing were not unsympathetic to Hong Kong protests against Japan, they were not at all keen to see nationalist protest on the mainland, and moved with some despatch to dampen protest. For example, the authorities 'encouraged' Tong Zeng, head of the PRC Bao Diao, to cease his protests against Japan, and then for good measure sent him on official business to Lanzhou, 1200 km from Beijing, 'to carry out scientific research'. Five other members of the PRC Bao Diao were also forced to leave the capital. Likewise, President Jiang Zemin himself ordered universities to prevent students from protesting on 18 September. Fudan University in Shanghai apparently cooperated by blocking access to an internet site used for protesting Japanese claims to the islands. See Reuters News Service, (17, 18 September 1996); *New York Times*, (19 September 1996), p. A7.

45 Reuters News Service, (27 September 1996).

the annual Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation summit and exchanged views on the islands.

## Explaining the Rage

How does one explain the anger so clearly observed in each of these cases? Contemporary international relations theory does not do well at explaining manifestations of the emotional in world politics. Emotions like anger, pride, love, hate and envy rarely feature in theoretical perspectives on international relations, whether these are the relations between the governments of states or relations between peoples. Instead, much international theory tends to be grounded in assumptions of rationality and materialistic conceptions of self-interest.[46] Actors in international politics are assumed to act *sensibly*: calmly, coolly and with an eye to careful calculations of self-interest. In this perspective, emotion becomes virtually invisible—dismissed as foolish, non-logical, even irrational—and always an impediment to the achievement of goals.[47]

To be sure, one set of actors is often exempted from such assumptions of rationality. 'Ordinary' people—in other words, those who are not state officials or corporate managers—tend to be analysed as though they operated under different assumptions of rationality. The literature does acknowledge that these actors (usually referred to as the 'mass public' or 'public opinion'[48]) do become excited by foreign policy issues. However, when 'the public' shows emotion, and particularly when they demonstrate deep love for their nation, or show anger at or antipathy towards the behaviour of other peoples or governments, these manifestations tend to be written off as 'volatility' or 'irrationality'.[49] We can go back to the classic statement by Hans J. Morgenthau, who argued that emotions 'deflect foreign policies from their rational course', and warned that the 'need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy itself'.[50] But as Miroslav Nincic has demonstrated, Morgenthau is by no means unusual: this is an exceedingly common way of characterising public opinion and foreign policy.[51]

This is particularly true when the emotions are driven by nationalism. Some try to explain love of nation away as mere pathology: Stephan Van Evera, for example, characterises nationalism as a form of insanity.[52] But it is hardly helpful to dismiss

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46 The exemplar would be Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in World Politics*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984).

47 See, for example, Sidney Verba, 'Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System,' in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds), *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 93–117; Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977).

48 For example, James N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, (New York, Random House, 1961).

49 Nationalism, for example, is commonly described in terms that suggest that those who love their nation are quite irrational, or, worse, inflicted by some disease. Consider how the authors of a leading American textbook teach their students how to view the nationalism of others by quoting without comment President Bill Clinton's characterisation of 'hypernationalism' as a 'cancerous prejudice, eating away at states and leaving their people addicted to the political painkillers of violence and demagoguery'. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 6th edn, (New York, St Martin's Press, 1997), p. 369.

50 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th edn, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 7. For recent empirical research on the management of public opinion in liberal democracies, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies', *World Politics*, 43 (July 1991), pp. 479–512.

51 Miroslav Nincic, 'A Sensible Public: New Perspectives on Popular Opinion and Foreign Policy', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36 (December 1992), pp. 772–789.

52 Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War', in Sean M. Lynn-Jones (ed.), *The Cold War and After: The Prospects for Peace*, (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992), p. 239, cited in Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, 'War and the National Interest: On the Relation between Nationalism and Hegel's Conception of the State as an Ethical Community', paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, St John's, Canada, 8–10 June 1997.

nationalism as madness, or anger as volatile irrationality; or to characterise emotion, as Morgenthau does, as one of the 'weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to'.[53] For, as Robert H. Frank reminds us,[54] the economistic fascination with rationality and material interest tends to obscure the important role played by powerful human emotions like anger and love, even if they do not always have fully rational elements (in the sense that they may not always be grounded in concrete materialist or income-maximising interests). Frank argues that just because emotions like love of self and anger at others are not grounded in concrete interests, that does not make them *irrational.* On the contrary, he argues that both love and anger can be understood as quite rational. While Frank's focus was not on international politics, it can be argued that the concerns he raises about the need to understand the place of emotions in human behaviour could be applied to the foreign policy realm.

