Kim Richard Nossal and Stéphane Roussel, "Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower," in Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley, eds., *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies,* (New York: Palgrave, 2000): 181–99. (Page turns indicated thus: **[182]**)

Twice in the 1990s the government of Canada went to war as part of a United States-led coalition. In January 1991, Washington and its coalition partners used force against Iraq after that country had invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and incorporated it into Iraqi territory. In March 1999, the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization went to war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after the government of Slobodan Milosevic refused to sign an international agreement intended to eliminate human rights abuses in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. In both conflicts, Canada contributed minimally to the use of force. In the war phase of the conflict against Iraq, the main Canadian contribution was in the air: operating an air base in Qatar and committing CF-18s to escort missions (at least until the final hours of fighting when these aircraft were authorized to use their munitions against Iraqi positions). On the ground, the Canadians contributed a field hospital based in Saudi Arabia.[1] In the war over Kosovo, Canada's contribution to the fighting was limited to air attacks against Yugoslav targets using 18 CF-18 fighter-bombers.[2]

Was Canadian participation in these wars *determined* by the coalition leader? Was it in any sense *forced* or *coerced* by the United States? The answers to such questions must, in both cases, be carefully qualified. For, on the one hand, it is true that in both cases, the smaller allies and coalition partners of the United States found themselves dragged into war by the coercive diplomacy of Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton. In the case of the Gulf conflict, all of the 36 members of the international coalition **[182]** were affected by the Bush administration's quite unilateral decision in November 1990 to change the purpose of the 36-member anti-Iraq coalition. No longer was the purpose of the coalition to defend Saudi Arabia and impose sanctions on Iraq; from November onwards, the purpose was expel Iraq from Kuwait, by using force if necessary. Likewise, in the Kosovo conflict, all the NATO allies of the United States could not help but be affected by the American decision to press at Rambouillet for an international force to occupy the province widely seen by Serbs as the cradle of the Serb nation, and then to make rejection of what any rational Serb leader would have to regard as an outrageous demand a cause of war.

In short, for all smaller coalition partners of the United States, both these conflicts had all the attributes of a hegemonic operation, albeit cloaked in the garb of multilateralism.[3] In each case, the preferences of the Bush and Clinton administrations became, perforce, the preferences of the entire coalition. All important decisions were made in Washington, from the broadest policy directions of the coalition (for example, the decision to transform the Gulf coalition from a defensive to an offensive posture, the decision to threaten the Milosevic government with the use of force if it did not sign the

Rambouillet accords) to the smallest operational details (for example, the decision as to when to begin the bombing campaign in the Gulf War, or the decision to keep Apache attack helicopters out of the fighting in Kosovo).

Moreover, in each case, the smaller coalition partners found themselves tied tightly to the preferences of the coalition leader, but without any serious capacity to influence those preferences. The preferences of the smaller partners for alternative courses of action were routinely given short shrift by decision makers in Washington. Thus, all members of the coalitions were stuck with the preferences of the leader, whether they agreed with them or not. For while leaving the coalition always remained a theoretical possibility, in fact defection was never seriously considered, given the huge costs involved. Like neophyte roller coaster riders who discover on the very first descent that they have made a dreadful mistake, the small coalition partners had little choice but to go along with the coalition leadership and grimly hang on until the end.

On the other hand, we have to acknowledge that just because the coalition leader set the pace, determined policy, ruled options in and out, and made the crucial decisions—all often unilaterally—it does not necessarily mean that the smaller coalition partner was *forced* into war. For it is possible that a smaller partner of a coalition leader might be enthusiastic about the leader's preferences, and a willing participant in the military option embraced by the leader. It depends entirely on what the motivation of the coalition partner itself was. Thus, in the case of the Gulf war, it was clear that **[183]** the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney might have been caught off guard by the unilateral decision of the Bush administration to change the purpose of the coalition, but it nonetheless turned into an enthusiastic supporter of the coalition's new goals.[4]

Our purpose in this chapter is to inquire into the motivations of the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien for Canada's participation in the Kosovo conflict. Seeking to reveal motivations through public statements and government policy, we will show that far from being forced into this war, the Canadian government was enthusiastic about NATO's use of air strikes to force the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to relinquish de facto control of Kosovo. Thus the government was equally enthusiastic about Operation Allied Force. Indeed, it could be argued that the Canadian government would not have been unhappy had NATO embraced a more robust ground troops option earlier in the conflict, even though Ottawa did not follow the path of the British prime minister, Tony Blair, who openly campaigned for the use of ground troops. However, the impact of the Chrétien government on allied policy direction was as minimal as that of other small states, and largely for the same reason. Canada, like all other small coalition partners, was unwilling to contribute more than a token to the actual fighting: 18 fighter-bombers and some 800 ground troops (a contingent so small that, in an eerie replay of another conflict 100 years earlier, they had to be attached to British forces deployed to the theater). In other words, even though the Canadian government's participation in the Kosovo conflict was in all important ways determined by policy decisions taken by the United States government, that participation nonetheless accorded with Canadian preferences. In the Kosovo conflict, Canada was indeed the happy follower: it was happy to be involved in a campaign that was being portrayed as a humanitarian mission; it was (in general) happy with the policy preferences of the United States as coalition leader; and it was particularly happy that it did not have to contribute anything more than token forces.

Possible Canadian Motivations: Overview

In the course of a debate in the House of Commons on 12 April 1999, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien outlined the basis of Canadian participation in these words: "It is these three elements—our values as Canadians, our national interest in a stable and secure Europe and our obligations as a founding member of NATO—that led Canada to take [up] arms with its NATO partners. It is because of our values, our national interest, and our obligations that we must see the job concluded."[5] In so doing, the Prime minister based his justification for Canadian participation on three arguments that, while not necessarily incompatible, were nonetheless of very **[184]** different orders. To establish the relevance and logic of these arguments, and at the same time to measure the government's rationale against the arguments being advanced by others, it is useful to resituate the various points of view expressed over the course of the

conflict—not only the arguments in favor of Canadian participation, but also the criticisms—in the context of several key hypotheses formulated to explain coalition behavior.

We hypothesize that Canadian participation in the war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could have been a function of one or more of the following factors: a concern to advance or maintain Canada's national security; alliance entrapment, in which the Canadian government was dragged into the war reluctantly as nothing more than a function of its membership in the Atlantic alliance; the lessons of history; domestic politics; or humanitarian motivations. These factors are most often mentioned in the theoretical literature on foreign policy and the causes of war.[6] They reflect very different approaches to international relations, in particular the traditional distinction between defensive realism (considerations of national security, alliance entrapment and lessons of history) and liberalism (domestic politics and humanitarian concerns). But variables such as the lessons of history or humanitarian concerns put more emphasis on ideas, values, and standards than on material or institutional factors, and inspire approaches such as neo-classical realism[7] or even constructivism.[8] To an assessment of each of these factors we now turn.

National Security
One of the most common hypotheses advanced by theories of alliances and coalitions is that states seek to join alliances in order to counter other states that might constitute a threat to their security.[9] To what extent were the policies of the government in Belgrade a threat, real or perceived, to Canadian security?

Every Canadian government since the Second World War has defined Canadian security interests in terms of European security; every European conflict was seen in Ottawa as imperiling Canada's military, diplomatic, political, and economic interests. It was this logic that led a succession of Canadian governments to embrace Atlanticism as a long-term cornerstone of foreign policy: in the late 1940s by attaching itself to the idea of an Atlantic Alliance, and then by stationing Canadian forces in Europe between 1950 and 1991.[10] In the post-Cold War period, the collapse of the former Yugoslavia was seen in Ottawa as a threat to the stability of Europe as a whole. It was for this reason that both the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney and the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien **[185]** involved Canada in multilateral attempts to secure the peace in Croatia and Bosnia.[11]

A posteriori, it is possible to explain Canada's participation in NATO's operations against Yugoslavia by using the concept of "national interest." On the one hand, the Canadian government, like the majority of its allies, had every interest in ensuring the survival of the Atlantic Alliance. The operations against the Serbs would certainly show the need for maintaining an American military presence in Europe—and thus for preserving the NATO alliance. Thus, Canada's participation would have made it possible to reinforce the transatlantic link and to show the importance that Ottawa attached to this institution. Moreover, the embrace of crisis management in Europe as a central mission of the alliance was in line with the ideal of NATO as a "cooperative security alliance" being articulated by Canadian leaders.[12] This evolution could only make NATO more valuable for Ottawa.

On the other hand, the involvement of Canadian forces would have served to shore up Canada's credibility as an alliance partner, and reverse the long-standing view among the allies that Canada was an "odd man out" in NATO.[13] Given this, it is not at all surprising that right from the outset of hostilities, the Department of National Defence was keen to stress the qualitative importance of Canada's contribution: although the 18 Canadian CF-18s constituted only 2 per cent of the 912 NATO aircraft involved, the Canadian planes flew fully 10 per cent of the missions and recorded a relatively high rate of "successful hits" compared with the European allies. Likewise, the performances of the Coyote reconnaissance vehicles attached to KFOR also produced a favorable impression among the other allies.[14]

The idea that Canada's security interests demanded Canadian involvement in the multinational use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for its policies in Kosovo was expressed on occasion. We have noted the Prime minister's comments above; reference to strategic calculations was also made by some commentators outside the government. For example, writing in *Le Devoir*, Marcel Belleau noted that intervention would guarantee "regional stability, by preventing an extension of the conflict to neighboring countries, notably Macedonia."[15] Likewise, some commentators noted that

NATO's use of force in Kosovo was designed to preempt possible comparable ethnic cleansing in the one other Yugoslav republic, Montenegro, or, more ominously, in the Vojvodina region in Serbia, where there was a significant Hungarian ethnic minority.[16]

On the whole, however, the strategic argument was not prominently heard in the justifications of government officials, parliamentarians, or media commentators. No Canadian politician tried to replicate for Canadians the brief lesson in geopolitics given by President Bill Clinton to the American people on the night of 24 March, when he tried to lay out in **[186]** clear terms why American security interests were threatened by the possibility of spillover from Kosovo. Rather, in Canada the strategic argument was sometimes even explicitly denied: for example, Frederic Wagnière, writing in *La Presse*, welcomed Canadian participation, but rejected the idea that this represented an appropriate Canadian investment in European security[17]; for his part, Marcus Gee opposed Canadian participation on any grounds, including the strategic rationale.[18]