That is why it makes little sense to analyse the deep anger of the hundreds of thousands of Australians and Hong Kong people who demonstrated against France and Japan in 1995 and 1996 as irrational. It is true that the anger cannot be readily explained by reference to interests that had a clear concrete or materialist base. In the nuclear testing case, it has been argued that there were concerns that Australians would suffer concrete environmental damage as a consequence of relatively low-yield underground explosions conducted on atolls that were thousands of kilometres from Australian shores; but it is difficult to sustain that argument in the face of a lack of vociferous protests by Australians against the Chinese nuclear tests being conducted at exactly the same time, tests of a higher yield and much closer to Australian territory. Likewise, in the Diaoyutai case, it is hard to make the argument that the concrete interests of Hong Kong people were going to be affected by which flag flew over some uninhabited rocks hundreds of kilometres from the territory. And even if they were, we must still explain why Hong Kong people expressed their anger in the Diaoyutai case, but not in the case of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. I argue that we can understand the anger only by reference to a set of interests that are more symbolic—the interests of nationalism, and the emotions engendered by nationalist beliefs.

For the arguments of the post-nationalists notwithstanding, there can be little doubt that nationalism remains an important political force in contemporary world politics which has an intensely *emotional* element. It involves emotional attachments to territory and conceptions of neighbourhood. It is also marked by emotional feelings about others, who are sometimes constructed by nationalists as opponents or enemies of the nation and its legitimate interests. More importantly, nationalism as an ideology legitimises mocking, sneering at, despising or even hating those who would harm one's nation or seize bits of the national homeland.[55] In both the cases explored here, it can be argued that the rage we saw was generated not so much by *what* was being done, as *who* was doing it. Thus how the French were seen in Australia and how the Japanese were seen in Hong Kong were more important to an understanding of anger in Australia and Hong Kong than what impact the actions of the French or Japanese governments had on Australians or Hong Kong people, as an examination of the context of each dispute reveals.

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53 Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 7.

54 Robert H. Frank, *Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions*, (New York, W. W. Norton, 1988). For comparable critiques, see Amartya K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6 (1977), pp. 326–336; Marsha Pripstein Posusney, 'Irrational Workers: the Moral Economy of Labor Protest in Egypt', *World Politics*, 46 (October 1993), pp. 83–120.

55 I do not use the language of identity construction, but the classic statement remains Carlton J.H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, (New York, Russell & Russell, 1931).

*Australia*

As noted above, some have argued that it was fear of environmental damage that prompted so many Australian to engage in protest during 1995. It is true that the Australian media portrayed the underground tests as liable to 'spray radiation all over Australia', but the distance from the sites, the prevailing winds, and the underground location made such a possibility highly unlikely—something that most protestors themselves were more than willing to acknowledge. And while newspapers did publish horrific accounts of what damage would be done if a bomb of comparable power was detonated over Australian cities, there is no evidence that any Australian protestor actually believed that there was a relationship between the tests and a possible nuclear attack, or even the kind of generalised fear of nuclear war which drew so many to the peace marches in Europe and North America in the early 1980s. Nor can one argue that the opposition to French nuclear testing was driven by a concern that testing nuclear weapons in the context of the post-Cold-War era was wrong and should be stopped.

The problem is that if either hypothesis were true—that the anger of Australians stemmed from concrete interests (threats to their safety) or symbolic concerns (all nuclear tests are wrong)—then logically Australians should have been equally angry at China when the government in Beijing conducted tests during this same period. But they were not. When the Chinese underground tests occurred, thousands of people did not turn out to protest, or dump bags of excrement in front of Chinese diplomatic missions; unions did not impose bans on Chinese goods and services; consumers did not boycott Chinese goods; Chinese restaurants suffered no loss of business.