Sometimes the strategic rationale was presented half-heartedly, or even added as an afterthought. For example, speaking before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade at the end of March, the minister of national defence, Art Eggleton, expressed it this way: "The objective of NATO's air campaign is to diminish the capacity of the Yugoslav forces to attack and inflict atrocities against the people of Kosovo, and to bring that government back to the negotiating table. Our military operations are intended to avert an even greater humanitarian catastrophe and prevent the prospect of wider regional insecurity and instability."[19]

For his part, Lloyd Axworthy, the foreign minister, tended not to focus on the strategic considerations alone, but to put them in the wider context of other motivations. To the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, he claimed that "I think most Canadians are aware that Kosovo is important to them… The events there have been happening in the heart of Europe, a continent where most Canadians find roots and where we have *vital interests in terms of our security and in the economic, cultural, and human fields*."[20] A week later, he again mentioned the strategic rationale, but again in passing:

> It was and is the humanitarian imperative that has galvanized the alliance to act. To be sure, strategic considerations played a role. The risk of the conflict's spilling over into the Balkans, in particular into Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, was and is a concern. However, NATO's actions are guided primarily by concern for the human rights and welfare of Kosovo's people.[21]

In short, the connection between Canada's "national interests" in Europe and the intervention against Yugoslavia seemed more virtual than real.

Alliance "Entrapment"
Derived from the theory of alliances, alliance entrapment seeks to explain how a state which, after having joined an alliance or a coalition, can be dragged by its allies into conflicts which it might not necessarily consider important to its interests but which it agrees to fight because of its fears of being abandoned or marginalized by its allies.[22] Junior partners in an alliance or an international **[187]** coalition can also become "trapped" by coalition leaders when the nature of the coalition changes from the time that the small state joins, as occurred in the Gulf conflict in 1990-91, when the coalition leader unilaterally changed the purpose of the multinational coalition ranged against Iraq.

At first blush, it might appear that this dynamic applied to the case of the Canadian participation in the Kosovo conflict in at least two ways. First, it can be argued that simply by being a member of NATO, the Canadian government had no other choice but to participate in the military operations against Yugoslavia, whether it wanted to or not. To paraphrase the formulation employed by Sir Wilfrid Laurier to describe an earlier period in Canadian history, when the Atlantic alliance is at war, Canada is also at war.[23] Moreover, this participation was seen as necessary if the Canadian government wanted to preserve a degree of credibility with its European partners, which too often tend to see Canada as little more than

part of the "American pillar" of the Atlantic alliance. In the second place, the Canadian government had already tied itself to alliance policy. By sending six CF-18 fighter-bombers to Italy in October 1998, the Canadian government placed itself in a situation where it would be virtually impossible to disengage if the Alliance eventually decided to resort to force.

This situation was clearly recognized, and admitted, by policy makers. When John McKay (Liberal: Scarborough East) asked whether it was possible, at least in theory, for a NATO member to have refused to participate in the conflict, Paul Meyer, director of international security affairs in the Department of Foreign Affairs, responded:

> It's my understanding, from a political perspective [...] Of course, it's always a choice of national governments as to whether to participate or not; no one is forced to participate in a NATO operation if they've taken a sovereign decision not to. You know that even among the NATO member states there is a variety of different types of participation or non-participation in the allied military efforts that are going on. *But I think there is a premise of overall political solidarity, which has continued to characterize the attitudes of member states. You're also right that at any time [...] when there are leaders gathering, there could be changes in the nature of participation by states.*[24]

Certainly the prime minister stressed Canada's "obligations" as a founding member of NATO. And in a similar fashion, commentators and editorialists alike were agreed that maintaining solidarity with the alliance was a given in the Canadian government's decision to participate in the air war against Yugoslavia.

A good illustration of Canada's commitment to alliance solidarity was the issue of ground troops. The Chrétien government consciously agreed to give up part of its capacity to make decisions to the alliance as a whole. It consistently refused to hold a debate on the possibility of using ground **[188]** forces—on the grounds that it would not be appropriate to anticipate the decision of the alliance as a whole. Thus, when the defense minister, Art Eggleton, let slip that Canada was looking at the possibility of using ground troops, he was quickly contradicted by a Pentagon spokesman,[25] and after this episode Chrétien made a point of stressing that the Canadian approach to the use of ground troops would be determined by NATO decisions. On the eve of the Washington 50th anniversary summit, he said "If everyone agrees, I will not be the only one not to agree."[26]

This drew considerable criticism from opposition spokesmen. One Reform MP complained that "It should be a Canadian decision. Why is [Chrétien] letting NATO tell us what to do?" The New Democratic Party accused the government of being a "lap dog of the United States."[27] Moreover, several editorials and commentators expressed a similar point of view.[28]

This line of criticism represented a less sophisticated version of the "alliance entrapment" thesis, one that stressed the degree to which the Canadian government was being dragged into war not by NATO, but by the United States. It also represented a faint echo of the vitriolic anti-American discourse that marked the Canadian debate during the Gulf war, when one of the principal criticisms of the Mulroney government was that it was in Washington's pocket.[29]