From the muted reaction to Chinese testing, it could be concluded that what was attracting the anger was not so much the testing itself, but rather the nation doing the testing. Australian anger in 1995 must be seen in the context of the previous 30 years, and the degree to which the relationship was periodically soured by the behaviour of the French government in the South Pacific, particularly over nuclear testing and colonial policy. The nuclear testing issue had been a particularly persistent source of Australian anger which had lasted from the beginning of the French atmospheric tests of the 1960s through to the moratorium on testing called by François Mitterrand in 1992.[56] The nadir came in July 1985, when agents of the French foreign intelligence service bombed the *Rainbow Warrior*, a Greenpeace vessel spearheading opposition to the tests, while it was in Auckland harbour, killing a member of the crew. The use of force by the French government against one of its own friends was widely seen as bad enough; but the aftermath was even more galling. When two of the agents were arrested, tried, found guilty of manslaughter, and jailed by New Zealand, the government in Paris threatened to impose economic sanctions against New Zealand produce entering the European Community unless the agents were released to serve their sentences in French custody. Faced with the possibility of crippling sanctions, New Zealand relented.[57] Although this French action was targeted at New Zealand, it also had a sharp effect on Australians.

Franco-Australian relations were also soured by French colonial policy in the South Pacific. In particular, the ALP government of Bob Hawke became more and more uncomfortable with French treatment of independence movements in the region, especially in New Caledonia. Over the course of the 1980s, the conflict between Canberra and Paris intensified, culminating in the expulsion of the Australian consulate-general from Noumea in January 1987.[58]

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56 Stewart Firth, *Nuclear Playground*, (Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1987).

57 Ramesh Thakur, 'A Dispute of Many Colours: France, New Zealand and the "Rainbow Warrior" Affair', *The World Today*, 42 (1986), pp. 209–214.

58 Carolyn O'Brien, 'Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January–June 1987', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 33 (1987), pp. 186–188.

It is not incidental to an understanding of the Australian anger in 1995 that Chirac himself had been associated with different disputes with Australia for over 20 years. As minister of agriculture in the early 1970s, he had a testy exchange with Canberra over agricultural protection; as mayor of Paris in 1985, he was in a dispute over honouring Australians who had died in the First World War; and as prime minister in 1986, he had gone so far as to publicly describe Hawke as 'very stupid' for his comments about New Caledonia, and then to release an off-the-record comment expressing his hope that Hawke would be defeated in the next election. As an official in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade put it, 'Chirac just doesn't like Australia or Australians.'[59] The feeling was, it would appear, mutual, and thus it is perhaps not surprising that Chirac's decision to resume nuclear testing should have sparked widespread condemnation and anger in Australia.

But anger at Chirac and the French government easily became anger at France, a transference easy to achieve using the standard nationalist *modus operandi* of embracing national stereotypes and national antipathies. It should be remembered that there is a deep historical context here: as Trevor Findlay reminds us, one could argue that the roots of anti-French sentiment in Australia go all the way back to the First Fleet, 'standard British prejudices', and the historical enmity between English and French.[60] Certainly the national stereotypes evident in the protests, even in the various efforts at humour, were in the best traditions of the nationalist construction of others as enemies or opponents of the nation.

## *Hong Kong*

Explanations for anger in Hong Kong over the Diaoyutai cannot be found in materialist conceptions of interest either. Unlike the Taiwanese, who could be interpreted as wishing to protect fishing interests, or the government in Beijing, which could be interpreted as being concerned about oil and gas, for Hong Kong people there was no comparable material interest. Rather, it is likelier that protestors were driven by entirely symbolic concerns. In this view, these islands were part of a Chinese motherland; Hong Kong people were *huaren* (literally, 'splendid people', i.e. Chinese), and indeed soon to be reunited with the motherland on 1 July 1997, and thus would want to struggle to ensure that all the territory of motherland China which had been so egregiously seized by imperialists was returned to the rightful sovereignty of China. In other words, it can be argued that what we saw in Hong Kong in 1996 was a manifestation of one of the foremost concerns of nationalists everywhere: that the *patria*, or native land, not be alienated from the nation.[61]

There is little doubt that nationalist sentiment stoked the fires of the Hong Kong protests; but this line of argument is incomplete. Just as we asked why Australians were angered at France but not China, so too we have to ask in this context: why were Hong Kong people not comparably angered at the behaviour of other countries in South East Asia who also denied Chinese claims to sovereignty over uninhabited islands, reefs and islets in the South China Sea? When the Vietnamese engaged China over the Spratly Islands in 1994, or the Philippines engaged China over Mischief Reef in early 1995,[62] Hong Kong

59 O'Brien, 'Problems in Australian Foreign Policy', pp. 187–188. On Chirac generally, see Shaun Gregory, *Les Essais Nucléaires: France and the Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumption Decision*, Occasional Paper 44, (Nedlands, Australia, Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, University of Western Australia, 1995).