Interestingly, the same accusation could have been levied against the Chrétien government in 1999, given that it was engaged in an operation directed more by Washington than by Brussels (to say nothing of New York). However, this opinion was not widely expressed, either by the opposition in Parliament, or by public opinion. None of the opposition parties in the House of Commons used this argument to oppose government's Kosovo policy. Indeed, a number of newspapers explicitly rejected it: *La Presse* argued that "the decision to bomb Yugoslavia was not made to support the United States, but it was made because Canada could not remain indifferent to what was happening in Kosovo."[30]

One of the reasons that could explain the fact that the Chrétien government did not suffer the same epithets that had been leveled at the Mulroney government during the Gulf war is probably because since coming to power in 1993, the Liberals had been very careful not to get too close to Washington. There had been no "Shamrock Summit" between Chrétien and Clinton, nor any ostentatious

manifestations of friendship or complicity.[31] Thus, people tended to believe the prime minister when he declared on 20 April: "We are taking collective decisions. These are not the Americans' decisions. Of course, the United States has a weight that is proportional to its importance in the attacks, but all decisions are made in the form of a consensus."[32]

Indeed, the record supports the prime minister's view: there is no evidence that the Canadian government was pressured either by the Americans **[189]** or the Europeans. In fact, one of the main worries of the government was how to dampen the ardor of the opposition parties, which wanted to move further and more quickly than the NATO allies. In short, there is a difference between being "entrapped" by alliance commitments and willingly agreeing to forego unilateral decision making in favor of a more collective approach. There is little evidence that the Chrétien government was in any sense trapped in a commitment that Ottawa did not want.

The Lessons of History
The lessons that policy makers and analysts draw from past experiences can also constitute an important element in decision making. When confronting a new and unclear policy situation, policy makers tend to look at comparable cases in the past, and draw inspiration from these cases to orient their decision. This hypothesis is particularly applicable to grave national decisions, such as entering alliances or going to war.[33] During the Gulf war, the "lessons of history" were used by numerous coalition policy makers to embellish their policy positions. While the comparison between Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler that was popular in the United States was not widely used in the Canadian debate, there were nonetheless constant references to the past as the proper guide for Canadian policy.[34] Can we see a similar pattern in 1999?

Most of the "historical" references used by government ministers and other members of Parliament focused on the behavior of the Yugoslav government in the recent past. Mention was often made of Milosevic's apparent difficulty in keeping his commitments (notably during the war in Bosnia). As Axworthy said to the Standing Committee: "One needs to recognize that with Milosevic, if one does not have the capacity to make him keep his agreements, he will not meet his obligations. It has always been this way for ten years."[35] This argument, it might be noted, also made its appearance in newspaper editorials.[36]

The Canadian government also justified NATO's operations against the Serbs by invoking the necessity of not repeating the errors of the past. As Axworthy told members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs: "Given our horrible experience in Bosnia and Rwanda, we decided that it was incumbent on the international community, using NATO as the intermediary, to have an effective response [to attacks on civilians].[37]

Finally, history was a source of inspiration to commentators who doubted the efficacy of NATO's strategy of limiting its military operations to air strikes. Using examples drawn from the Second World War, the **[190]** Vietnam War, and the Gulf War, some parliamentarians, together with a goodly number of analysts, raised questions about the approach adopted by the Atlantic alliance.[38]

In effect, these critiques could serve either as justification for a ground operation or (more rarely) as a condemnation of using force. Curiously, however, virtually all commentators forgot to make reference to the case of Bosnia in 1995, when NATO air strikes contributed to bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, paving the way for the Dayton Accords.[39] On balance, however, the lessons of history did not seem to constitute a clear or visible motivation for the Canadian decision to participate in the attacks on Yugoslavia.

Domestic Politics and Public Opinion
It is also possible that the Canadian government's approach to the conflict in Kosovo was determined by domestic politics. There are several variables associated with the "domestic politics" approach: type of regime, bureaucratic politics, élite bargaining, public opinion, style of decision making, electoral politics, etc. For the purpose of this chapter, we will concentrate primarily on the reactions of members of Parliament, commentators in the press, and public opinion. In our view, this element is particularly

significant given the importance of domestic politics the last time that Canada had gone to war—during the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990-91.

While there was considerable opposition to Canadian participation from Canadians of Serbian origin—manifested most visibly in violent street demonstrations at the outset of the conflict—there was also considerable consensus that this was, in Gwynne Dyer's phrase, a "good war."[40] Certainly the principal daily Canadian newspapers—such as Toronto's *Globe and Mail* and *National Post*, or Montréal's *Le Devoir* and *La Presse*—argued that the "international community" should adopt an increasingly firm attitude towards Belgrade. Indeed, much of the criticism leveled at the Canadian government—and at NATO—in the media tended to focus on the strategies employed. Of the four main dailies, only *Le Devoir* pronounced the air strikes "illegal and illegitimate."[41]

There was also widespread consensus among the various parties in the House of Commons about the appropriateness of the Canadian response to the Kosovo crisis; the principle of Canada's participation in NATO operations inspired next to no opposition in Parliament. On the contrary, there was a quasi-consensus among the main opposition parties—Reform, the Bloc Québécois, and the Progressive Conservatives. The intransigence of the government in Belgrade, and the massive exodus of the Kosovar Albanians **[191]** from Kosovo generated unanimity among Canadian parliamentarians on the issue of air strikes. When the air operations were formally announced on 24 March, all the opposition parties gave their approval for the NATO initiative. It is true that the unanimity was not unqualified. Some MPs, such as David Price of the Progressive Conservatives, and Daniel Turp of the Bloc Québécois, openly deplored the absence of a mandate from the Security Council of the United Nations.[42] And on 31 March 1999, the New Democratic Party changed its mind, calling for a cessation of the bombing and a return to negotiations. But on the general approach, the major parties were in agreement. If anything, the main opposition parties were out in front of the government in their enthusiasm for a forceful response to the Kosovo crisis, inclined to try to prod the Liberals on the issue of a ground operation.

If there was general agreement on Canada's Kosovo decisions, there was little agreement on the way in which those decisions had been made. Much of the parliamentary debate fixed on process, with the government, in effect, continually pestered to recall Parliament, which had recessed on 25 March, the day after the bombing started, and hold a debate on an eventual ground war.[43]

Public opinion tended to mirror the attitudes of the political élite. Canadians appeared unwilling to oppose the decision to participate in NATO operations. One of the first polls, published on 10 April in the *National Post*, indicated that fully 79 percent of respondents approved of the NATO air strikes, and that 57 percent were in favor of launching a ground operation against the Serbs in Kosovo. Two weeks later, a *Globe and* Mail/CTV/Angus-Reid poll showed that 69 percent of Canadians approved of the bombing, and that 59 percent wanted to send ground troops to Kosovo if that were the only way to stop the humanitarian crisis there. In Quebec, where there is generally more reticence than in English Canada when it comes to dispatching troops for service overseas, similar opinions were expressed. A poll published on 26 April in *Le Devoir* revealed that 73 percent of Quebecers approved of the bombing and that a slim majority, 52 percent, would approve of sending ground troops to expel Serb forces from Kosovo, at least "as a last resort."[44]

When one notes the widespread consensus in Canadian society on the appropriateness of the use of force in response to the Kosovo crisis, one might well conclude that the enthusiasm of the Chrétien government for participation in a multilateral use of force was in part determined by the permissive domestic political environment in Canada. And, if there were few overt demonstrations by Canadians in favor of an even more forceful and muscular response, there was open support for the use of force for humanitarian purposes.

[192] Humanitarian Motivations

In the last few years, notions such as values, standards, ideas and culture have made a comeback in the analysis of international relations: constructivists, critical theorists, and, to a lesser extent, neoclassical realists all stress the importance of these notions. One of the hypotheses advanced by constructivists consists of linking definitions of interest and identity and the policies of international actors to the

normative environment in which they operate.[45] Indeed, one of the significant components of the contemporary international environment—at least for Western states—would be all of the norms relating to humanitarian intervention, which were gradually introduced over the last 150 years, and which were appreciably reinforced in the decade after the Gulf War of 1991.[46]

Canada could be one of the countries most sensitive to this normative environment. Canadian foreign policy is still strongly marked by the idealism of Lester B. Pearson.[47] It is deeply based on the respect for the Charter of the United Nations and the search of international stability. The participation in both missions and in an active pursuit of human rights policies constitute elements of foreign and security policy which garner the most support among Canadians. It is thus not surprising that policies based on humanitarian grounds are given considerable support in Canada.

One of the reasons why the Canadian debate did not emphasize either strategic considerations, alliance entrapment, the lessons of history, or domestic politics was that the debate was so dominated by humanitarian concerns, and in particular by the "human security" discourse championed by Lloyd Axworthy, the minister of foreign affairs. Canadian officials and commentators were in broad agreement that the Serb forces in Kosovo were not threatening the "national" security interests of Canada as a state, but rather the "individual" security interests of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians.

The humanitarian plight of the Kosovar Albanians in early 1999 fitted perfectly with the "human security" perspective that Axworthy had been pushing since his appointment to the foreign affairs portfolio in 1996. In this view, the traditional focus of foreign and defense policy on "state security" was no longer appropriate. In the post-Cold War era, when intrastate conflicts killed far more people than interstate war, what was needed was a focus on "human security"— in other words, putting the security needs of the individual ahead of those of the state.[48] Axworthy's highly successful campaign for a global ban on anti-personnel land mines in 1997 reflected that view.[49]

The situation in Kosovo over the winter of 1998-99 proved to be a quintessential example of the need for a "human security" perspective. The persistent refusal of the government in Belgrade to provide security for the **[193]** Albanian majority and the accumulating evidence that the Milosevic government was about to launch a massive ethnic cleansing campaign in the spring combined to convince Axworthy of the need for, and appropriateness of, robust and muscular action by the NATO alliance.