60 Findlay, 'Explaining Australasian Angst', pp. 374–375.

61 Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism and Internationalism: Belonging in the Human Experience*, (Malabar, FL, Krieger Publishing, 1982), pp. 29–36.

62 See Craig Snyder, 'The Implications of Hydrocarbon Development in the South China Sea', *International Journal*, 52 (Winter 1996–1997), pp. 142–158.

people did not turn out in large numbers to sing protest songs, to march to local diplomatic missions, to organise boycotts of Philippine or Vietnamese products, or organise flotillas to the South China Sea in support of the Chinese claim.

In this case, we are left to wonder whether, as in the nuclear testing case, it was the country that was doing the occupying that drew the anger of Hong Kong people. And the answer must be the same: the fact that it was the Japanese who occupied Chinese territory appears to have been the galvanising factor in the Hong Kong protests. While we can understand the Diaoyutai protests as a manifestation of love of motherland, we also need to look at that other part of the nationalist credo mentioned above: the construction of others as antithetical to the interests of the nation. In other words, we should see the Diaoyutai/Senkaku-shotō case in the context of the broader perception of Japan, and particularly historical memories held by Chinese people about Japanese behaviour in the Asia–Pacific. The memories of the long war between 1931 and 1945, which left millions of Chinese dead and millions more displaced, continue to frame the way in which Japan is seen by Chinese people, wherever they might be located in 'Greater China'. For example, such events as the 'rape of Nanjing'—the seven weeks of brutality visited on the inhabitants of that city after its seizure by Japanese troops on 13 December 1937—still linger in many contemporary memories. There is a continuing impetus to continue to protest those wrongs—particularly in the persistent absence of Japanese official or unofficial willingness to apologise or to cease engaging in behaviour that looks as though they are honouring those who engaged in the invasion of China. There is a connection of past and present in the Diaoyutai—nicely demonstrated by the hot-links to the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall and the Alliance for Preserving the Truth of the Sino–Japanese War that one Bao Diao group has programmed into its website (http://www.yitch.com/Baodiao). In this way, the islands became symptomatic of a still-unrighted wrong from the past.[63]

## Conclusions

In the grand scheme of things, these are but little cases. The anger of Australians and Hong Kong people proved to be short-lived, and the longer-run effects of the public protests were limited. In the Diaoyutai case, the main consequence was that the dispute scratched once again at the historical scab of Japanese imperialism in China from the 1890s to the 1940s. In the nuclear testing case, one consequence was that the French government backed down in the face of protests, reducing the number of tests, and closing its testing sites; another was that the Chirac government contributed to the efforts to defeat Australia's bid in 1996 for a seat on the United Nations Security Council failed.

But however small, these cases are nonetheless instructive, because they illustrate the importance of emotion in shaping foreign policy and the limits of assumptions of materialist rationality which pervade the analysis of international relations. The highly emotional reaction of ordinary Australians to a series of nuclear tests that had no possibility of doing them actual harm, and the equally emotional reaction of Hong Kong people to the issue of ownership of rocky outcroppings hundreds of kilometres from Hong Kong suggest that the proponents of post-nationalism and the enthusiasts of the democratic peace proposition may be running somewhat ahead of themselves. Rather, these cases remind us that in some situations, the emotionalism so deeply intertwined with the ideology of nationalism continues to play a crucial part in determining how publics approach international issues. For people really do love their nation; they do get angry at the behaviour of others; they

63 This is also why in Hong Kong there was none of the good-natured humour evident in the Australian 'rage' against France: the Japanese invasion and occupation of China does not exactly lend itself to a humorous touch.

do hold others in contempt. And often such emotions will override more materialistic conceptions of interest. Moreover, these cases suggest that the democratic nature of Australia, France, Hong Kong and Japan did little to dampen the nationalist emotionalism that was aroused.