It is true that a number of observers pointed out that Axworthy's "human security" perspective was not fully worked out, particularly in cases like the Kosovo conflict where a recourse to force prevailed over all other measures.[50] Moreover, even if all the logical consequences of the concept of human security are not yet clear, it seems evident that the notion of "human security" belongs in a different intellectual universe: it is a post-Westphalian, essentially non-state, conception of security which sits uneasily with the logic of a realist state-centric perspective.[51]

Regardless of the intellectual complications of the term itself,[52] there can be little doubt that Axworthy's "human security" discourse was widely embraced in the debate about Kosovo in Canada. Much of the official justification embraced by the Canadian government stressed that the primary purpose behind the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was to safeguard the human rights of Kosovar Albanians threatened by Serb security forces, both local militias and army and police units from Serbia proper. In his public statements, for example, the prime minister routinely referred to the importance of the humanitarian element and the deteriorating condition of Kosovar Albanians. Not surprisingly, the humanitarian aspect was also uppermost in Axworthy's own justifications for Canada's participation. As he put it in April 1999:

> NATO's actions are guided primarily by concern for the human rights and welfare of Kosovo's people. NATO's recourse to air strikes was precipitated by evidence that the regime of repression by the Serb government was on the rise and accelerating… NATO did not provoke this tragedy— it responded to it. And the decision to act was not motivated by a military threat to Alliance territory, but by an affront to Alliance values and a belief—perhaps more explicit in some capitals than in others—that human security matters. Alliance members could not turn away from the humanitarian crisis taking place on NATO's European doorstep. That is why Canadian pilots are

part of the effort, why we are providing humanitarian relief and why we are offering sanctuary to 5,000 refugees.[53]

Indeed it can be argued that this humanitarianism was already deeply entrenched in Canadian political discourse by the time the Kosovo conflict broke out. One of the early warning signals that Canadian public opinion had shifted occurred in July 1995, at the time of the massacres which followed the fall of the Bosnian Muslim city of Srebrenica, an enclave long protected **[194]** by Canadian Blue Helmets. A second signal was sent in November 1996, when a humanitarian crisis erupted in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Stung by public opinion still outraged by the Rwandan massacres of 1994, the Chrétien government tried to form an international coalition to bring aid to the Rwandan refugees. While the initiative collapsed when the refugees returned en masse to Rwanda at the end of November,[54] the lesson was clear: Canadians would no longer tolerate their government remaining indifferent in the face of humanitarian calamities. And the Liberal government, which had made "human security" such a cornerstone of its foreign policy, was naturally inclined to respond to such public pressure.

Overall, the arguments justifying Canadian participation on the basis of respect for human rights were the most frequently heard. The prime minister made frequent reference to this aspects. Nearly all of the public pronouncements of Cabinet ministers were embellished with reference to such phrases as "the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo," "ethnic cleansing," "atrocities committed by Serb forces," and, most frequently of all, "protection of human rights."[55] On at least one occasion, Axworthy left in no doubt his view about which factor best explained Canadian participation: "Humanitarian considerations," he said on the day the bombing began, "are the principal motive for our action."[56] Opposition members of Parliament were no different. Daniel Turp of the Bloc Québécois expounded on numerous occasions his belief in the necessity of "preventing a genocide."[57] and used this argument to press for setting in motion a ground operation in Kosovo. And, as noted above, comparable ideas were expressed by all of the parties represented in the House.

The lessons of the events in Bosnia and Rwanda indicate than Canada's participation in the Kosovo operation—and the tendency of the government to justify its participation using the discourse of humanitarianism—was no accident. It reflected the logical continuation of policy evolved in previous engagements. It also demonstrated the degree to which norms relating to humanitarian interventions have become anchored more and more deeply in both civil society and the political élite in Canada.

Conclusions

Our survey of the different possible factors that motivated the Canadian government to participate in the NATO attacks on Yugoslavia reveals little support for what might be thought of as the classical concerns of realism in international politics. The Canadian government did not contribute the few resources it did to this fight for national security reasons. Nor was it a victim of alliance entrapment. While Canadian policy makers were not oblivious to the broader geostrategic implications of allowing Kosovo to be cleansed by **[195]** Serb forces, and while Canadian policy makers were only too aware of the dynamics of alliance politics, they were also seized by what they saw as the essential rightness of the use of force in these circumstances. Moreover, as we have shown, they were operating in a domestic political environment that was not only permissive but also generally supportive (with the notable exception of numerous Canadians of Serb origins, who remained unaffected by the humanitarian crisis caused by the mass expulsion of Kosovar Albanians and persisted in their staunch opposition to the campaign).

While this case might offer little support to realists, it does lend a certain credence to constructivist hypotheses. There was an almost complete absence of any mention of the concept of national interest in the government's justifying rhetoric; rather, Canada's participation was justified using the language of humanitarianism, reinforcing the constructivist hypothesis that the normative environment is an important determinant of foreign policy decisions. This is all the more plausible since the Canadian reaction to the events in Kosovo does not seem to be an isolated or aberrant policy. Rather, it seems to be the latest stage in the process of the integration of norms, a process started after the Second World War and dramatically accelerated by the events in Bosnia and in Rwanda. Thus, our conclusions reinforce—

and indeed go well beyond—the observations of Peter Katzenstein, who noted that "Canadian identity on the question of security is defined in terms of international peacekeeping rather than the defense of national sovereignty." In this sense, "Canada [is] arguably the first postmodern state par excellence."[58]

        We have characterized Canada as the "happy follower" in the Kosovo conflict. The above account suggests that the Canadian government was happy that the international community (or, more properly, NATO) was taking human security seriously. It was enthusiastic about the use of force, for it was widely believed that the use of force in Kosovo would finally bring an end to ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. Ottawa was also happy that the government in Washington was in command, for that ensured that the superordinate power of the United States would be committed to the campaign. But most of all, the Chrétien government was happy because Canada could participate in what was widely perceived to be a just cause without having to devote any serious Canadian blood or treasure to the enterprise. In short, if the Canadian government was a "forced ally," it was forced by the internal logic of its own well-established foreign and security policy, and not by the coalition leader or the hegemonic power.

Endnotes [appear on pp. 195–99]

1.   For an examination of the middle power contributions to the Gulf war, see Andrew F. Cooper and Kim Richard Nossal, "The Middle Powers in the Gulf **[196]** Coalition: Australia, Canada, and the Nordics Compared," in Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, eds., *Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Gulf War* (New York: St Martin's, 1997), pp. 269-95.

2.   David Price, a Progressive Conservative member of Parliament, claimed that members of Canada's anti-terrorist unit, Joint Task Force 2, were operating in Kosovo behind the lines with the Kosovo Liberation Army, along with comparable units from other NATO countries. This was flatly denied by Art Eggleton, the Canadian minister of National Defence. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 20 April 1999, p. A1.

3.   For a discussion of this dynamic, see the contributions in Michel Fortmann, S. Neil Macfarlane, and Stéphane Roussel, eds., *Tous pour un ou chacun pour soi: promesses et limites de la coopération régionale en matière de sécurité* (Sainte-Foy: Institut québécois des hautes Études internationales, 1996).

4.   See, for example, Martin Rudner, "Canada, the Gulf Crisis and Collective Security," in Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, eds., *Canada Among Nations, 1990-91: After the Cold War* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991); Kim Richard Nossal, *Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), chap. 9.

5.   *Le Devoir* (Montréal), 13 April 1999. p. A8 (our translation).

6.   For an overview of the contemporary debate in Foreign Policy, see Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis," in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light, dir., *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory* (London: Pinter, 1994), pp. 93-108.

7.   Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51 (October 1998), pp. 144-72.

8.   Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

9.   The classic formulation is to be found in Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985), 3-43; also Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

10.   Kim Richard Nossal, "Un pays européen? L'histoire de l'atlanticisme au Canada", in *La politique étrangère canadienne dans un ordre international en mutation* (Sainte-Foy, Québec: Centre québécois de relations internationales, 1992), 131-60; Nils Ørvik, "A defense doctrine for Canada," *Orbis* 27 (Spring 1983), 185-206;

Stéphane Roussel, "Amère Amérique… L'OTAN et l'intérêt national du Canada," *Revue canadienne de défense* 22 (février 1993), 35-42.

11. André P. Donneur and Stéphane Roussel, "Le Canada: Quand l'expertise et la crédibilité ne suffisent plus", dans Alex Macleod et Stéphane Roussel, dirs. *Intétêt national et responsabilités internationales: Six États face au conflit en ex-Yougoslavie (1991-1995)* (Montréal: Guérin, 1996), 143-60.

12. David G. Haglund, "The NATO of Its Dreams? Canada and the Cooperative-Security Alliance," *International Journal* 52 (Summer 1997), pp. 464-82.

13. Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, *Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out* (New York: Praeger, 1986).

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14. Interview, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, June 1999.

15. Marcel Belleau, "Le Canada devait-il participer aux bombardements en Yougoslavie?" *Le Devoir*, 7 April 1999, p. A7.

16. See, for example, Kim Richard Nossal, "Another march of folly? Hardly," *Globe and Mail*, 15 April 1999, p, A15.

17. Frederic Wagnière, "Les Canadiens en Europe," *La Presse* (Montréal), 3 June 1999, p. B2.

18. Marcus Gee, "NATO's unjust war," *Globe and Mail*, 21 April 1999, p. A10.

19. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 31 March 1999; emphasis added. For the full text, see: http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/1/FAIT/Meetings/Evidence/faitev111-e.htm.

20. *Ibid*.; emphasis added.

21. Lloyd Axworthy, "Kosovo and the human security agenda," Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* 99/28, 7 April 1999, Woodrow Wilson School of Public And International Affairs, Princeton University. For the full text, see: <http://198.103.104.118/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/100194.htm>.

22. This dynamic is best explicated in Glenn H. Snyder, "The security dilemma in world politics," *World Politics* 36 (July 1984), 471-77.

23. In 1910, Sir Wilfrid had said "If England is at war we are at war and liable to attack." C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, vol. 1: *1867-1921* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), p. 135.

24. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 22 April 1999; also at http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/1/FAIT/Meetings/Evidence/faitev118-e.htm; emphasis added.

25. Jeff Sallot, "The federal government wants NATO to consider sending ground troops into Kosovo to halt ethnic cleansing by Serb forces," *Globe and Mail*, 8 April 1999, p. A1.

26. *Globe and Mail*, 21 April 1999, p. A1.

27. *National Post*, 22 April 1999, p. A1; *Globe and Mail*, 22 April 1999, p. A8.

28. For example, *Le Devoir* editorialized that "le gouvernement Chrétien obéit aux ordres." *Le Devoir*, 14 April 1999, p. A8.

29. See Jocelyn Coulon, *La dernière croisade. La guerre du Golfe et le rôle caché du Canada* (Montréal: Méridien, 1992).

30. *La Presse*, 3 mai 1999, p. B2 (our translation).

31. Roy Norton, "Posture and Policymaking in Canada-US Relations: The First Two Mulroney and Chrétien Years," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 5 (Winter 1998), 15-36.

32. Cited by Manon Cornellier, "Le Canada se ralliera à l'OTAN", *Le Devoir*, 21 avril 1999, pp. A1, A8.

33. Dan Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Reiter, "Learning, realism, and alliances: the weight of the shadow of the past," *World Politics* 46 (July 1994), 490-526.

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34. Kim Richard Nossal, "Quantum leaping: the Gulf debate in Australia and Canada," in Michael McKinley, ed., *The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), pp. 58-63; Cooper and Nossal, "Middle powers in the Gulf coalition."

35. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 31 March 1999, 1200hrs.

36 For example, *La Presse*, 15 October 1998; "A peacekeeper goes to war," *Globe and Mail*, 22 April 1999.

37 Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 31 March 1999, 1145hrs.

38 See the comments of the following MPs on the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade: John O'Reilly (31 March, 1215hrs); Keith Martin (1 June, 1530hrs). Also Robert Pelley, "Participer à la guerre au Kosovo: soyons prudent", *Le Soleil*, 3 May 1999, p. B9.

39 However, according to Adam Roberts, NATO policy makers drew the wrong lessons from Operation Deliberate Force, undertaken in Bosnia in 1995, when they estimated that air strikes alone would be enough to convince the Serbian government to agree to the conditions of the Rambouillet agreement. Adam Robert, "NATO'S Humanitarian War Over Kosovo," *Survival* 41 (Autumn 1999), pp. 102-23.

40 Gwynne Dyer, "At last, a good war," *Globe and Mail*, 17 April 1999, p. D1.

41 *Le Devoir*, 1 April 1999.

42 *Le Devoir*, 25 mars 1999; "La fermeture des frontières du Kosovo fait des Kosovars des prisonniers chez eux", *Communiqué of the Bloc Québécois*, 9 April 1999. Price began by calling the NATO bombing a violation of international law, but was quickly reined in by his leader, Joe Clark, who issued a statement disavowing Price's view and supporting the NATO bombing. *National Post*, 25 March 1999, 26 March 1999.

43. Manon Cornellier, "L'opposition pourrait appuyer l'envoi de troupes au Kosovo", *Le Devoir*, 13 April 1999.

44. *National Post*, 10 April 1999; *Globe and Mail*, 12 April 1999; *Le Devoir*, 26 April 1999.

45. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security,* pp. 33-75.

46. Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" in Peter J. Katzenstein, *Culture of National Security*, 153-185.

47. As Canada's foreign minister from 1948 to 1957, Pearson inspired the UN peacekeeping force deployed in the wake of the Suez crisis of 1956, which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize. He later became Prime minister, from 1963 to 1968.

48. For a formal statement, see Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs, April 1999).

49. For an excellent survey of the "Ottawa Process" and Axworthy's role in it, see the various contributions to *Canadian Foreign Policy* 5 (Spring 1998).

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50. Christian Geiser, "Fin du conflit au Kosovo: Le danger de la "sécurité humaine,"" *Le Devoir*, 14 June 1999, p. A7; for a critique, see Fen Osler Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, "Pulpit diplomacy: a critical assessment of the Axworthy doctrine," *International Journal* 53 (Summer 1998), 379-406.

51. See Stephen M. Walt, "The renaissance of security studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (June 1991), 211-39.

52. For critiques of the concept of human security, see, in particular, Myriam Gervais and Stéphane Roussel, "De la sécurité de l'État à celle de l'individu: l'évolution du concept de sécurité au Canada (1990-1996)", *Études internationales* 29 (March 1998), pp. 25-52; Fen Hampson and Dean Oliver, "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine," *International Journal* 53 (Summer 1998), pp. 379-406.

53. Axworthy, *Statements and Speeches*, 99/28, 7 April 1999.

54. Myriam Gervais, *Le concept de sécurité humaine et ses applications : Afrique des Grands Lacs et Bosnie* (Ottawa, Canadian Center For Foreign Policy Development, June 1998).

55. See, for example, Art Eggleton's interventions to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 31 March 1999.

56. Lloyd Axworthy, *Statements and Speeches* 99/23, 24 March 1999.

57. See, for example, "La fermeture des frontières du Kosovo fait des Kosovars des prisonniers chez eux", *Communiqué du Bloc québécois*, 9 avril 1999; also Turp's interventions before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on 31 March 1999 (1145hrs).

58. Peter J. Katzenstein, "Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World," in Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, p. 535 and p. 518 fn. 48.